Theory and Decision Library C

Collective Decision Making

Views from Social Choice and Game Theory

Editors: Van Deemen, Adrian, Rusinowska, Agnieszka (Eds.)

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  • ISBN 978-3-642-02865-6
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About this book

This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.

Table of contents (16 chapters)

  • From Black’s Advice and Arrow’s Theorem to the Gibbard–Satterthewaite Result

    Saari, Donald G.

    Pages 1-16

  • The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists

    Gehrlein, William V.

    Pages 17-29

  • Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models

    Nurmi, Hannu (et al.)

    Pages 31-56

  • Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules

    Bochet, Olivier (et al.)

    Pages 57-68

  • Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making

    Deemen, Adrian (et al.)

    Pages 69-83

Buy this book

eBook $109.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-3-642-02865-6
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $149.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-02864-9
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $149.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-642-26381-1
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Collective Decision Making
Book Subtitle
Views from Social Choice and Game Theory
Editors
  • Adrian Van Deemen
  • Agnieszka Rusinowska
Series Title
Theory and Decision Library C
Series Volume
43
Copyright
2010
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright Holder
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
eBook ISBN
978-3-642-02865-6
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-642-02864-9
Softcover ISBN
978-3-642-26381-1
Series ISSN
0924-6126
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XIV, 266
Number of Illustrations and Tables
33 b/w illustrations
Topics