Skip to main content
Book cover

The Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience

An Investigation into Attention and Cognitive Penetrability

  • Book
  • © 2020

Overview

  • Offers an action-based criterion to ground a graded distinction between perception and cognition in the mental processing hierarchy
  • Provides a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory
  • Presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind (SIBM, volume 16)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

eBook USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (8 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible.


The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or evenforming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification.


The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Francesco Marchi

About the author

Francesco Marchi is a research assistant at the chair for Philosophy of Mind in the department of Philosophy II of the Ruhr University of Bochum. He received his PhD in March 2017 with a dissertation about the role of attentional processes in the interaction between cognition and perception. His main interests lay in the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Predictive-Coding models of cognition and Epistemology. His published work currently focuses on the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience and the role of attention in the shaping of experience by cognition.

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: The Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience

  • Book Subtitle: An Investigation into Attention and Cognitive Penetrability

  • Authors: Francesco Marchi

  • Series Title: Studies in Brain and Mind

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33558-8

  • Publisher: Springer Cham

  • eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-33557-1Published: 24 January 2020

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-33560-1Published: 24 January 2021

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-33558-8Published: 23 January 2020

  • Series ISSN: 1573-4536

  • Series E-ISSN: 2468-399X

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XVIII, 157

  • Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations

  • Topics: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Psychology

Publish with us