Overview
- Explores the history and role of reduction in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind
- Offers a new, coherent framework within which various notions of reduction can be defined
- Sheds light on the relation between reductive explanation and neighboring topics, such as mechanistic explanation, unification, levels in science, and metaphysical dependence
- Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series (PSSP, volume 121)
Access this book
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Other ways to access
Table of contents (10 chapters)
-
Front Matter
-
The Concept of Reduction – An Explication
-
Front Matter
-
Keywords
- Conceptions of Reduction in the Philosophy of Science
- Definition Reduction
- Functional Reduction
- How to Approach Reduction
- Hyper-Intensionality
- Identity in Mechanistic Explanation
- Mechanistic Explanation
- Metaphysical Explanation
- Metaphysical dependence
- Metaphysics
- Naturalism
- Non-Reductive Physicalism
- Ontological Reduction
- Physicalism
- Reduction Water H2O
- Reduction in the Philosophy of Mind
- Reductionism
- Reductive Explanation
- Scientific Levels
- Scientific Reduction
- Theory Reduction
- Token Identity Theory
- Type-Identity Theory
- Ways of defining reduction
About this book
This volume investigates the notion of reduction. Building on the idea that philosophers employ the term ‘reduction’ to reconcile diversity and directionality with unity, without relying on elimination, the book offers a powerful explication of an “ontological”, notion of reduction the extension of which is (primarily) formed by properties, kinds, individuals, or processes. It argues that related notions of reduction, such as theory-reduction and functional reduction, should be defined in terms of this explication. Thereby, the book offers a coherent framework, which sheds light on the history of the various reduction debates in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of mind, and on related topics such as reduction and unification, the notion of a scientific level, and physicalism.
The book takes its point of departure in the examination of a puzzle about reduction. To illustrate, the book takes as an example the reduction of water. If water reduces to H2O, then water is identical to H2O – thus we get unity. Unity does not come at the price of elimination – claiming that water reduces to H2O, we do not thereby claim that there is no water. But what about diversity and directionality? Intuitively, there should be a difference between water and H2O, such that we get diversity. This is required for there to be directionality: in a sense, if water reduces to H2O, then H2O is prior to, or more basic than water. At least, if water reduces to H2O, then H2O does not reduce to water. But how can this be, if water is identical to H2O? The book shows that the application of current models of reduction does not solve this puzzle, and proposes a new coherent definition, according to which unity is tied to identity, diversity is descriptive in nature, and directionality is the directionality of explanation.
Authors and Affiliations
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: The Concept of Reduction
Authors: Raphael van Riel
Series Title: Philosophical Studies Series
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04162-9
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and Law, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-04161-2Published: 06 March 2014
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-34552-9Published: 03 September 2016
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-04162-9Published: 19 February 2014
Series ISSN: 0921-8599
Series E-ISSN: 2542-8349
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XII, 226
Number of Illustrations: 3 b/w illustrations
Topics: Epistemology, Statistical Theory and Methods, Philosophy, general