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The Limits of Logical Empiricism

Selected Papers of Arthur Pap

  • Book
  • © 2006

Overview

  • Demonstrates the importance of Pap's work for the development of analytic philosophy of science
  • Illustrates how Pap's work was the central reference on modality in analytic philosophy before Kripke
  • Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest

Part of the book series: Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 334)

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Table of contents (26 chapters)

  1. THEMES IN PAP’S PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS

  2. ANALYTICITY, A PRIORITY AND NECESSITY

  3. SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: TRUTH, PROPOSITIONS, AND REALISM

  4. PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS

Keywords

About this book

Arthur Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light.

Editors and Affiliations

  • University of Groningen, The Netherlands

    ALFONS KEUPINK

  • Wesleyan University, Middletown, U.S.A.

    SANFORD SHIEH

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