Beyond 1995

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvii

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2. Introduction

   • Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley

   Pages 1-5

3. The Nonproliferation Treaty Regime

   • Mohamed I. Shaker

   Pages 7-15

4. Avoiding the Worst of All Possible Worlds

   • Benjamin Sanders

   Pages 17-26

5. The Collapse of the NPT— What if?

   • Lewis A. Dunn

   Pages 27-40

6. What Happens to Safeguards if the NPT Goes?

   • David Fischer

   Pages 41-52

7. Does the NPT Matter?

   • Lawrence Scheinman

   Pages 53-63

8. Beyond the NPT

   • Richard Butler

   Pages 65-71

9. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

   • Antonio Carrea

   Pages 73-82

10. Toward a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint

    • Munir Ahmad Khan

    Pages 83-91

11. European and Global Security in a World without the NPT

    • Harald Müller

    Pages 93-105

12. The NPT and Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia

    • Ryukichi Imai

    Pages 107-116

13. World and Regional Power Relations without the NPT

    • Ashok Kapur

    Pages 117-131

14. Should India Sign the NPT?

    • Raju G. C. Thomas

    Pages 133-150

15. A World without the NPT?

    • Joseph F. Pilat

    Pages 151-163

16. Conclusions

    • Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley

    Pages 165-168

17. Back Matter

    Pages 169-257

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There is almost universal support for the view that the world would be an even more dangerous place if there were to be more nuclear-weapon states. There would be more fingers on more triggers and, probably, a greater risk that a trigger might be pulled with incalculable consequences. It is easy to see, therefore, that there is a collective interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. Nations do not, however, normally undertake or refrain from actions because of such a collective interest; they do so because of their individual interests. This is especially true in the field of national security. A nation perceiving that it has a real interest in developing nuclear weapons is not very likely to refrain from doing so merely because it is told such development would be bad for the world community. If the global interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to more coun­ tries is to succeed, conditions that make it in the interest of each individual nation to renounce nuclear weapons need to be created or maintained. Fortunately, conditions have prevailed in which the vast majority of nations have seen an advantage in making legally binding nonproliferation commitments. An important rationale for many of these countries has been that these commitments would facilitate the transfer of desired civil nuclear technology.

• Disarmament
• General Assembly Resolution 1664
• General Assembly Resolution 2028
• General Assembly Resolution 2346
• General Assembly Resolution 2373
• General Assembly Resolution 3184
• General Assembly Resolution 3261
• General Assembly Resolution 33/57
• NPT
• National Security
• Nonproliferation Treaty
• Nuclear Restraint
• Nuclear weapons
• Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif

• Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, USA

  Joseph F. Pilat, Robert E. Pendley

Policies and ethics