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Collective Decision-Making:

Social Choice and Political Economy

  • Book
  • © 1996

Overview

Editors:
  1. Norman Schofield

    1. Washington University in St. Louis, USA

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Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought (RETH, volume 50)

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Table of contents (19 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xxi
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  2. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation

    1. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation

      • Norman Schofield
      Pages 1-22

  4. Elections and Committees

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 111-111
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    2. Electing Legislatures

      • David Austen-Smith
      Pages 113-148

    3. Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games

      • Cheryl L. Eavey
      Pages 149-181

    4. The Heart of a Polity

      • Norman Schofield
      Pages 183-220

    5. Refinements of the Heart

      • David Austen-Smith
      Pages 221-236

  5. Coalition Governments

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 237-237
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    2. Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan

      • Junichiro Wada, Norman Schofield
      Pages 239-250

    3. An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament

      • Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen
      Pages 251-263

    4. Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation

      • Bernard Grofman
      Pages 265-280

    5. The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models

      • Bernard Grofman, Philip Straffin, Nicholas Noviello
      Pages 281-293

    6. Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation

      • Michael Laver, Kenneth Shepsle
      Pages 295-314

    7. The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly

      • Carol Mershon
      Pages 315-334

  6. Political Economy

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 335-335
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Keywords

About this book

In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro­ vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken­ neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.

Reviews

`The editor has selected carefully an excellent array of articles and organized them most effectively in a logical and coherent presentation of critical issues with social choice and political economy within the context of collective decision making. This is an excellent edited volume for readers familiar with the general theories, theorems, and voting methods presented, and for those interested in updating their understanding of the more recent literature on these topics.' Review of Radical Political Economics, December 1998

Editors and Affiliations

  • Washington University in St. Louis, USA

    Norman Schofield

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Collective Decision-Making:

  • Book Subtitle: Social Choice and Political Economy

  • Editors: Norman Schofield

  • Series Title: Recent Economic Thought

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1996

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-7923-9711-3Published: 30 September 1996

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-5800-3Published: 07 December 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-015-8767-9Published: 09 March 2013

  • Series ISSN: 0924-199X

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XXI, 422

  • Topics: Political Science

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