Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History

Authors: Heckelman, Jac. C., Moorhouse, John C., Whaples, Robert M.

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About this book

Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse and Robert Whaples The eight chapters of this volume are revised versions of papers originally presented at the "Applications of Public Choice Theory to Economic History" conference held at Wake Forest University, April 9-10, 1999. They all apply the tools of public choice theory to the types of questions which economic historians have traditionally addressed. By adding the insights of public choice economics to the traditional tools used to understand economic actors and institutions, the authors are able to provide fresh insights about many important issues of American history. 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY Economists have historically sought to develop policies to improve social welfare by correcting perceived market failures due to monopoly power, externalities, and other departures from the textbook case of the purely competitive model. An underlying assumption is that the public sector, upon recognizing the market failure, will act to correct it. Applied work often develops the conditions under which these policies will be optimal. The public choice movement has questioned the false dichotomy established by welfare economists. Economists of all persuasions assume traditional private market actors, such as entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers, are self-interested rational maximizers. Why should this not hold for all economic agents? The innovation of public choice analysis is to show what happens when public sector actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, also behave as rational self-interested maximizers.

Table of contents (9 chapters)

  • Introduction

    Heckelman, Jac C. (et al.)

    Pages 1-9

  • Public Goods and Private Interests: An Explanation for State Compliance with Federal Requisitions, 1777–1789

    Dougherty, Keith L.

    Pages 11-31

  • State Constitutional Reform and the Structure of Government Finance in the Nineteenth Century

    Wallis, John Joseph

    Pages 33-52

  • Property Rights in the American West: The Tragedy of the Commons or the Tragedy of Transactions Costs?

    Anderson, Terry L. (et al.)

    Pages 53-75

  • Did the Trusts Want a Federal Antitrust Law? An Event Study of State Antitrust Enforcement and Passage of the Sherman Act

    Troesken, Werner

    Pages 77-104

Buy this book

eBook $139.00
price for USA (gross)
  • ISBN 978-1-4615-4573-6
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $199.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-0-7923-7721-4
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
Softcover $179.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-1-4613-7065-9
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Usually dispatched within 3 to 5 business days.
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Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History
Authors
Copyright
2000
Publisher
Springer US
Copyright Holder
Springer Science+Business Media New York
eBook ISBN
978-1-4615-4573-6
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4615-4573-6
Hardcover ISBN
978-0-7923-7721-4
Softcover ISBN
978-1-4613-7065-9
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XI, 188
Topics