Preface to the New Edition

I

It can be both good and bad to re-publish this book, which I wrote 10 years ago.

It may be a positive reflection on the author, since Peking University Press sees this book as valuable in terms of business and benefitting others. If this is the right judgment, then it shows that the book is of some value to today’s China. But what does this value stand for? Is the book well written? And furthermore, what does it mean to be “well written”?

After revision, I began to realize that the main value for re-publishing this book is that the problems regarding China’s judicial system that this book focuses on and discusses till exist to some extent or in some other adapted form. Some have been improved, but others have gotten more severe. Some questions are not limited to courts of basic levels and are even no longer limited to central and western regions or rural areas of China. My basic approach during my research at that time—analysis and theory pursuit based on China’s problems and experiences—may still remain pioneering, especially in face of the rampant spread of conceptualist jurisprudence and ideological jurisprudence. With China’s peaceful rise, the focus on China’s problems and academic research demonstrated by this book has turned out to be even more imperative. This book,¹ which used to arouse intensive discussions and controversies, remains updated and even more targeted only because it used to be inappropriate at that time.

¹Book reviews which are rather long are as follows:
Xiao Han: “Reading Sending Law to the Countryside,” Social Sciences in China;
For an ordinary person who makes living by doing academic research, this seems to be a success and a comfort. However, the significance of any texts, including literary texts, is always determined by social needs. It is ultimately a failure and a tragedy for a person who wishes to participate in or promote China’s social development through academic research.

I yawn for rapid decay.

II

It has been 10 years, after all. The rapid development of China’s society, including the judicial reform of last 10 years, has indeed brought many changes to China’s basic-level judiciary. During these 10 years, I have written on subjects related to these changes and problems.² In general, these subjects are as follows:

Footnote 1 (continued)
Feng Xiang: “Sending Law to the Countryside and Teaching Fish to Swim,” DUSHU, Issue 2, 2003;
Wu Yuzhang: “Reading Sending Law to the Countryside,” DUSHU, Issue 2, 2003;
Zhao Ming: “Law Philosophy Criticism of Local Knowledge—Taking Sending Law to the Countryside as focus of analysis,” Journal of Central South University of Forestry (Social Science Edition), Issue 2, 2007;
Zhang Qi: “China’s Basic-level Justice from the perspective of State Social Relations—Thoughts on Mr. Su Li’s Sending Law to the Countryside,” Legal System and Society, Issue 17, 2009.

²Those directly or indirectly related are:
“Quality of Judges and Education of Law Colleges,” Studies in Law and Business; Issue 3, 2004;
“There Is No Real Estate,” Journal of Law Application, Issue 8, 2005;
“Perspective on Judicial Demands in China’s Rural Areas,” How Systems Are Formed (Revised), 2007 (originally as “Demands for Rule of Law In China’s Rural Areas and Response of Legal Systems,” China Court, March 27, 2006, B1–2);
“Parties in China’s Judiciary,” Law and Social Science, Inaugural Issue, Law Press, 2006;
“Being Prudent, but not Rejecting,” Journal of Law Application, Issue 1, 2010;
“Active Juridicities and Big Mediation,” China Legal Science, Issue 1, 2010;
1. China’s basic-level judiciary has become increasingly important, particularly in rural areas. Due to many factors, including legislation and judiciary themselves, China is now entering into a period in which social conflicts happen more frequently and turn out to be sharp, and more and more people turn to the courts for settling disputes. People have greater expectations from the judicial system, but they are getting increasingly disappointed. The rapid development of China’s economic society has brought great changes to disputes. With improved social mobility, the objects that people engage with are more diversified and disputes increase. The changes in interpersonal relations have reduced the applicability and efficiency of mediation, even in the rural areas. The cases in rural areas are no longer simple. Urban lives have more bearings on disputes, especially in areas on China’s coast. Even in remote rural areas, divorce cases are more likely to be put forward by females. Personal injuries caused by vehicles, machines, and electrical appliances have completely changed the type of tort disputes. Issues involving lawsuit petitions have become common.

2. Although rule-based governance remains to be one of the key issues in the entire judicial system, dispute settlement with finality is still a key issue and pursuit of the basic-level judges.

3. The position of institutional functions (different from social functions) of basic-level courts in the court system, the trial system, and the administrative system inside the court, including internal and external supervision and prevention mechanisms to prevent miscarriage of justice, is not clear. These problems remain unchanged.

4. In the 1990s, the trial method and judicial reform started from the point of “the burden of proof lies upon he who affirms,” which emphasized an adversary system, handling cases in court, and in-court procedures. This system has achieved a lot in urban areas, but still falls short of the practical needs and system support of the courts. Due to the severe lack of formalized conditions (including lawyers acting as agents and evidence documentation), the basic-level courts, especially those involving civil cases in the people’s courts, have always been “active judiciaries,” in which case, mediation usually comes first.

5. Generally speaking, there is still a severe lack of legal professionals in the courts. Even in the rural areas of developed and relatively developed regions in eastern China, there are occasionally lawyers with formal legal education in the basic-level judiciary, but civil lawyers at the local level are still rarely seen in most of the central and western regions. The uniform judicial examination has raised the standards for junior judges and thus brought about a flow of judges from central and western regions to the coastal areas of eastern regions and from local level to high-level courts. In addition, a large number of old judges have retired or are forced to retire in the name of raising the so-called standard of professionalism, and law-school graduates prefer not to work in basic-level courts due to meager payment, which results in the lack of judges in basic-level courts in central and western China. The total number of civil courts is on the decrease. There is severe short of judges with a law-school education in basic-level courts.
6. Since the 1990s, there has been huge improvement of judges’ overall competence and professionalism. However, there is still not enough, or even less, attention in the legal, judicial, and jurisprudence circles paid to the specialized and comprehensive knowledge needed by basic-level judges. With insufficient emphasis on specific social conditions, there is neither enough attention to, nor adequate summary or improvement of effective judicial experience under such circumstances, which gives rise to a tendency toward rigid legalism.

7. Social reform has brought about recohesion and formation of legal and moral consensus in Chinese society. However, formal legal knowledge and belief have quite a few conflicts with customs that are rather stable and prevalent in Chinese society.

The society and the situations have changed, but some key issues remain unchanged.

III

As for this new edition, I have not made any substantial modifications to the content, even though there are new data and materials available to enrich and amend related chapters. My research has always been guided by fundamental issues. If the update of details does not affect the fundamental conclusion of the analysis, then it is superfluous.

I have made some adjustments to the language. Apart from correcting some misspellings, I have tried my best to simplify my expressions, abandoning or playing down the translated elements of original texts. There are certain areas in this book to which not enough reasons and explanations are given from today’s point of view—I therefore add a few words to them.

Here is my explanation for reediting this book. I do believe that it is not necessary for readers who already have the previous edition to spend more money on this book, but there is one wish outweighing all other considerations, which is to leave a fossil for the history—about China’s society, judiciary, and jurisprudence at the end of the twentieth century, which we have lived through.

August 2010

Suli Zhu
Confessions on the Last Day of the Twentieth Century (Preface)

I

In 1996, I published my first book of collected papers—The Rule of Law and Its Native Resources, which led to some discussion in the circle of jurisprudence. Apart from many compliments, there were also many doubts and criticisms. I gave my heartfelt thanks to both compliments and criticisms alike, even though some criticisms were strongly worded and determined to act on impulses and raised to a higher plane of principle and two-line struggle. In a somewhat snobbish line of thought, criticizing means respect. It means that the ideas and arguments made caused critics to be nervous and feel the urge to speak out, and even feel the need to fight. These debates would force me to review whether I had done anything wrong or imperfect and help me to understand how others view these issues, and from which angle and based on what presumption they draw such conclusions. It is actually a kind of encouragement to me, although I have no intention to change my views till my last breath. The only thing that I find it difficult to forgive is that a few individuals confess that they have not even seen the book, but have already begun to demonstrate (show off?) based solely on the name of the book. This method and writing style should not be tolerated in any academic circles.

I am still somewhat disappointed—I feel that many criticisms and even some praises are based on misunderstandings caused by carelessness. They often pay attention only to terms like “native resources.” During this process, my views have been labeled as “conservatism,” “postmodernism,” “in support of localization of rule of law,” and even been regarded as “dangerous thoughts.” Some scholars believe I stand for rebuilding China’s rule of law based on China’s traditional culture. From their perspectives, China’s culture itself does not provide any basis for modern rule of law, and my statement is therefore only a kind of sweet dream. There are other scholars who think that I refuse to learn from foreign experiences regarding rule of law and jurisprudence and that my emphasis that law is a kind of local knowledge will lead to dead ends. These misunderstandings are probably destined, since even those brand-new, historically pioneering works are doomed to
be misunderstood. That is to say, as long as this kind of pioneering work shares some kind of similarities with those antiquated lifestyles, it will be misunderstood as opposition to those social lifestyles.\(^3\) Not to mention my opinions which are neither brand-new nor historically pioneering enough.

However, I still want to illustrate these issues, as a confession to and a mark of respect to my friends, colleagues, and peers—since it is impolite to ignore such remarks. I determined to quote from my original book, including page numbers, in case people think that I have changed my words.

About whether native resources equate to tradition or if there is any basis for modern rule of law in contemporary Chinese society:

To look for native resources and to focus on traditions of this country are usually understood as to look through the history, especially history books and rules. Those kinds of resources are important for sure, but what matters more is that we need to look for native resources from all kinds of informal legal systems of social lives. Historical research is only one way to get help from local resources. However, native resources do not exist in history only. Informal systems already being formed or developed in the social activities of people nowadays are even more important.

With the reform of production methods, as well as migration of people, it is fair to say that the basic economic institutions to strengthen the traditional patriarchal system or a different form of the patriarchal system have been increasingly weakened. My emphasis of getting help from China’s native resources to establish modern rule of law is exactly based on this fundamental precondition of economic system reform. (pp. 14–15)

As for legal transplant, I really do not think it is possible. My views are based on the difference in meanings of laws both literally and practically, or even broader as the difference between jurisprudence and rule of law. From my perspective,

Even the influence of legal research on modern legal systems is also a justification process, which can only have some impact on the form, structure, and justification argument of the legal system at most. However, the legal system grows from the society, and its practice may, but not necessarily, apply to certain research results or some research results of jurisprudence.

… The life of a nation creates its own legal system, but academic jurists create only theories about legal system. (p. 287, 289; Marks of emphasis are left out.)

I prefer not to quote any more, incase I will be blamed for earning royalties by quoting my previous books. What I want to say is that my views or ideas were consistent throughout that book and in all other articles afterward, which serve as main clues and boundaries, although I do not think there is any particular significance in singling these views out. From my perspective, the most important thing is not how to express one’s opinions, but whether the attitude and manner of analysis demonstrated by an article is in line with the author’s words in terms of logic and mentality, or whether there is a coherent development. If it is not,

what are the reasons and factors? They should be explained at an appropriate time. Otherwise, there will be suspicion of being “opportunistic” and “jumping on the bandwagon.” There is also a situation that the author themselves does not fully understand the topic under discussion, which is often seen in China’s community of jurisprudence.

II

There is another issue that I need to clarify: It is about the issue of “local knowledge.” It is true that there is no thorough discussion on this issue in this book, except one sentence that “A large part of the knowledge needed in our social life is specific and local”. I think it is very clear and people will understand it once it is mentioned. But it seems this is not the case. Why? The question is that many people have a kind of foresight or prejudice (which is not necessarily negative in the sense of Gadamer, who believes that there is no knowledge that is complete, and therefore, it is prejudice which constitutes the basis and necessity for learners to seek knowledge) and an unnecessary feeling that knowledge is myth. To these people, it stands that only knowledge printed in textbooks, especially textbooks of university students and postgraduates, is knowledge and that only information which is becoming common propositions or those wrapped up in some exciting or “big” words is knowledge. But knowledge is shown in all kinds of forms. There are many kinds of knowledge that cannot be expressed (but can be done) or are awkward when expressed by language or common propositions in our social lives. Consider your feelings when you are in love. You may use the word “happiness” (which is based on your knowledge) to express your feeling. But happiness itself is different. It is not like the happiness you felt when you got an “A” or your mom bought you an ice cream when you were young. It is the same in terms of legal knowledge. Apart from the many propositions, principles, rules, standards, and other knowledge that can be generalized abstractly, the operation of law needs all kinds of other knowledge, such as so-called practical reasons and skills, or “common knowledge” and specific knowledge about the parties concerned (please refer to Chap. 1 of this book).

Another issue related to the notion that law is local knowledge is whether paying attention to and giving emphasis to this local knowledge will result in knowledge inclusiveness. I don’t think this will be the case. I consider myself to be concerned very much with local knowledge, and I pay great attention to many of those details. I try to find out the theoretical significance in such knowledge. However, I do not think it leads to self-imposed enclosure. Frankly speaking, as far as the books I reference in this book are concerned, the legal sciences, as well as many other subjects, all demonstrate that paying attention to local knowledge does not necessarily lead to enclosure or obsolescence of knowledge. In addition, I have emphasized in this book many times that since the science of law is not a self-sufficient subject, openness of mind shall be directed not only to knowledge
coming from foreign countries and marked as jurisprudence, but also to the knowl-
edge and experience of oneself, as well as of other ordinary people, and to knowl-
edge and research findings of related subjects. If you pay attention only to writings
and opinions of certain foreign scholars from the subject (even within your aca-
demic field) of your own interests, and regard yourself as having true learning
while resisting or ignoring research results of other subjects, you will likely have
neither an open attitude nor the manner of a scholar—and will be acting as an
apologist.

Even from a logical point of view, to build legality based on local knowledge is
not meant and will not lead to supremacy of local knowledge. From my personal
experience, if I want to pay attention to local knowledge, I must open my mind
since only in this way can I possibly understand, feel, discover, and even find local
knowledge. To understand local knowledge is and must be based on the premise of
understanding many other kinds of knowledge (which, too, are local knowledge).
If a person stays in a certain place for too long and fails to absorb others’ points
of view, he will think that everyday is the same and “only the world outside is
exciting.” If one has an open mind and keeps changing and enriching their frame
of reference through understanding view points and knowledge of other people
and subjects, the seemingly bland and mundane world is also full of energy and
magnificence. There are many interesting questions that make your heart sensi-
tive and young once more, and you will feel “a day that [your] heart beat finally
comes” (written by He Qifang). You will feel—as described in my old poem—“All
are familiar but newly met; All are understood but require new understanding.” To
rephrase it in a candid way which may lack academic tastes, you can understand
yourself only by seeing others. To make it more academic, but perhaps more awk-
ward, locality is one of the qualities of the knowledge demonstrated by inter-rela-
tions of all kinds of local knowledge.

III

Because I use the term “native resources,” there are quite a few people trying to
connect me with “localization of rule of law.” This is a kind of misunderstanding
based on “native” which takes my words only literally. As a matter of fact, atten-
tive readers will notice that I have never talked about localization of rule of law.
There was only one article in my book Native Resources in which I did mention
the localization of legal studies, mainly because the whole academic circle was
then discussing the standardization and localization of academic studies. My arti-
cle was expected to focus on this main theme naturally. I do stand for localization
of legal research. That is to say, Chinese scholars who have studied overseas, like
me, must (but not only) study issues related to China. They should have their own
visions and pursue their own findings (with or without achievement). They should
not behave as the overseas students criticized by Chairman Mao as “having
returned from Europe, North America, and Japan… only to talk about superficial
knowledge of foreign countries. They act only as a phonograph and forget completely about their responsibilities of getting to know and creating new things.\textsuperscript{44}

I myself don’t stand for localization of rule of law; I don’t think the way it is put is of any actual significance, but I suspect it as showing off without keeping one’s feet on the ground. Why is it so? My reasons are as follows. First of all, to keep in line with the self-cited words in the previous section, I believe that it is not for the jurists to decide whether a country’s rule of law is good or not. It is the life of a whole nation that has created its own rule of law. What the jurists have created is theory justification of a certain rule of law. Therefore, for those people who think highly of themselves only because what they have said has become popular or adopted by the government, and those who believe that slogans will determine the results of rule of law, they are taking themselves too seriously while being contemptuous toward others. If there is localization of the rule of law as a matter of fact, it cannot be westernized even if desired. However, if it is geared to international standards, it will not work out even if all jurists stand for localization. I myself understand this theoretical limitation very well. Just think of the following question: Can jurists order judges to listen to them? Or can they order citizens to listen to them? You may be unable to manage a stowaway (who is perhaps also trying to get in touch with the world in his own way?)!

These words are too realistic to be of any theoretical value—at least some people will think this way. As a matter of fact, I have further theoretical analysis. That is to say, I believe that there is such a hidden precondition in the slogan of the localization of rule of law that China is born to be and will forever be different from foreign countries (mainly Western countries). This theory gives emphasis to cultural type, which stands that due to the difference of cultural types between the East and the West, whatever (the rule of law included) comes from the West will not become effective until localized in China and that this situation will go on forever (the precondition of this theory is a metaphor borrowed from the genes of the biology). I respect this theory as well as the scholars that accept and stand for this theory (they might be right since we cannot test and verify who is right and who is wrong at the moment). However, respect does not mean that I am convinced or accept this. I still believe more in the historical materialism of Marx as well as related sociological and economic theories. I believe that a so-called cultural difference is not the reason for differences, but more the result of a difference in natural environment, modes of production, and other physical factors. The weak point of the cultural theory is to find out the reasons for historic cultural differences, and accurately tracking and attributing this difference to overall results. As far as I’m concerned, there is a hidden danger (which might be too strong a word) that all kinds of differences are made consolidated and eternal, and sometimes alleged only by a certain group of people. As far as the historical development of China

since modern times is concerned, it seems that the Chinese do not adhere to traditional culture all that much. If a kind of new invention or foreign object can bring actual interests, people are ready to accept it, no matter if it is Marxism, democracy, science, TV, or pirated discs (I think that the original pirated disc surely came from outside China). In addition, with international economic and information exchanges getting increasingly frequent, today’s China is converging with developed countries while diverging from traditional Chinese society. This has already become fact. It is therefore not necessary to accept a theory of localization of the rule of law that emphasizes difference as a purpose only for reducing transaction fees and increasing social wealth.

This does not deny the difference in individuals, ethics, the economic development level of different countries, or the major conflicts in interests of different countries. I believe that laws of different countries have their own features to some extent. However, this feature is the result not of how loudly the slogan of localization is being shouted, but the actions taken by people (not only jurists or law makers) to tackle detailed issues they face in their own lives. That is to say, a slogan itself does not solve problems—problems can only be solved by detailed research and actions. The law should be tailored according to specific issues. I believe that due to the secularity and practicality of law itself, what the law needs to consider truly and firstly is whether it is “feasible” (whether is it can be accepted practically by people), but not whether it is “local” (whether it is different from others). No matter whether it is local or international, if a law is unable to solve problems, it is not a good law. If it is localized during the process of solving actual problems, then it is a result, not necessarily a purpose. It is in this sense that I believe that the discourse regarding the localization and internationalization of the rule of law is a signboard rather than a true or meaningful issue. This kind of slogan bears the trace of an ideology—it emphasizes the political and directional correctness of the concept without paying much attention to its real meaning, not to mention caring about its actual effects. In this sense, I oppose either the internationalization or the localization of the rule of law, because either of them ignores the issues of the actual laws or systems in question. It is not pragmatic to approach first the terms or the cultural and political standards of an issue. I am a pragmatist myself who emphasize the institutional function of law, but not its external claims.

It is due to the above reason that I don’t care much about the cultural label given to all kinds of materials or opinions by the current intellectual system. Neither do I pay any attention to the “true” or “core” thought of scholars, Chinese or foreign, ancient or modern. What I care about is whether materials and opinions—after my careful reading—can extend my understanding of the issues related to legal systems of modern China and give me new inspirations (I therefore do not force others to understand these materials and opinions). I will not read traditional Chinese documents only because my research is about contemporary Chinese issues. Neither will I forget about the wisdom hidden in what Confucius says about being “unwilling to comment on something which is not one’s own concern” only because the concepts of judicial independence and professionalism come from the West. It is actually not that important to identify the academic
tradition. What is more important is whether one can understand the issue and elicit a wise response. Academic research is a highly individual practice. It will not increase a person’s wisdom to identify academic tradition. On the contrary, real wisdom can actually create and change academic tradition.

IV

I was urged to say the above words a long time ago. A law magazine used to suggest hosting an academic symposium on this subject and then publishing a special issue—but I don’t think it is worth the efforts. There is another paper that consecutively carried a series of articles criticizing me and sent those papers to me. Seeing that I had no reactions at all, they asked me to write something to respond to those criticisms. I refused politely because I am afraid of being used by the media or by critics. There is a possibility that I might be led by those people to their directions. I felt it was better to keep my distance, continuing reading worthwhile books, doing my own research, and writing my own articles. However, the more important reason is that I don’t think this kind of argument is meaningful. In a reply to one of my students,\(^5\) I mentioned that the concept of native resource itself does not matter much. There is somewhat of a contingency related to its invention. What matters is the study of China’s actual issues, answering China’s questions, and putting forward specific ways to solve problems. It is meaningless to argue about the specific meaning of native resource (which is also the biggest misunderstanding against me). When we argue, the word that is supposed to express a certain view in a specific context might be substantiated and become “something” outside the context. As a result, people are fighting for this word, just as Liu Huan sings in his song “Retribution”: “We almost forgot our intention that used to be unchanged. We almost lost our sincerity that we were born with.” This is the result that I want to see least (Pragmatism again!). This phenomenon is called alienation in philosophy: It seems as if everybody is talking about this word, but the word is actually speaking on behalf of everybody. I wouldn’t do such silly things, would I? Our ancestor Confucius already understood this principle long time ago, that’s why he “did not talk about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, or spiritual beings,” and “as to what is beyond the physical world, the sage master leaves not discussed.” Why did Confucius not talk or discuss about such topics? It does not mean that Confucius agreed to those “things,” but that he was wise enough to know that when such issues are discussed, there will be no result (Just think about it, who in this world can actually accept defeat in debate?) because there is no definite reference. You cannot get back what is said, and opposite of the wishes,

extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorders, or spiritual beings would be materialized in people's minds. People can only say something when they remain silent. People cannot really say anything at any time. Speech is silver, while silence is gold. All these are words of wisdom.

Most importantly, argument does not solve any practical problems. Even if I won this argument and became somewhat “famous” because of this, I would only be given an undeserved reputation of a voice of “native resource,” wouldn’t I? Even Qin Wen in A Dream in Red Mansions knew that bearing an undeserved reputation is no good. If you really want to persuade people into having less doubt, you need to have something to show to the people. In China, as long as you are serious, smart, and capable, you can still present good and real things on research of seemingly trivial things. Chinese people are smart enough to recognize good things. Then, they will try to imitate (there will certainly be piracy involved) and then create. Thus, it is important not to argue too much (but it is OK to argue a little bit when necessary) or construct the issues such as how is “native resource” possible, whether “native resource” actually exists, and whether “native resource” is necessary. It is important that Chinese scholars present something truly academic from their research on China that foreigners are unable to present.

It has been three years since I have been able to present this book. It appears to me that this could have only been written by a Chinese author; it is a book in which I have explored “native resource” systematically and it has included, demonstrated, and pushed forward my previous thoughts. It comes from discussions and thoughts on some common phenomena in China’s justice, from a person who lives on this soil. It also contains summaries and generalizations of experiences of a common Chinese judge at the local level. It does not simply demonstrate or enumerate Chinese phenomena, but has a theoretical pursuit. It does not only get deep into this field of judicial practice in courts to which the legal science circle has paid not enough attention to, but also makes issues which jurists seldom or hardly pay attention to under the current framework of legal knowledge more prevalent. Moreover, in terms of theoretical analysis, it does not refer to a theoretical framework which stresses cultural incommensurability, but makes efforts to analyze and explain empirical materials inside a theoretical framework which even common people can understand and exchange ideas about. It may not be perfect and may even have some errors, but it can only be produced by a Chinese person in this land that I am so deeply in love with. In this sense, it is original and irreplaceable.

V

This is the last dawn of the twentieth century.

I couldn’t help feeling touched when finishing this book—at such a symbolic moment! Although I know clearly that the date is only a symbol without much true meaning, I can still feel the magnificence of this moment! (Modernization has certainly trained us to be so.)
At this moment, my students, colleagues, and compatriots on the other side of the ocean are gathering together to enjoy New Year’s Eve dinner. They are bracing for the new year, new century, and new millennium with all kinds of complicated but forward-looking emotions. Within a few hours, there will be jubilation everywhere. But as a stranger all alone in a strange land far away, I have spent this moment in my office.

I miss my motherland.

It reminds me of a line written by a poet:

Why there are always tears in my eyes?
It is because I am so deeply in love with this land...6

Suli Zhu
Written at 6 o’clock on the last day of the twentieth century
Cambridge

Sending Law to the Countryside
Research on China's Basic-level Judicial System
Zhu, S.
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