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Economics - Economic Theory | Collective Decision Making - Views from Social Choice and Game Theory

Collective Decision Making

Views from Social Choice and Game Theory

Van Deemen, Adrian, Rusinowska, Agnieszka (Eds.)

2010, XIV, 266 p.

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This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.

Content Level » Research

Keywords » Alternative - Coalition Formation - Electoral Systems - Social Choice - Social Choice Theory - Voting Systems - game theory

Related subjects » Economic Theory - Public Finance

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