Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XVIII

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2. Prologue

   1. Prologue

      • Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann

      Pages 1-2

3. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing

   1. Agent and Principal

      • Klaus Spremann

      Pages 3-37

   2. Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information

      • Hellmuth Milde

      Pages 39-59

   3. Risk Sharing and Subcontracting

      • Günter Bamberg

      Pages 61-79

4. Information and Incentives

   1. Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems

      • Volker Firchau

      Pages 81-92

   2. Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts

      • Marina Blickle

      Pages 93-103

   3. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods

      • Helmut Funke

      Pages 105-116

   4. Incentives to Forecast Honestly

      • Andreas Pfingsten

      Pages 117-133

5. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard

   1. Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues

      • Helmut Bester, Martin Hellwig

      Pages 135-166

   2. The Liquidation Decision as a Principal Agent Problem

      • Peter Swoboda

      Pages 167-177

   3. On Stakeholders’ Unanimity

      • Jochen E. M. Wilhelm

      Pages 179-204

6. Financial Contracting and Dividends

   1. Signalling and Market Behavior

      • Andreas Gruber

      Pages 205-227

   2. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information

      • Thomas Hartmann-Wendels

      Pages 229-253

   3. Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis

      • Jan P. Krahnen, Georg Meran

      Pages 255-280

7. External Accounting and Auditing

   1. The Financial Theory of Agency as a Tool for an Analysis of Problems in External Accounting

      • Ralf Ewert

      Pages 281-309

   2. Asymmetric Information between Investors and Managers under the New German Accounting Legislation

      • Friedrich Fricke

      Pages 311-326

   3. Auditing in an Agency Setting

      • Wolfgang Ballwieser

      Pages 327-346

   4. Investigation Strategies with Costly Perfect Information

      • Alfred Wagenhofer

      Pages 347-377

8. Coordination in Groups

   1. Managers as Principals and Agents

      • Martin J. Beckmann

      Pages 379-388

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco­ nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap­ plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza­ tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese­ arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa­ tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

• Agency-Theorie
• Delegation
• Informationsökonomie
• Risikoanalyse
• cooperation
• institutions
• interaction
• microeconomics
• organization
• organizations
• public goods
• taxation
• theory of the firm

• Lehrstuhl für Statistik, Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

  Günter Bamberg

• Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Ulm, Ulm, Germany

  Klaus Spremann

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