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Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

  • Book
  • © 1994

Overview

Editors:
  1. Jean-François Mertens

    1. Center for Operations Research & Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

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  2. Sylvain Sorin

    1. Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
      Université Paris X, Nanterre, France

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: NATO Science Series D: (ASID, volume 77)

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Table of contents (19 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-9
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  2. Introduction

    1. Introduction

      • Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 11-13

  3. The Core and The Bargaining Set

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 15-15
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    2. General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results

      • Beth Allen, Sylvain Sorin
      Pages 17-33

    3. Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies

      • Robert M. Anderson
      Pages 35-45

    4. Economies with Atoms

      • Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 47-50

    5. Bargaining Sets

      • R. Vohra
      Pages 51-58

  4. The Value

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 59-59
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    2. The Shapley Value

      • Robert J. Aumann
      Pages 61-66

    3. Value of Games with a Continuum of Players

      • A. Neyman
      Pages 67-79

    4. The TU Value: The Non-differentiable Case

      • Jean-François Mertens
      Pages 81-94

    5. Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist

      • Françoise Lefèvre
      Pages 95-104

    6. The Harsanyi Value

      • Sergiu Hart
      Pages 105-111

    7. Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases

      • Sergiu Hart
      Pages 113-120

    8. Economic Applications of the Shapley Value

      • Robert J. J. Aumann
      Pages 121-133

  5. The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 135-135
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    2. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon

      • Pradeep Dubey, Abraham Neyman
      Pages 137-144

    3. Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups

      • Myrna H. Wooders
      Pages 145-206

  6. The Non-Cooperative Approach

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 207-207
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    2. Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results

      • Pradeep Dubey
      Pages 209-224
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Keywords

About this book

JEAN-FRANQOIS MERTENS This book presents a systematic exposition of the use of game theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Clearly the first such use was by Arrow and Debreu, with the "birth" of general equi­ librium theory itself, in using Nash's existence theorem (or a generalization) to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But this use appeared possibly to be merely tech­ nical, borrowing some tools for proving a theorem. This book stresses the later contributions, were game theoretic concepts were used as such, to explain various aspects of the general equilibrium model. But clearly, each of those later approaches also provides per sea game theoretic proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium. Part A deals with the first such approach: the equality between the set of competitive equilibria of a perfectly competitive (i.e., every trader has negligible market power) economy and the core of the corresponding cooperative game.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Center for Operations Research & Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Jean-François Mertens

  • Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France

    Sylvain Sorin

  • Université Paris X, Nanterre, France

    Sylvain Sorin

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis

  • Editors: Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin

  • Series Title: NATO Science Series D:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1994

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-7923-3011-0Published: 31 July 1994

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-4442-6Published: 05 December 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-017-1656-7Published: 18 April 2013

  • Series ISSN: 0258-123X

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: IV, 268

  • Topics: Econometrics, Operations Research/Decision Theory, Microeconomics

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