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Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics in honor of John C. Harsanyi

  • Book
  • © 1998

Overview

Editors:
  1. Werner Leinfellner

    1. University of Nebraska and University of Graz, Austria

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Eckehart Köhler

    1. Institute Vienna Circle, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook (VCIY, volume 5)

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Table of contents (46 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-X
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    1. Introduction

      • Werner Leinfellner
      Pages 1-8

  3. Articles

    1. Keynote Lecture

      1. Game Theory, Experience, Rationality
        • Reinhard Selten
        Pages 9-34

    2. Rationality and the Foundations of the Social Sciences

      1. Counterproductive Rationality
        • Anatol Rapoport
        Pages 35-48
      2. Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality
        • Thomas C. Schelling
        Pages 49-53
      3. Do Rational People Make Mistakes
        • John D. Hey
        Pages 55-66
      4. Rationality and Knavery
        • Daniel M. Hausman
        Pages 67-79
      5. Structural Rationality in Game Theory
        • Julian Nida-Rümelin
        Pages 81-93
      6. Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance
        • Robin Pope
        Pages 95-107
      7. Agreeing to Disagree: Harsanyi and Aumann
        • Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey, Mathias Risse
        Pages 109-115

    3. Cooperation and Rationality

      1. Rethinking Rational Cooperation
        • Edward F. McClennen
        Pages 117-129
      2. Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games
        • Karl Sigmund, Maarten Boerlijst, Martin A. Nowak
        Pages 131-139

    6. Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Dynamics

      1. Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution
        • Werner Leinfellner
        Pages 197-210
      2. Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamical Equations
        • Dirk Helbing
        Pages 211-224
      3. Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets
        • Immanuel M. Bomze
        Pages 225-243
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Keywords

About this book

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover­ ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.

Reviews

`... the book is recommended to all who want to get first-hand information on rationality and what game theory can and cannot contribute.'
OR News, 8 (2000)

Editors and Affiliations

  • University of Nebraska and University of Graz, Austria

    Werner Leinfellner

  • Institute Vienna Circle, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Eckehart Köhler

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