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Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

  • Book
  • © 1986

Overview

Editors:
  1. Eugenia Froedge Toma

    1. Department of Economics, Auburn University, USA

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Mark Toma

    1. Department of Economics, Miami University, USA

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies (FMPS, volume 13)

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Table of contents (13 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XIV
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  2. Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy: An Introduction

    1. Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy: an Introduction

      • Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
      Pages 1-7

  3. Structure of Central Bank Financing and Bureaucratic Rents

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 9-9
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    2. Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

      • Milton Friedman
      Pages 11-35

    3. Inflationary Bias of the Federal Reserve System

      • Mark Toma
      Pages 37-66

    4. Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System

      • William F. Shughart II, Robert D. Tollison
      Pages 67-90

    5. The Structure and Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve

      • Wm Stewart Mounts Jr., Clifford Sowell
      Pages 91-104

  4. The Organization of Central Bank Bureaus and the Problems of Control

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 105-105
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    2. The Choice of Monetary Instruments and the Theory of Bureaucracy(1)

      • John F. Chant, Keith Acheson
      Pages 107-128

    3. Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals

      • Keith Acheson, John F. Chant
      Pages 129-150

    4. Research Activities and Budget Allocations Among Federal Reserve Banks

      • Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
      Pages 151-168

    5. Banking Sector Influence on the Relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System

      • Neil T. Skaggs, Cheryl L. Wasserkrug
      Pages 169-182

  5. Political Pressures, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 183-183
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    2. Politics and Fed Policymaking: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same

      • Edward J. Kane
      Pages 185-198

    3. Central Bank Independence: A\n International Comparison

      • King Banaian, Leroy O. Laney, Thomas D. Willett
      Pages 199-217

    4. A Private Central Bank: Some Olde English Lessons

      • G. J. Santoni
      Pages 219-239

  6. Conclusion

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 241-241
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    2. Central Bankers and the Issue of Independence

      • Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
      Pages 243-249

  7. Back Matter

    Pages 251-251
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Keywords

About this book

By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern­ ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it.

Reviews

`The papers are well written and are of high quality: the studies are lucid, the numerical work is well documented, and some of the papers are quite provocative. The book will be of interest to academicians as well as business executives.'
Kashi Nath Tiwari, The Southern Economic Journal, Jan. 1989.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Economics, Auburn University, USA

    Eugenia Froedge Toma

  • Department of Economics, Miami University, USA

    Mark Toma

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

  • Editors: Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma

  • Series Title: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1986

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-90-247-3366-8Published: 30 November 1986

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-94-010-8473-4Published: 22 September 2011

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-009-4432-9Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 0921-8580

  • Series E-ISSN: 2197-1889

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XIV, 253

  • Topics: Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics, Public Economics

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