The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvi

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2. Perspectives

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Introduction

      • Charles K. Rowley, Gordon Tullock

      Pages 3-13

   3. Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities

      • Charles K. Rowley

      Pages 15-25

   4. In Search of Rent-Seeking

      • Michael A. Brooks, Ben J. Heijdra

      Pages 27-49

   5. Rents and Rent-Seeking

      • Gordon Tullock

      Pages 51-62

3. Theoretical Developments

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 63-63

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   2. The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

      • William P. Rogerson

      Pages 65-80

   3. Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power

      • Arye L. Hillman, Eliakim Katz

      Pages 81-90

   4. Efficient Rent-Seeking Revisited

      • Gordon Tullock

      Pages 91-94

   5. Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking

      • William J. Corcoran

      Pages 95-101

   6. Long-Run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking: A Comment

      • Gordon Tullock

      Pages 103-105

   7. Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Long Run

      • William J. Corcoran, Gordon V. Karels

      Pages 107-126

   8. Free Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking

      • Richard S. Higgins, William F. Shughart II, Robert D. Tollison

      Pages 127-139

   9. Back to the Bog

      • Gordon Tullock

      Pages 141-146

   10. Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking

       • Richard S. Higgins, Robert D. Tollison

       Pages 147-157

4. Applications

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 159-159

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   2. Regulation

      1. Dispelling the Disinterest in Deregulation

         • Michael A. Crew, Charles K. Rowley

         Pages 163-178

      2. Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation

         • Fred S. McChesney

         Pages 179-196

   3. International Trade

      1. Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws

         • Gary M. Anderson, Robert D. Tollison

         Pages 199-215

It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com­ plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy­ tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.   

• deregulation
• economic theory
• political economy
• pollution
• public goods
• taxation
• welfare

• Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, USA

  Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock

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