Verifiable Privacy Protection for Vehicular Communication Systems

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XV

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • David Förster

   Pages 1-9

3. Background

   • David Förster

   Pages 11-25

4. Evaluation of Pseudonym Strategies

   • David Förster

   Pages 27-54

5. A Pseudonym System with Strong Privacy Guarantees

   • David Förster

   Pages 55-91

6. Decentralized Enforcement of k-Anonymity for Location Privacy Using Secret Sharing

   • David Förster

   Pages 93-121

7. Conclusion and Outlook

   • David Förster

   Pages 123-127

8. Back Matter

   Pages 129-150

   PDF

David Förster examines privacy protection for vehicular communication under the assumption of an attacker that is able to compromise back-end systems – motivated by the large number of recent security incidents and revelations about mass surveillance. The author aims for verifiable privacy protection enforced through cryptographic and technical means, which safeguards user data even if back-end systems are not fully trusted. Förster applies advanced cryptographic concepts, such as anonymous credentials, and introduces a novel decentralized secret sharing algorithm to fulfill complex and seemingly contradicting requirements in several vehicle-to-x application scenarios. Many of the concepts and results can also be applied to other flavors of internet of things systems.

 

• V2X
• Car-to-X
• Security
• Cryptography
• Anonymity
• vehicle-to-x communication
• internet of things
• Privacy Protection
• Vehicular Communication Systems
• Communication Systems

• Institute of Distributed Systems, Ulm University , ULM, Germany

  David Förster

David Förster completed his dissertation at Ulm University while working in the Corporate Research department of a leading German automotive supplier. He has worked as a consultant for IT security for several years and holds a degree in Computer Science from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

Policies and ethics