Institutional Competition between Optional Codes in European Contract Law

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XX

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2. Introduction

   • Alexander J. Wulf

   Pages 1-8

3. Theoretical Framework

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 9-9

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   2. The Debate on an Optional European Contract Law

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 11-84

   3. The Theory of Institutional Competition in European Contract Law

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 85-106

   4. An Optional European Contract Code in the Institutional Competition between European Contract Laws

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 107-153

4. Empirical Research

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 155-157

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   2. Methodology

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 159-172

   3. Association Analysis for the Choice of Proper Contract Law and Dispute Resolution Forum in Cross-Border Contracts

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 173-190

   4. Regression Models for Addressing Questions in European Contract Law

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 191-244

   5. The Transaction Costs Latent Variable Model

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 245-260

5. Conclusions

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 261-261

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   2. Assessment of the Desirability of an Optional European Contract Law

      • Alexander J. Wulf

      Pages 263-280

6. Back Matter

   Pages 281-311

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​The Commission of the European Union has identified divergences between the national contract laws of the Member States as an obstacle to the completion of the European Internal Market and put this issue on its highest political agenda. Alexander J. Wulf analyses and predicts the effects. The study is situated in the context of the recent developments in the discussion on European contract law. The book begins with an introduction to the economic and legal theories that serve as the rationale for the development of the line of argument. These theories are then applied to the issues involved in the current controversy on European contract law. The author develops a model that he uses to analyze the institutional processes of European contract law. Empirical data are employed to test this model and discuss the results. From his analysis the author develops criteria that can serve as a starting point for thinking about the economic desirability of an optional European contract law.

• Empirische Rechtsforschung
• Europäisches Vertragsrecht
• Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht
• Rechtsvereinheitlichung
• Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts

• Berlin, Germany

  Alexander J. Wulf

Dr. Alexander Wulf, MLB (WHU), MSc (LSE) received his doctorate from Bucerius Law School, Hamburg.

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