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Thought-Contents

On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution

Authors:

  • Provides a novel formal ontology of thought-contents which integrates the Chisholm-Lewis thesis that belief is a relation to properties with Fodor’s thesis that thinking transpires in a language of thought
  • Constructs a compositional formal semantics that handles reports of arbitrarily complex beliefs
  • Solves standard puzzles about belief attributions in an intuitively satisfying way
  • Avoids the difficulties encountered by most if not all extant accounts that accept opacity as a genuine semantic datum
  • Offers the only account in the literature of how to understand Russell’s account of logical forms in a way that vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series (PSSP, volume 104)

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Table of contents (10 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XVIII
  2. Preliminaries

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-2
    2. Terms of the Art

      Pages 3-38
  3. Semantics

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 203-204
    2. Objections and Replies

      Pages 265-293
  4. Rear-Guard Action

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 295-296
  5. Back Matter

    Pages 357-374

About this book

According to our commonsense view of the matter, beliefs, desires, intentions and the like are special kinds of internal states the possession of which by a given cr- ture potentially explains its behavior and otherwise renders the creature intelligible to us. So-called folk psychology provides us with a rough-and-ready network of counterfactuals delimiting the role supposedly played by these internal states v- à-vis perceptual input, inference, and behavioral output in a normal member of our species. The exact empirical details of this network do not matter here, for we are not undertaking further re nement or systematization of the relevant counterfac- als. Instead, our topic is the ontological analysis of the internal states that occupy the nodes of this complex network and the bearing of that analysis on the truth conditions of the sentences we use to ascribe beliefs and related states. The relevant counterfactuals canonically describe particular belief-, desire-, and intention-states as states of believing, desiring, and intending that such-a- such. The use of in nitival clauses to describe desires and intentions is not really an exception, for desiring or intending to do A (or to be F) is just having a self-regarding desire or intention that oneself does A (or that oneself is F). By the lights of our commonsense psychology, then, to be in a particular belief-, desire-, or intention-state is to bear the corresponding attitudinal relation— believing, desiring, or intending—to a certain content.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA

    Steven E. Boër

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Thought-Contents

  • Book Subtitle: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution

  • Authors: Steven E. Boër

  • Series Title: Philosophical Studies Series

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5085-2

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-4020-5084-8Published: 08 December 2006

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-7280-1Published: 30 November 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-1-4020-5085-5Published: 23 November 2006

  • Series ISSN: 0921-8599

  • Series E-ISSN: 2542-8349

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XVIII, 380

  • Topics: Ontology, Philosophy of Language, Semantics, Philosophy, general

Buy it now

Buying options

eBook USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access