Authors:
- Articulates a novel empiricist position in the debate on scientific realism
- Critically examines and proposes an alternative to Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism
- Provides an inductive epistemology for modalities that could be of interest beyond philosophy of science
Part of the book series: Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 440)
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About this book
This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science.
This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.
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Authors and Affiliations
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General Philosophy of Science, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico, Mexico
Quentin Ruyant
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Modal Empiricism
Book Subtitle: Interpreting Science Without Scientific Realism
Authors: Quentin Ruyant
Series Title: Synthese Library
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72349-1
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-72348-4Published: 08 May 2021
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-72351-4Published: 08 May 2022
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-72349-1Published: 07 May 2021
Series ISSN: 0166-6991
Series E-ISSN: 2542-8292
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XIV, 230
Number of Illustrations: 17 b/w illustrations
Topics: Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Pragmatism