Overview
- Argues for a skeptical theory of legal interpretation; for an interpretation-sensitive theory of gaps; for an articulated theory concerning the "relevance" of judicial precedents and for a skeptical approach to the defeasibility issue
- Sets out the fundamentals of a general theory of legal interpretation
- Outlines a philosophy of legal interpretation based on the principles of analytical realism
Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library (LAPS, volume 128)
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Table of contents (11 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
Keywords
- Analytical Scepticism
- Analytical legal theory
- Civil Law, Common Law, and Legal Gaps
- Container-Retrieval View
- Defeasibility in law
- Interpretation without Truth
- Interpretive Games
- Judicial precedent
- Legal Interpretation
- Legal gaps
- Linguistic Contextualism
- Milestones in XIXth Century Continental Methodology
- Philosophy of Precedent
- Roots of Juristic Formalism
- Statutory Interpretation
- Theory of Legal Interpretation
About this book
This book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Interpretation without Truth
Book Subtitle: A Realistic Enquiry
Authors: Pierluigi Chiassoni
Series Title: Law and Philosophy Library
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15590-2
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Law and Criminology, Law and Criminology (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-15588-9Published: 25 June 2019
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-15590-2Published: 12 June 2019
Series ISSN: 1572-4395
Series E-ISSN: 2215-0315
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: VIII, 279
Topics: Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History, Philosophy of Law