Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Editors: Bamberg, Günter, Spremann, Klaus (Eds.)

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About this book

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco­ nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap­ plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza­ tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese­ arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa­ tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Table of contents (26 chapters)

  • Prologue

    Bamberg, Günter (et al.)

    Pages 1-2

  • Agent and Principal

    Spremann, Klaus

    Pages 3-37

  • Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information

    Milde, Hellmuth

    Pages 39-59

  • Risk Sharing and Subcontracting

    Bamberg, Günter

    Pages 61-79

  • Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems

    Firchau, Volker

    Pages 81-92

Buy this book

eBook $69.99
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-75060-1
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives
Editors
  • Günter Bamberg
  • Klaus Spremann
Copyright
1987
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-75060-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XVIII, 533
Topics