Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Introduction

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Introduction and Overview

      • James W. Friedman

      Pages 3-15

   3. A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games

      • James W. Friedman

      Pages 17-47

   4. Coordination in Games: A Survey

      • Gary Biglaiser

      Pages 49-65

3. General Issues in Coordination

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 67-67

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   2. Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory

      • Matthew Rabin

      Pages 69-87

   3. On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games

      • William Stanford

      Pages 89-101

   4. The “Folk Theorem” for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules

      • James W. Friedman, Larry Samuelson

      Pages 103-127

   5. Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplaycommunication

      • Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Thomas W. Ross

      Pages 129-146

4. Coordination in Specific Economic Contents

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 147-147

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   2. The Dynamics of Bandwagons

      • Joseph Farrell, Carl Shapiro

      Pages 149-184

   3. Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability

      • Andreas Blume, Raymond G. Riezman

      Pages 185-205

   4. Coordination Theory, The Stag Hunt and Macroeconomics

      • John Bryant

      Pages 207-225

5. Back Matter

   Pages 227-230

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Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.

• Industrial Organization
• dynamics
• economics
• equilibrium
• game theory
• international trade
• macroeconomics
• organization
• strategy

• University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

  James W. Friedman

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