Collective Decision-Making:

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xxi

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2. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation

   1. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation

      • Norman Schofield

      Pages 1-22

3. Social Choice

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 23-23

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   2. An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains

      • Michel Le Breton, John Weymark

      Pages 25-61

   3. Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formation

      • Donald E. Campbell

      Pages 63-78

   4. Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction

      • Yongsheng Xu

      Pages 79-91

   5. Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting

      • Donald G. Saari

      Pages 93-110

4. Elections and Committees

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 111-111

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   2. Electing Legislatures

      • David Austen-Smith

      Pages 113-148

   3. Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games

      • Cheryl L. Eavey

      Pages 149-181

   4. The Heart of a Polity

      • Norman Schofield

      Pages 183-220

   5. Refinements of the Heart

      • David Austen-Smith

      Pages 221-236

5. Coalition Governments

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 237-237

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   2. Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan

      • Junichiro Wada, Norman Schofield

      Pages 239-250

   3. An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament

      • Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen

      Pages 251-263

   4. Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation

      • Bernard Grofman

      Pages 265-280

   5. The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models

      • Bernard Grofman, Philip Straffin, Nicholas Noviello

      Pages 281-293

   6. Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation

      • Michael Laver, Kenneth Shepsle

      Pages 295-314

   7. The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly

      • Carol Mershon

      Pages 315-334

6. Political Economy

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 335-335

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In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro­ vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken­ neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.

• Policy
• economy
• monetary policy
• political economy
• politics
• social choice theory

`The editor has selected carefully an excellent array of articles and organized them most effectively in a logical and coherent presentation of critical issues with social choice and political economy within the context of collective decision making. This is an excellent edited volume for readers familiar with the general theories, theorems, and voting methods presented, and for those interested in updating their understanding of the more recent literature on these topics.' Review of Radical Political Economics, December 1998

• Washington University in St. Louis, USA

  Norman Schofield

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