Markets, Games, and Organizations

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-VI

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Tatsuro Ichiishi, Tom Marschak

   Pages 1-5

3. On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy

   • Rabi N. Bhattacharya, Mukul Majumdar

   Pages 7-27

4. Uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu and Arrow-Radner equilibrium when utilities are additively separable

   • Rose-Anne Dana

   Pages 29-47

5. Entry, productivity, and investment

   • Kenneth J. Arrow

   Pages 49-58

6. A model of Russia’s “virtual economy”

   • Richard E. Ericson, Barry W. Ickes

   Pages 59-88

7. Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments

   • Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler

   Pages 89-97

8. Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives

   • Peter B. Linhart

   Pages 99-113

9. Investment and concern for relative position

   • Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite

   Pages 115-135

10. Coordination of economic activity: An example

    • Stanley Reiter

    Pages 137-162

11. Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching

    • Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter

    Pages 163-178

12. Roy Radner and incentive theory

    • Eric S. Maskin

    Pages 179-192

13. Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

    • Steven R. Williams

    Pages 193-210

14. Majority rule with dollar voting

    • James S. Jordan

    Pages 211-220

15. Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution

    • Charles A. Wilson

    Pages 221-238

16. Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

    • Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini, Andrés Velasco

    Pages 239-264

17. Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric?

    • Roger Lagunoff, Akihiko Matsui

    Pages 265-280

18. Trust and social efficiencies

    • Robert W. Rosenthal

    Pages 281-296

19. Survival and the art of profit maximization

    • Prajit K. Dutta, Rangarajan K. Sundaram

    Pages 297-314

We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke­ ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co­ authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions. 

• Game Theory
• General Equilibrium Analysis
• Markets
• Organizations
• productivity
• sets

• Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA

  Tatsuro Ichiishi

• Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, USA

  Thomas Marschak

 

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