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Economics - Game Theory / Mathematical Methods | Strategic Social Choice - Stable Representations of Constitutions

Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions

Peleg, Bezalel, Peters, Hans

2010, XVIII, 154 p.

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  • Provides the first monograph on the subject of constitutions modeled by effectivity functions
  • Reviews and extends the literature on this issue from the beginning, around 30 years ago
  • Relevant for researchers, including PhD students, in the area of game theory and social choice theory
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

Content Level » Research

Keywords » Constitutions - Effectivity functions - Game forms - Nash and strong Nash equilibrium - Strategic stability - modeling

Related subjects » Applications - Economic Theory - Game Theory / Mathematical Methods - Social Sciences

Table of contents 

Representations of constitutions.- to Part I.- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms.- Nash consistent representations.- Acceptable representations.- Strongly consistent representations.- Nash consistent representation through lottery models.- On the continuity of representations of constitutions.- Consistent voting.- to Part II.- Feasible elimination procedures.- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions.- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.

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