Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems

With Applications in Nuclear Engineering

  • Book
  • © 2008

Overview

Authors:
  1. Pierre-Jacques Courtois

    1. Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
      Federal Agency for Nuclear Safety, BEL-V, Brüssel, Belgium

    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Provides a framework for the justification of the dependability of a computer system
  • Author is a consultant to the OECD and the IAEA and has published over 100 papers on computers and communications in nuclear and safety engineering
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Reliability Engineering (RELIABILITY)

  • 4324 Accesses

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (12 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xviii
    Download chapter PDF

  2. The Context

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Introduction

      Pages 3-7

    3. Current Practices

      Pages 9-11

    4. Axiomatic Justification and Uncertainty

      Pages 13-16

    5. Justification and Dependability Case

      Pages 17-20

  3. Prescriptions

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 21-21
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Requirements, Claims and Evidence

      Pages 23-40

    3. Arguments, Syntax and Semantics

      Pages 41-57

    4. Axiomatic Principles and Limits

      Pages 59-70

  4. Descriptions

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 71-71
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Structures and Interpretations

      Pages 73-115

    3. Embedded Computer System Structures

      Pages 117-242

  5. Methodological Implications

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 243-243
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Pre-existing Systems and Components

      Pages 245-268

    3. Construction Methods

      Pages 269-282

    4. Postface

      Pages 283-286

  6. Back Matter

    Pages 287-323
    Download chapter PDF
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

Safety is a paradoxical system property. It remains immaterial, intangible and invisible until a failure, an accident or a catastrophy occurs and, too late, reveals its absence. And yet, a system cannot be relied upon unless its safety can be explained, demonstrated and certified. The practical and difficult questions which motivate this study concern the evidence and the arguments needed to justify the safety of a computer based system, or more generally its dependability. Dependability is a broad concept integrating properties such as safety, reliability, availability, maintainability and other related characteristics of the behaviour of a system in operation. How can we give the users the assurance that the system enjoys the required dependability? How should evidence be presented to certification bodies or regulatory authorities? What best practices should be applied? How should we decide whether there is enough evidence to justify the release of the system? To help answer these daunting questions, a method and a framework are proposed for the justification of the dependability of a computer-based system. The approach specifically aims at dealing with the difficulties raised by the validation of software. Hence, it should be of wide applicability despite being mainly based on the experience of assessing Nuclear Power Plant instrumentation and control systems important to safety. To be viable, a method must rest on a sound theoretical background.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Pierre-Jacques Courtois

  • Federal Agency for Nuclear Safety, BEL-V, Brüssel, Belgium

    Pierre-Jacques Courtois

About the author

Pierre-Jacques Courtois is a professor of computer science in the engineering department of the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve in Belgium. He has degrees in electrical engineering and nuclear physics, and a doctorate in applied sciences. Formerly with the Philips Research Laboratory in Brussels, he has been working for the last fifteen years at the Belgian authorized inspection agency for nuclear installations, where he is in charge of the assessment of safety critical software based systems used in nuclear power plants. He has served as a consultant to the OECD and to the IAEA for issuing guidance on the design and validation of software important to nuclear safety. He has also served as the chairman of the European Commission nuclear regulator task force on licensing issues of nuclear safety critical software, and he has been active in several European research projects on dependable computer systems and nuclear safety.

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation