Authors:
- Uses various sources including original datasets, archival records, and interviews with legislators to support argument
- Fulfills the gap between theoretical arguments and empirical findings
- Analyses the Argentine Senate: an ideal laboratory for considering these questions as it incorporates experienced politicians (e.g., former presidents and former governors) as well as inexperienced backbenchers. Moreover, the Argentine federalism consists of a wide variety in provincial politics allowing for a wide comparison of sub-units in the country
Part of the book series: IDE-JETRO Series (IDE)
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Table of contents (7 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.
Reviews
“This book is a fascinating study on the influence of subnational politicians at the national legislative process. It shows how the upper chamber —the Argentine Senate— functions as the arena where governors, through their legislators, seek to amend or veto presidential policies. This thorough analysis of the Argentine legislativeprocess is an enormous theoretical and empirical contribution on how the institutions of presidentialism and federalism work.” (Mariana Llanos, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Germany)
Authors and Affiliations
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Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan
Hirokazu Kikuchi
About the author
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process
Book Subtitle: The Argentine Senate in Comparative Perspective
Authors: Hirokazu Kikuchi
Series Title: IDE-JETRO Series
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Political Science and International Studies, Political Science and International Studies (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-90112-1Published: 26 July 2018
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-07936-9Published: 08 February 2019
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-90113-8Published: 11 July 2018
Series ISSN: 2662-6314
Series E-ISSN: 2662-6322
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XX, 295
Number of Illustrations: 2 b/w illustrations
Topics: Latin American Politics, Comparative Politics, Legislative and Executive Politics