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Advances in Economic Design

  • Book
  • © 2003

Overview

Editors:
  1. Murat R. Sertel

    1. Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Semih Koray

    1. Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Recent research in economic and political design
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design (DESI)

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Table of contents (24 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XIII
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  2. Introduction

    1. Introduction

      • Semih Koray, M. R. Sertel
      Pages 1-15

  3. Social Choice and Electoral Systems

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 17-17
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    2. Selecting a Social Choice Rule — An Exploratory Panel Study

      • Murat R. Sertel, Ayça E. G. Kara
      Pages 19-52

    3. Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency

      • William V. Gehrlein
      Pages 53-63

    4. Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem

      • Hans Gersbach
      Pages 65-76

  4. Buyers and Sellers

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 77-77
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    2. On Determination of Optimal Reserve Price in Auctions with Common Knowledge about Ranking of Valuations

      • A. Alexander Elbittar, M. Utku Ünver
      Pages 79-94

    3. On Auctions with Interest Linkages among Bidders

      • Ottorino Chillemi
      Pages 95-104

    4. Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models

      • V. I. Danilov, G. A. Koshevoy, C. Lang
      Pages 105-123

    5. Core Convergence in Two-Sided Matching Markets

      • Aljoša Feldin
      Pages 125-150

  6. Coalitional Stability and Efficiency

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 217-217
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    2. Stable Cartel Structures in a Dismantling Game

      • Sylvie Thoron
      Pages 219-232

    3. A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities

      • Sergio Currarini, Marco Marini
      Pages 233-249

    4. Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

      • Göksel Aşan, M. Remzi Sanver
      Pages 251-259
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Keywords

About this book

This book, Advances in Economic Design, celebrates the birth of SED, the Society for Economic Design. It grew out of SED 2000, the first International Conference of the Society for Economic Design, which took place in istanbul during 23-27 lune, 2000. While it is not a proceedings or even a selected proceedings volume, it nevertheless contains many chapters which derive from papers presented at SED 2000, although they have typically been substantially reworked, extended and deepened. Of course, all the papers published in this book were anonymously refe­ reed. As a collection of selected essays, the book displays the state of the art across a broad spectrum of theoretical questions and topics and areas of application which economic designers are investigating. This characteristic of the book is reflected in its organization into seven parts: (A) Social Choice and Electoral Systems, (B) Buyers and SeIlers, (C) Bargaining, (D) Coalitional Stability and Efficiency, (E) Regulating and Organizing Markets, (F) Designing Rights, (G) Information. Most of the chapters of this book were edited for their English. Ms. ludith Tucker edited Chapters A2, A3, BI, B3, Cl, C4, DI, D2, D3, E2, E3, F2, F3 and F4, while Dr. Noah Hardy linguistically edited Chapters B2, B4 and C3. We thank Ms. Tucker and Dr. Hardy for their diligent support in this regard.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

    Murat R. Sertel

  • Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey

    Semih Koray

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Advances in Economic Design

  • Editors: Murat R. Sertel, Semih Koray

  • Series Title: Studies in Economic Design

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05611-0

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-540-00267-3Published: 15 April 2003

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-642-05541-6Published: 15 December 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-662-05611-0Published: 17 April 2013

  • Series ISSN: 2510-3970

  • Series E-ISSN: 2510-3989

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XIII, 458

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

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