Fiscal Equalization

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Introduction

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Challenges in the Design of Fiscal Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers

      • Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Bob Searle

      Pages 3-10

3. The Nature of Equalization - Objectives and Consequences

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 11-11

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   2. Fiscal Capacity Equalization and Economic Efficiency: The Case of Australia

      • Jeffrey D. Petchey, Sophia Levtchenkova

      Pages 13-30

   3. Ensuring Inter-Regional Equity and Poverty Reduction

      • Bert Hofman, Susana Cordeiro Guerra

      Pages 31-59

   4. The Impact of Equalization on Service Delivery

      • Catherine Hull, Bob Searle

      Pages 61-93

   5. Harmonizing Objectives and Outcomes at the National and Sub-National Levels Through Citizen Engagement and Capacity Building (With Special References to the Philippines)

      • Alex B. Brillantes Jr., Jose O. Tiu Sonco II

      Pages 95-128

   6. Discussant Comments

      • David Péloquin

      Pages 129-137

4. The Institutional Setting

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 139-139

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   2. A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers

      • Anwar Shah

      Pages 141-162

   3. Intergovernmental Transfers: The Funding Rule and Mechanisms

      • Paul Bernd Spahn

      Pages 163-204

   4. Intergovernmental Transfers: The Vertical Sharing Dimension

      • Roy Bahl, Sally Wallace

      Pages 205-249

   5. Discussant Comments

      • Giorgio Brosio

      Pages 251-256

5. Challenges in Implementing Equalizaton

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 257-257

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   2. Expenditure-Based Equalization Transfers

      • Richard Bird, François Vaillancourt

      Pages 259-289

   3. Designing Intergovernmental Equalization Transfers with Imperfect Data: Concepts, Practices, and Lessons

      • Jameson Boex, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

      Pages 291-343

   4. A Model for Public Infrastructure Equalization in Transitional Economies

      • Sophia Levtchenkova, Jeffrey D. Petchey

      Pages 345-362

   5. Discussant Comments

      • Serdar Yilmaz

      Pages 363-367

6. The Relationship of Equalization to Other Policies

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 369-369

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Each endogenous variable in the model is a function of the exogenous For later discussion, it is useful to explore this in variables and parameters. more detail for one of the endogenous variables, for example the grant to State i. In this regard, one can define from (6) the per capita grant to a State as where F = [s N] is a vector of variables determined by the federal government, P = [p, p,] is a vector of the local public good prices, CGC = [I, pi c] is a vector of variables determined by the CGC and S = lq, q,] is the strategy set of the two States. Within F, the variable s is determined by the federal government. The total federal population N is determined by things such as the birth and death rate, but also by international migration and hence, to some extent, the population policy of the federal government. Within the vector CGC, the variables yi , pi, c are all determined by the CGC, while the public good provision levels within S are determined by the States. As discussed below, we assume that each State perceives s, N, public good prices and the CGC variables (except the adjustment term c) to be exogenously given. This is reasonable since in practice the States have no impact on s and only a marginal impact on the CGC variables.

• Fiscal Equalization
• Grants
• Poverty
• development
• economy
• efficiency
• infrastructure
• migration
• options
• organization
• organizations
• population
• strategy
• transition
• value-at-risk

• Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA

  Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

• Consultant on Fiscal Decentralization, Formerly the Commonwealth Grants Commission, Australian Government, Australia

  Bob Searle

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