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Self and Substance in Leibniz

  • Book
  • © 2004

Overview

Authors:
  1. Marc Elliott Bobro

    1. University of Southern Maine, USA

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Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-vii
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  2. Introduction

    Pages 1-6

  3. Am I Essentially a Person?

    Pages 7-20

  4. What Makes Me a Person?

    Pages 21-38

  5. What Makes Me The Same Person?

    Pages 39-59

  6. Could Thinking Machines Be Moral Agents?

    Pages 60-79

  7. Why Bodies?

    Pages 80-98

  8. What Makes My Survival Meaningful?

    Pages 99-117

  9. Back Matter

    Pages 118-144
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Keywords

About this book

There is a close connection in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s mind between the notions of self and substance. R. W. Meyer, in his classic 1948 text, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution, writes that “the monad … is nothing but a 1 représentation (in both senses of the French word) of Leibniz’s personality in metaphysical symbols; and there was, under contemporary circumstances, no need 2 to ‘introduce’ this concept apart from ‘propounding’ it. ” It is not clear what Meyer means here except that from the consideration of his own self, in some way Leibniz comes to his concept of simple substance, or monad. Herbert Carr, in an even earlier work, notes that Leibniz held that “the only real unities in nature are formal, not material. … [and] [f]or a long time Leibniz was content to call the formal unities or substantial forms he was speaking about, souls. This had the advantage that it referred at once to the fact of experience which supplies the very 3 type of a substantial form, the self or ego. ” Finally, Nicholas Rescher, in his usual forthright manner, states that “[i]n all of Leibniz’s expositions of his philosophy, 4 the human person is the paradigm of a substance.

Authors and Affiliations

  • University of Southern Maine, USA

    Marc Elliott Bobro

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Self and Substance in Leibniz

  • Authors: Marc Elliott Bobro

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-2582-3

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2004

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-4020-2024-7Published: 29 June 2004

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-6572-8Published: 19 October 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-1-4020-2582-2Published: 16 January 2006

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VIII, 144

  • Topics: Metaphysics, History of Philosophy

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