Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

Editors: Schofield, Norman, Caballero, Gonzalo (Eds.)

  • Presents latest research in the field of Political Economy
  • Focuses on topics such as war and the formation of states, analysis of corruption 
  •  Provides new techniques for analysing elections, including the connection between game-theoretic and empirical methods 
  •  Offers a comparison of developed and new democracies, and of elections under plurality and proportional rule
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eBook $149.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-19519-8
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  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $189.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-19518-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $189.00
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  • ISBN 978-3-642-43513-3
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
About this book

This book presents the latest research  in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory.

The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies.

 

Table of contents (17 chapters)

  • Introduction

    Schofield, Norman (et al.)

    Pages 1-10

  • Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?

    Greif, Avner (et al.)

    Pages 13-43

  • War, Wealth and the Formation of States

    Boix, Carles (et al.)

    Pages 45-74

  • Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation?

    Desierto, Desiree A. (et al.)

    Pages 75-94

  • Self-Enforcing, Public-Order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050–1350

    Lara, Yadira González

    Pages 95-117

Buy this book

eBook $149.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-19519-8
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: EPUB, PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $189.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-19518-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $189.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-43513-3
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting
Editors
  • Norman Schofield
  • Gonzalo Caballero
Copyright
2011
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-19519-8
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-642-19518-1
Softcover ISBN
978-3-642-43513-3
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
IX, 425
Topics