Skip to main content

Economic Analysis of Liability Rules

  • Book
  • © 2015

Overview

  • Presents a comprehensive analysis of liability rules

  • Contains complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules

  • Establishes that the untaken precaution approach as well as decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency

  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (10 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.

The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.

Reviews

“The book under review is an excellent text which deals with some key topics in the field of law and economics … . most fascinating element of this book is its elegant framework of analysis which is simple and yet quite general and rigorous. … This book has the potential to foster further study of law and legal system … . It is highly recommended for those who are looking for research agenda in the field of law and economics.” (Papiya Ghosh, Indian Economic Review, Vol. 52, 2017)

Authors and Affiliations

  • Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

    Satish Kumar Jain

About the author

Satish K. Jain is Professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. He did his Master’s in Economics from Delhi School of Economics, and Ph.D.  from the University of Rochester, USA. His areas of interest are law and economics, and social choice theory.

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us