Studies in Choice and Welfare

Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions

Authors: Peleg, Bezalel, Peters, Hans

  • Provides the first monograph on the subject of constitutions modeled by effectivity functions
  • Reviews and extends the literature on this issue from the beginning, around 30 years ago
  • Relevant for researchers, including PhD students, in the area of game theory and social choice theory
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Buy this book

eBook $109.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-13875-1
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $149.00
price for USA
valid through November 5, 2017
  • ISBN 978-3-642-13874-4
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $149.00
price for USA
valid through November 5, 2017
  • ISBN 978-3-642-26505-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
About this book

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

Reviews

From the reviews:

“The book studies stable representations of constitutions. … the book is very well written and perfectly organized … . I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way.” (Agnieszka Rusinowska, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, 2013)

“The book presents in terms of effectivity functions (i.e. coalitional game forms) a very deep, clear and consistent exposition of the most important social choice problem­–coalitional decision making. … Written by two authors who have made outstanding contributions to the developed theory, the book will be very useful for game and social choice experts, lecturers, and master’s and Ph.D. students in these fields.” (Fouad T. Aleskerov, Mathematical Reviews, Issue 2012 b)

Table of contents (11 chapters)

  • Introduction to Part I

    Peleg, Bezalel (et al.)

    Pages 3-6

  • Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms

    Peleg, Bezalel (et al.)

    Pages 7-20

  • Nash consistent representations

    Peleg, Bezalel (et al.)

    Pages 21-43

  • Acceptable representations

    Peleg, Bezalel (et al.)

    Pages 45-57

  • Strongly consistent representations

    Peleg, Bezalel (et al.)

    Pages 59-66

Buy this book

eBook $109.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-13875-1
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $149.00
price for USA
valid through November 5, 2017
  • ISBN 978-3-642-13874-4
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $149.00
price for USA
valid through November 5, 2017
  • ISBN 978-3-642-26505-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Strategic Social Choice
Book Subtitle
Stable Representations of Constitutions
Authors
Series Title
Studies in Choice and Welfare
Copyright
2010
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-13875-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-642-13874-4
Softcover ISBN
978-3-642-26505-1
Series ISSN
1614-0311
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XVIII, 154
Number of Illustrations and Tables
2 b/w illustrations
Topics