Overview
- Clarifies and explains the Liberal/Communitarian debate
- Explains the connection between early criticism of Rawls's original position and more recent criticisms of liberal notions of political identity
- Explains and clarifies the broader debate regarding the issues discussed in Will Kymlicka's book
- More fully explains the reasons that Sandel and other communitarians have criticized liberal political theorists, Rawls in particular
- Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
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Table of contents (8 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
Keywords
- Charles Taylor
- Identity, Persons and Political Theory
- John Rawls' Political Philosophy
- Liberal Political Theory
- Liberal/Communitarian Debate
- Liberals, Communitarians and Individualism
- Metaphysical Individualism
- Michael Sandel
- Normative Individualism
- Objections to Rawls
- Political Conception of the Person
- Political Philosophy
- Priority of the Right over the Good
- Rawls's Conception of Political Identity
- Taylor’s Conception of Persons
- Will Kymlicka
About this book
This book examines the conception of the person at work in John Rawls’s writings from Theory of Justice to Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The book aims to show that objections to Rawls’s political conception of the person fail and that a Rawlsian conception of political identity is defensible. The book shows that the debate between liberals and communitarians is relevant to the current debate regarding perfectionism and neutrality in politics, and clarifies the debate between Rawls and communitarians in a way that will promote fruitful discussion on the issue of political identity. It does this by providing a clearer account of a conception of personal identity according to which persons are socially constituted, including the intuitions and assumptions underlying the communitarians’ conception of persons as “socially constituted.” It examines the communitarian objections to liberal political theory and to the liberal conception of persons, the “unencumbered self.” The book differentiates between two types of objection to the liberal conception of persons: the metaphysical and normative. It explains Rawls's political conception of persons, and the metaphysical and normative commitments Rawls incurs—and does not incur—in virtue of that conception. It shows that both kind of objection to Rawls's political conception of the person fail. Finally, modifying Rawls’s political conception of the person, a Rawlsian conception of political identity is explained and defended.
Authors and Affiliations
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Persons, Identity, and Political Theory
Book Subtitle: A Defense of Rawlsian Political Identity
Authors: Catherine Galko Campbell
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7917-4
Publisher: Springer Dordrecht
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Hardcover ISBN: 978-94-007-7916-7Published: 04 December 2013
Softcover ISBN: 978-94-017-7876-3Published: 23 August 2016
eBook ISBN: 978-94-007-7917-4Published: 19 November 2013
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XI, 187
Topics: Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History, Ethics