Modest Nonconceptualism

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xi

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 1-5

3. Content, Concepts, Concept Possession

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 7-30

4. Nonconceptual Content

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 31-72

5. Arguments from Phenomenology

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 73-104

6. The Argument from Contradictory Contents

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 105-123

7. Arguments from Concept Possession

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 125-166

8. The Epistemological Objection

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 167-231

9. The Objection from Objectivity

   • Eva Schmidt

   Pages 233-255

10. Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated

    • Eva Schmidt

    Pages 257-261

11. Back Matter

    Pages 263-268

    PDF

The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate.

An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity.

Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.

• Animal minds
• Mental content
• Nonconceptual content
• Perceptual experience
• Perceptual objectivity
• Perceptual reasons
• Philosophy of perception
• Scenario content

• Philosophy Department Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

  Eva Schmidt

Eva Schmidt is a Research Assistant at the Department of Philosophy at Saarland University, Germany, and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Luxembourg. Her areas of specialization include philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of perception. She has published several papers on nonconceptual content and other issues in the philosophy of perception.

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