Advances in Mathematical Economics

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-v

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2. Research Articles

   1. Turnpike theorems for positive multivalued stochastic operators

      • S. V. Anoulova, I. V. Evstigneev, V. M. Gundlach

      Pages 1-20

   2. Functional differential inclusion on closed sets in Banach spaces

      • Charles Castaing, Ahmed Gamal Ibrahim

      Pages 21-39

   3. Job matching: a multi-principal, multi-agent model

      • Tatsuro Ichiishi, Semih Koray

      Pages 41-66

   4. Term structure and SPDE

      • Shigeo Kusuoka

      Pages 67-85

   5. Fixed point theorems and the existence of economic equilibria based on conditions for local directions of mappings

      • Ken Urai

      Pages 87-118

   6. Efficiency of stochastic transfers in a directed graph

      • Akira Yamazaki

      Pages 119-135

   7. Allocations of labour resources on trajectories for the model with discrete innovations

      • Alexander J. Zaslavski

      Pages 137-160

3. Back Matter

   Pages 161-164

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The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is­ sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') re­ sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in­ formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor­ tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula­ tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter­ mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract.

• agents
• economics
• efficiency
• mathematical economics
• sets
• quantitative finance

• Graduate School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Tokyo, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, Japan

  Shigeo Kusuoka

• Department of Economics, Keio University, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan

  Toru Maruyama

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