Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XVII

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2. Introduction

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 1-7

3. Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 9-22

4. Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 23-52

5. Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 53-92

6. Interest Alignment Instruments of Shareholders

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 93-106

7. Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 107-146

8. Conclusion

   • Frederik Drescher

   Pages 147-150

9. Back Matter

   Pages 151-191

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​Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. The hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings, which was developed using a decision model, is experimentally confirmed. Moreover, the author analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

• Experiment
• Financial Distress
• Insolvency Proceedings
• Interest Alignment Instruments
• Managerial Decision Making

• TU München, München, Germany

  Frederik Drescher

Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.

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