Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Some Tips Concerning Application of Game Theory to Real Problems

   • Michael Maschler

   Pages 1-5

3. Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design

   • Alvin E. Roth

   Pages 7-18

4. On the Exploitation of Casino Games: How to Distinguish between Games of Chance and Games of Skill?

   • Peter Borm, Ben Van Der Genugten

   Pages 19-33

5. Agreement through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case

   • Steven J. Brams, Jeffrey M. Togman

   Pages 35-52

6. The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction

   • Eric Van Damme

   Pages 53-73

7. Bird’s Tree Allocations Revisited

   • Vincent Feltkamp, Stef Tijs, Shigeo Muto

   Pages 75-89

8. How to Share Railways Infrastructure Costs?

   • Vito Fragnelli, Ignacio García-Jurado, Henk Norde, Fioravante Patrone, Stef Tijs

   Pages 91-101

9. Why Punish? Norms and Revenge in an Experimental Game

   • Uri Gneezy, Avraham Stoler

   Pages 103-107

10. A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion

    • Michele Grillo

    Pages 109-122

11. Structural Estimation of Auction Models

    • Han Hong, Matthew Shum

    Pages 123-142

12. A Multiplicative Variant of the Shapley Value for Factorizing the Risk of Disease

    • Matthias Land, Olaf Gefeller

    Pages 143-158

13. Experiments on Auctions with Random Prizes and EU/Non-EU Bidders

    • Lucia Parisio

    Pages 159-175

14. Dynamic Games and Oligopoly Models of Technological Innovation

    • Maria Luisa Petit, Boleslaw Tolwinski

    Pages 177-203

15. The Structure of Fair-Division Problems and the Design of Fair-Negotiation Procedures

    • Matthias G. Raith

    Pages 205-223

16. Effectivity Functions and Parliamentary Governance Structures

    • Stefano Vannucci

    Pages 225-239

17. Sequential Production Situations and Potentials

    • Mark Voorneveld, Stef Tijs, Lina Mallozzi

    Pages 241-258

18. Approximate Envy-Free Procedures

    • Dao-Zhi Zeng

    Pages 259-271

19. Back Matter

    Pages 273-274

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This collection of papers is an outgrowth of the "Game Practice I" th th conference held in Genoa from 28 to 30 June 1998. More precisely, it is the result of the call for papers that was issued in association with that conference: actually, nearly half of the contributions to this book are papers that were presented in Genoa. The name chosen for the conference and for this book is in evident and provocative contrast with "Game Theory": this choice needs some explanation, and to that we shall devote a few words of this Preface. Let us say at the outset that "Game Practice" would not exist without Game Theory. As one can see, the overall content of this book is firmly rooted in the existing Game Theory. It could be hardly otherwise, given the success and influence of Game Theory (just think of the basic issues in Economic Theory), and the tremendous development that has taken place within Game Theory. This success, however, makes even more evident the existence of problems with respect to the verification of the theory. This is patent from the point of view of the predictive value of Game Theory (the "positive" side): a lot of experimental and observational evidence demon­ strates that there is a large gap between theory and "practice".

• European Union (EU)
• Oligopol
• decision theory
• game theory
• industrial organization
• production

• University of Genoa, Italy

  Fioravante Patrone

• University Santiago de Compostella, Spain

  Ignacio García-Jurado

• Tilburg University, The Netherlands

  Stef Tijs

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