Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvii

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2. Constructivism, Judgement and Reason

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Verificationism Then and Now

      • Per Martin-Löf

      Pages 3-14

   3. Demonstrations Versus Proofs, Being an Afterword to Constructions, Proofs, and the Meaning of the Logical Constants

      • Göran Sundholm

      Pages 15-22

   4. Containment and Variation; Two Strands in the Development of Analyticity from Aristotle to Martin-Löf

      • Göran Sundholm

      Pages 23-35

3. Judgement and Reason in the Seventeenth Century

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 37-37

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   2. Descartes’ Theory of Judgement: Warranted Assertions, the Key to Science

      • Elodie Cassan

      Pages 39-47

   3. Striving, Oomph, and Intelligibility in Spinoza

      • Della Rocca Michael

      Pages 49-65

4. Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Bolzano

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 67-67

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   2. The Role of Wolff’s Analysis of Judgements in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation

      • Johan Blok

      Pages 69-83

   3. Windelband on Beurteilung

      • Arnaud Dewalque

      Pages 85-99

   4. A Priori Knowledge in Bolzano, Conceptual Truths, and Judgements

      • Stefan Roski

      Pages 101-130

5. Husserl, Frege and Russell

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 131-131

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   2. Immanent and Real States of Affairs in Husserl’s Early Theory of Judgement: Reflections on Manuscripts from 1893/1894 and Their Background in the Logic of Brentano and Stumpf

      • Robin D. Rollinger

      Pages 133-150

   3. Frege and Russell on Assertion

      • Jeremy J. Kelly

      Pages 151-161

This compelling reevaluation of the relationship between logic and knowledge affirms the key role that the notion of judgement must play in such a review. The commentary repatriates the concept of judgement in the discussion, banished in recent times by the logical positivism of Wittgenstein, Hilbert and Schlick, and the Platonism of Bolzano. The volume commences with the insights of Swedish philosopher Per Martin-Löf, the father of constructive type theory, for whom logic is a demonstrative science in which judgement is a settled feature of the landscape. His paper opens the first of four sections that examine, in turn, historical philosophical assessments of judgement and reason; their place in early modern philosophy; the notion of judgement and logical theory in Wolff, Kant and Neo-Kantians like Windelband; their development in the Husserlian phenomenological paradigm; and the work of Bolzano, Russell and Frege. The papers, whose authors include Per Martin-Löf, Göran Sundholm, Michael Della Rocca and Robin Rollinger, represent a finely judged editorial selection highlighting work on philosophers exercised by the question of whether or not an epistemic notion of judgement has a role to play in logic. The volume will be of profound interest to students and academicians for its application of historical developments in philosophy to the solution of vexatious contemporary issues in the foundation of logic. ​

• Bolzano and analytic truth
• Bolzano and conceptual truth
• Brentano on states of affairs
• Conception of mathematics
• Concepts of knowledge
• Constructions and proofs
• Constructive type theory and analyticity
• Constructive type theory and logical positivism
• Constructive type theory and unanswerable questions
• Epistemic rules and Descartes
• Frege, Russell and the assertion sign
• Heying and assertion
• History of Logic
• Husserl on states of affairs
• Judgement and Bolzano
• Judgement and Descartes
• Judgement and Frege
• Judgement and Husserl
• Judgement and Kant
• Judgement and Per Martin-Löf
• Judgement and Russell
• Judgement and Spinoza
• Judgement and Windelband
• Judgement and Wolff
• Judgement and reason
• Judgement and the epistemic foundation of logic
• Judgement and the principle of sufficient reason
• Stump on states of affairs
• Theory of Judgement
• Windelband and Brentano
• Wolff and Kant
• judgement and ground

• , Institute of Philosophy, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

  Maria van der Schaar

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