From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvii

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2. Political Economy

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 3-23

   3. Approval Theory and Social Contract

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 25-50

   4. Economic Exchange and Social Exchange

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 51-71

   5. Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 73-90

   6. Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 91-111

   7. System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy

      • Kiichiro Yagi

      Pages 113-130

3. Back Matter

   Pages 131-138

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4. Further Explorations

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 139-139

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   2. Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics

      • Tetsuya Kawamura

      Pages 141-159

   3. On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher’s FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe’s Construction

      • Tomonori Koyama

      Pages 161-190

This book combines modern evolutionary economics and classical political economy. Modern evolutionary economics with its pluralistic and contingent view of reproduction does not presuppose equilibrium or harmonious reproduction. A society that consists of multiple agents needs to establish an order from the interactions of those agents. The book introduces a normative and a practical dimension where mutual justification occurs through the act of exchange. Mutual justification ultimately leads to the emergence of social and economic order, an approach that the author dubs “approval theory.” The division of labor proceeds alongside the emergence of money and capital, and the book discusses the dual structure of the real and financial economy that is the consequence. It then interprets collective action using the twin concept of voice and exit and proposes the concept of evolutionary governance to explain the politico-economic aspects of the social economy.


As such, this book shows the promising direction in which the modern political economy is now proceeding, in accordance with the contingent process of evolutionary reproduction. Further, two collaborating authors supply a game-theoretical interpretation of approval theory and an exploration of the evolution of dynamical systems, respectively.

• civil society
• evolutionary political economy
• governance
• recognition
• reproduction

• Setsunan University, Neyagawa, Japan

  Kiichiro Yagi

Kiichiro Yagi is the ex-president of Setsunan University, Osaka, Japan. He taught History of Economics and Political Economy at Okayama University, Kyoto University, and Setsunan University. He served as the President of Japan Society of the History of economic Thought, Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics, and Japan Society of Political Economy, successively. His many publication includes Social Economics of Modern Japan (1999 in Japanese), Potitical Economy (2006 in Japanese), and Austrian and German Economic Thought (2011 in English). He is currently the editor-in-chief of Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review.
Tetsuya Kawamura is lecturer of the faculty of management at Japan University of Economics, Tokyo. He received PhD from Kyoto University in 2009. He published “Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation” in Metroeconomica (2015) and “Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games” in Research in Economics (2019). His recent research is directed to the relation between intelligence and social preference. He uses laboratory and field experiments to study the relationship between intelligence and strategic choice.

Tomonori Koyama is assistant professor of the faculty of psychology at Yasuda Women’s University, Hiroshima, Japan. He received PhD from Kyoto University in 2012 on the thesis "Re-examination of J. Stanley Metcalfe’s Evolutionary Market Analysis: Focusing its relation to R. A. Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection" (in Japanese). His fields of research are the interconnection of dynamical system with statistical inference, the criticism of utilitarianism, and the social design of regional revitalization. 

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