Social Design

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xii

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2. In Lieu of an Introduction: HowIRemember Leonid Hurwicz

   • Walter Trockel

   Pages 1-7

3. Institution Design

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 9-9

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   2. Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty

      • Thomas Marschak, Dong Wei

      Pages 11-33

   3. Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz

      • Roger B. Myerson

      Pages 35-51

   4. The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future

      • Andrew Postlewaite, David Schmeidler

      Pages 53-61

   5. Social Networks from a Designer’s Viewpoint

      • Fernando Vega-Redondo

      Pages 63-81

4. Design Under Uncertainties

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 83-83

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   2. Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design

      • Claude d’Aspremont, Jacques Crémer

      Pages 85-98

   3. Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

      • Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Andrew Postlewaite

      Pages 99-137

   4. Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement

      • John O. Ledyard

      Pages 139-156

   5. Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design

      • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

      Pages 157-171

5. Markets

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 173-173

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   2. Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities

      • Peter J. Hammond

      Pages 175-186

   3. The Role of (Quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria

      • Yakar Kannai, Roberto C. Raimondo

      Pages 187-203

   4. Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium

      • Matthew Van Essen, Mark Walker

      Pages 205-215

6. Rules

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 217-217

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   2. Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules

      • Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen

      Pages 219-231

   3. Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims

      • William Thomson

      Pages 233-246

7. Implementation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 247-247

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This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

• Economic Design
• Mechanism Design
• Game Theory
• Markets
• Incentives
• Auctions
• Strategy

• Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

  Walter Trockel

Walter Trockel graduated in Mathematics (1971) at the University of Bonn (Germany). After he had written his dissertation, supervised by Werner Hildenbrand, during a stay at Berkeley in the group of Gerard Debreu, he received his doctoral degree in Economics (1974) from the University of Bonn. He is a Professor Emeritus at the Center of Mathematical Economics (IMW) of Bielefeld University where he had succeeded  Reinhard Selten on his chair in Mathematical Economics in 1985. From 2012 to 2017 he was a professor at the Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies at Istanbul Bilgi University. He is a Managing Editor of the Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, and had served in the editorial boards of JME, ET, IGTR, RED and JMID. He is a member of the Advisory Board of RED and a Fellow of the RCGEB at Shandong University, China. Since 2011 he has been a Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. 

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