Insofar as Foucault’s critical history reveals the thought that defines our limits, we examine the latter in this chapter and Chap. 3 in terms of the epistemological and political critique of POST. To begin with, we account for the origins of a philosophy of the subject, who grounds man’s order of things. After Hobbes’ reduction of objective experience to a material ontology and Locke’s deployment of the subject’s rational capacities, freedom becomes a matter of the non-interference by others in the autonomous will of the man who desires and knows, respectively. In contrast, Rousseau says knowledge of the world depends on our prior constitution as subjects through language. Here, freedom is still based on a universal capacity for reason, but it is mediated by the establishment and continual affirmation of the General Will. Even if Rousseau fails to specify the precise province of man’s reason, his account of how autonomy only gets beyond pride and alienation if a process of recognition substantiates it situates him at the core of POST.

It is out of a desire to thwart dogmatism and scepticism through limiting the remit of man’s objective experience that Kant’s critical philosophy introduces enlightenment as an obligation to think and act freely, which he fosters with a metaphysics of experience and the idea of freedom that links moral autonomy, duty and Morality. Apart from the centrality of Kant to enlightenment, he is the spur for Hegel’s critique of Kantian man’s bifurcation from his empirical self, who lives in and is shaped by the world. To alleviate diremption, we trace Hegel’s proposal for a phenomenology of the objective experience of Spirit and the moral
moderation of man’s recognition by the state, which encapsulates Ethical Life. From its origins in Hobbes and Locke, and via its reformulation with Rousseau, the epistemological critique of Kant and Hegel acts as the precondition for autonomy and recognition, which together make them the founders of the approach adopted by POST.

**Autonomy**

Hegel (1991, 344) writes that after the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century, humanity becomes conscious of an endogenous value “in the morality, rectitude, probity and activity of man”. His words start to order the world and replace medieval Christianity’s ontology of things, which are grounded in the word of God. As Heidegger (1998, 132–135) portrays it, man conquers the world as a picture via representation. He sets out before and in relation to himself a thing as a structured image. With his essence of the will to will, or his subjectivity of “humanitas,” man replaces “Him” as the lord of being (Heidegger 1998, 243–247). And while Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* is perhaps the most famous conception of man from this period, Hobbes (1985, Chap. IX) is the first to make an explicit connection between his capacity for knowledge and freedom.

In his desire to order the political chaos of mid-seventeenth century England, Hobbes considers who man is as a potential source of knowledge. To this end, he embarks upon his quest with reason rather than the prudence encapsulated in tradition, which is propagated by Christian ontology. For Hobbes, the wisdom of reason derives from speech, which paradoxically forms the glue of intersubjective, albeit pre-social, relations. It allows man to gather the things he represents in concepts; “*True* and *False*,” Hobbes (1985, 105; italics in the original) says, “are attributes of Speech, not of Things.” Secondly, he combines speech with a mechanistic view of nature and a deductive scientific method, which defines Hobbes’ (1985, Chap. V) anti-metaphysical pragmatic science of reason. Here, to read oneself as a means to know one’s thoughts and passions is to read and know the thoughts and passions of others. This mechanico-deductive approach instructs Hobbes that man’s basic ontology is material, and he works from the first principle of autonomous man in a state of nature up to theorems about knowledge and the life of man in society regulated by a state that monopolises power.
The material nature of Hobbesian man is determined by sensations and emotions, which interact with his ideas. When he moves directly toward or away from the thing imagined, man’s reaction is unmediated, pure endeavour.\textsuperscript{1} It is only when he deliberates on the thing he desires or wishes to avert that one discovers who man is. He is a self-mediated, mechanical subject who, aware a priori of his wants and preferences, knows no tranquillity of mind. Life is nothing but perpetual motion between the basic desires of appetite for more and aversion to risk (Hobbes 1985, Chap. VI). Hobbesian man has no \textit{summum bonum}. His understanding is distinct from his will, and uppermost in his mind is his felicity, which requires the prioritisation of the will and its capacity to reason upon the activity necessary to realise the imperatives of the desires.

Hobbes’ philosophy is a science of the consequences of the unhappy lives of mechanical men in a state of nature, where due to their subjective desires and their absence of an ethical compass a “condition of Warre” is the norm (Hobbes 1985, Chap. XIII). In parallel, Hobbesian moral philosophy points out the laws of nature, for instance, liberty and justice, which enable men who have the capacity for self-institution to will their escape and covenant into a body politic (Balibar 1996, 225). Together with man’s innate capacity for speech, Hobbes (1985, Chaps. XIV–XV) turns a material ontology of perpetual motion into a right to political liberty. It is upheld by Leviathan’s sword, which hovers over men in their efforts to gratify an insatiable, yet radically subjective, will to happiness. Through the basic capacity of reason, which enables man to realise his desires and know the thoughts and passions of others, he constitutes a juridical state that pacifies intersubjective relations (Hobbes 1985, Chap. XXI). In Hobbes’ (1985, 223) elegant words, “[t]he finall … Designe of men … in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves … is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby.”

A Hobbesian material ontology discloses a speaking, mechanical man who seeks to fulfil his appetites and reduce his aversions. His words order an objective experience of things, and he authorises Leviathan’s power in the interests of the regulation of his desires and the fulfilment of his needs. But an even more innovative statement on man as the ground for epistemological critique in the interests of autonomy comes from Locke (1947, Bk. I, Chaps. I–II), who develops the idea that behind the mask of man is a \textit{tabula rasa}.\textsuperscript{2} For Locke, man’s faculty of understanding
enables the capacity of sensation that gives him simple ideas about the external objects perceived by the senses. Indeed, this faculty experiences something like the pitch black we would perceive from inside a cupboard, with only a little hole left to let in the light and the external resemblance of things. Secondly, through the capacity of reflection man observes the internal objects of his mind, which are independent of empirical things. He experiences himself by the ideas of, amongst others, thinking, doubting, loving and fearing (Locke 1947, Bk. II, Chap. I). Ideas that derive from either the objects of the senses, or the operation of the mind, are then lent meaning by reason. Man rationalises knowledge of a thing-for-itself to arrive at complex ideas of substances, modes and relations (Locke 1947, Bk. II, Chaps. XXII–XXVI). Of most relevance, the rational capacity of consciousness, which procures phenomenal knowledge, is synonymous with man’s self-mediation of himself into what Locke terms the “person.” He is a thinking, reasoning subject, who “can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and, it seems to me, essential to it” (Locke 1947, Bk. II, 165; italics in the original).

Locke’s concept of the person is reducible to and identifiable with consciousness or the self, who is aware of pleasure and pain and capable of happiness and misery. Yet, because consciousness tends to be interrupted by forgetfulness, such that man loses sight of the connection between who he is in the present and who he was upstream in the past, Locke introduces memory as the guarantor of the continuity of the person to himself. Like Hobbes’ (1985, Chap. XVI) mechanical man, who within the civil society he asks Leviathan to regulate is taken to be a person whose words and actions are self-authored, Locke conceives of the subject in terms of an intelligent agent with a capacity for law. The forensic subject is the epistemological condition behind right, reward and punishment. In addition, he justifies the call for toleration, as happiness and misery are the concerns of each subject and, collected as memory, define personal identity (Locke 1947, Bk. II, Chap. XXVII). In essence, Locke’s personal identity is constituted in a realm of spatio-temporality that is distinct from power. It also implies that nobody but the person has any right to the property of his body, whilst the power of property necessitates a mutually conducive civil society of toleration and constitutional rights that facilitates its exchange (Balibar 1996, 234–239). With Locke, the rational capacity of consciousness enables man’s objective
experience of both the things in the world as phenomena, or a metaphysics of empirical realism, and the truth of his authentic being as a unique personal identity, an a priori autonomy, that calls for toleration, which the juridical state guarantees as political liberty.

**RECOGNITION**

In their attempts to create an enlightened, self-ruling humanity, Hobbes and Locke invoke a philosophy of the subject to stabilise objective experience. As a consequence, man carves out a realm of political liberty from the juridical power that he constitutes. Rousseau, however, rejects the pragmatic naivety of the English, which dupes them into a misguided focus on autonomy. He calls instead for a process of reciprocal recognition with others through the General Will, which only then enables man to realise his autonomy. As we shall see, he hereby paves the way for Kant’s understanding of autonomy and Hegel’s desire to embed it in recognition.

Although he beholds the spectacle of man raising himself up from savagery through nothing other than his reason, Rousseau (1988a, 4; 1988b, 50–59) pleads that whilst Hobbes and Locke claim to know the true nature of man, they do no more than confound him with the merchants they see daily before their eyes in places like the city of London. Their misplaced advocacy of political liberty is a result of their philosophy of man’s mechanical nature and sovereign memory. For Rousseau, man on his own has neither the capacity of speech with which to covenant out of a state of nature, nor the words essential for his rational capacity of understanding to provide him with an objective experience of things. In their conception of language as preceding the constitution of the social, Hobbes and Locke simply re-iterate the metaphysical presuppositions of Christian ontology, whereas Rousseau’s emphasis on speech as the first social institution is indicative of what Jacques Derrida (1982, 139–146) calls an “epistemological break.” For Rousseau, language, society and knowledge of the world evolve together, and although the autonomy implied by Hobbes and Locke might be definitive of modern man, without recognition through a politically mediated process it remains unfilled, or merely as base licence rather than the nobility of liberty.

In addition to the failure of Hobbes and Locke to appreciate the social nature of language, the modern arts and sciences in respect of which man mediates his freedom fling garlands of flowers—akin to chains—over his socio-economic aspirations and nip autonomy in the
bud. They lead, Rousseau (1988a, 25–29) laments, to indolence, luxury and an absence of virtue. The arts and sciences exacerbate the inequality of modern civilised society, divorce man from his natural liberty and infatuate him with slavery. In this regard, Rousseau (1988b, 71–74) contrasts pride \([amour propre]\), which burgeons in eighteenth-century Parisian society, with man’s natural capacities for self-preservation and compassion. The latter determine his pre-social self-love \([amour de soi]\), where the virtue is to love oneself without the mediation of others, hence a natural liberty (which Hobbes intuited as licence and ensuing chaos). Nevertheless, the mediation of man’s being in respect of the arts and sciences and inequality—that is, recognition in a society that honours pride and valorises egoism—leads to man’s alienation from himself. The very society of production that Hobbes and Locke first acknowledge, which throws man into intersubjective relations and raises the question of his autonomy and desire to be recognised, also foists upon him alienated egoism that enjoins the compromise of blind obedience to appearance. As a result of pride, appearance and its flatteries reign over whom one really is (Rousseau 1988b, 84–95).

Rousseau (1988b, 49–51) is clear that he is not concerned with the reconciliation of the pre-social savage human to his natural liberty. Despite its vices, modern society is indicative of the collective maturity of a people, who are ready to shape their own laws rather than defer to tradition (Rousseau 1988c, Chaps. 9–10). The problem of freedom is framed in respect of the civilised man as he is, so that he may reconstitute state power accordingly. Whilst savage man is endowed with the capacities for self-preservation and compassion that enable self-love, it is only through the capacity for reason, which is particular to a civilised language user, that morality is possible. It is thanks to this potentially universal ability that Rousseau argues man is born free, yet under the conditions of pride and inequality his capacity to reason is enchained. As man does not live by the laws he makes himself, which would realise his autonomy, but through the appearance reciprocated between alienated egoists subject to pride, he discovers freedom is an empty promise (Rousseau 1988c, Chaps. 1–4).

Rousseau’s solution is for the community to jointly constitute juridical power, which protects every one’s liberty and goods and simultaneously allows each to co-author the laws. Language and reason enable man to partake in the virtuous communal activity of the legislation of the General Will. It is a process of reciprocal dialogue, in which men
recognise themselves in others and acknowledge the universality of their interests. At the same time, through obedience to the laws he makes himself, man realises his political liberty. He throws off his submission to appearance and, as the master of himself, he is autonomous in his thought and action (Rousseau 1988c, Chaps. 6–8). Man is mature and no longer bifurcated by pride from his capacity for autonomy. The unmediated self-love of savage man, for whom liberty is the mere impulse to appetite—or slavery, as Rousseau calls it—is transcended in the people’s formation of the body politic. And, as civilised man, he is reconciled to himself insofar as political liberty enables the realisation of the capacity of reason through political liberation in the General Will. The Rousseauian subject moves beyond pride and into generally willed mutual recognition, which still allows particularity in the shape of autonomy that is akin to a socialised self-love. For the watchmaker’s son who is proud in regard to what he is, in spite of his origins, and beside himself when one reminds him of it (Nietzsche 1968, 63), the linguistic avenue to knowledge justifies the substantiation of autonomy through the recognition that is afforded by the juridical state. “Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will,” Rousseau (1988c, 192–193; italics in the original) writes, whence the notion of the republic where those “associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign authority, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State.”

**Enlightenment and Maturity**

After the insights of Hobbes and Locke into man’s ability to realise objective experience in pursuit of political liberty, Rousseau’s account of the social nature of language and the alienation of autonomous man inaugurates the communal mediation of man’s self-love into liberty via reason, which ensures political liberation in tandem with the constitution of the General Will. Nonetheless, the worry with Rousseau’s dream of a transparent society, which is based on the philosopher’s epistemological and political critique, is that the self-love he reifies as autonomy to escape pride requires a social process of recognition, which invites a politics of control and exile (PK, 152). In anticipation of the excesses of reason latent within Rousseau, Kant seeks to put a break on the eighteenth century’s domination of the mind by the heart (Nietzsche 1968, 59).
After 1781, he reformulates critical philosophy to offer an epistemological critique, which reigns in latent Rousseauian excesses and nullifies both the scepticism of the empiricists and the dogmatism of Christian ontology.

Seen from another angle, Kant wants to overcome philosophy’s pedantic university practice and realise its Rousseauian potential to deliver critique in the name of freedom (Beck 1969, 426). In the Introduction to Logic, for example, Kant (1885, 25) says a “cosmopolitan” philosophy ought to answer four questions: what can I know?; what ought I to do?; what may I hope for?; and what is man? With respect to what may I hope for?, critical philosophy does not proffer knowledge of things beyond human experience (Kant 1949a). Similarly, what is man? is a subsidiary of the second question, rather than the basis of normative justice as for Hobbes and Locke, who make a pernicious error in their moral ground of man’s heteronomous desire (Kant 1991, 40–45). In response to the first two questions, Kant’s (2006, 228–229) Rousseauian reflection in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is to say that, in virtue of his reason, man is a social animal with a moral sensibility. For Kant, therefore, what can I know? demands an objective knowledge of the things in the world that is suited to, and derived from, man’s capacity for autonomy. Further, because autonomy translates into the idea of freedom that affirms Morality, it is also the key to what I ought to do. Firstly, though, it is fruitful to consider the German intellectual climate of the eighteenth century, especially the Pantheism Controversy [Pantheismustreit] and the Storm and Stress [Sturm und Drang], which challenge man’s capacity for reason. Further, we reflect upon the contribution of Moses Mendelssohn, whose clarification of enlightenment [Aufklärung] in opposition to these challenges motivates Kant’s vision of maturity.

Between Martin Luther’s publication of the Disputation against Scholastic Theology in 1517 and Friedrich II’s coronation in 1740, the German speaking regions of Europe suffered the Thirty Years’ War, absolutist principalities, authoritarian rule and economic stagnation. Among the intelligentsia, critical thought and political commitment were as scarce as a public culture of debate and informed opinion. Philosophers were overly professorial and parochial in comparison to their foreign counterparts, and the intellectual climate lagged behind that of England and France. But humanism slowly gained in popularity as German replaced Latin and writers started to publish in the vernacular. In the
universities, the rise of natural philosophy facilitated the secularisation of Aristotelianism away from its monopolisation by the Christian ontology of the Pietists. Further, Friedrich II was a politically enlightened, Francophile king who modernised Prussia. By the late eighteenth century Prussia—if only Berlin—had became the home of enlightenment. Amidst all this, the relation between philosophy and religion comes to the fore in the Pantheism Controversy, in which man as a subject of knowledge was at stake. Similarly, the questions of authenticity and cultural tradition were challenged by the Storm and Stress, which repudiated the use of reason to articulate social norms and anchor cultural values.

The English, Scottish and French dilemma over the appropriate balance between man and God characterised the Pantheism Controversy. It centred on the mutually exclusive belief of advocates of enlightenment, who promoted reason as the basis for objective experience, and Pietists that upheld faith as the ground of knowledge. After Leibniz’s harmonisation of reason with faith, Christian Wolff developed a secular morality that commanded allegiance on the basis of a formal ontological logic. Under pressure from the Pietists, Friedrich I expelled Wolff from his post at the rationalist, anti-Aristotelian Halle University. After sporadic flourishes between 1650 and 1730, faculties of philosophy were subject to the faculties of theology, which were headed by the Pietists under the aegis of Friedrich I. However, Wolff was re-instated upon the succession of Friedrich II to the Prussian throne, which rekindled the main philosophical debate about whether the formal, structural elements of thought, on which enlightenment was predicated, might be grounded in man. In their emphasis on the limitations of human understanding, the Pietists maintained that the principles of sufficient reason could not be deduced from formal logic. In fact, they demarcated the latter from Christian ontology in the interests of a return to the scriptures for questions about knowledge. But by the 1780s a strong anti-Pietist opposition had developed. It was spurred on by the Berlinisches Journal für Aufklärung and other publications, which advocated man as the condition of possibility for knowledge.

Parallel to the philosophical dispute between reason and faith, a moral and cultural reaction to enlightenment arose called the Storm and Stress. In the land of the Dichter und Denker, the Pantheism Controversy seemed far removed from the concerns of most people. The dispute over a pious versus abstract morality provided fertile soil for a revolt against both the enlightenment’s faith in reason as a basis for justice, as well as
its cultural enthralment with antiquity, which was perceived as a threat
to the cultural originality and unique propensity of the German lan-
guage to produce literary geniuses. The misologues of the Storm and
Stress opposed enlightenment on several fronts: truth and culture are
ends rather than a means to self-interest and profit; genius and intui-
tion should take priority over rationalism; and an idyllic, medieval sense
of Gemeinschaft ought to be promoted ahead of the nascent modern
Gesellschaft. In addition, through the Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen
journal and the two Johanns, Herder and Goethe, the highpoint of the
Storm and Stress coincided with the Pietists’ success between the 1750s
and the 1770s. An important reason why it finally lost its momentum
is the counter-Storm and Stress stance of Mendelssohn in the 1780s,
whose urban cosmopolitanism, fluency in English and introduction of
David Hume’s philosophy to Berlin prepared the ground for Kant.13
Moreover, Mendelssohn’s conception of enlightenment is further proof
that the theme of epistemological critique in the name of autonomy and
recognition, which enamours Kant and animates Hegel, depends on
Rousseau’s opening of the field discussed earlier.

In September 1784, three months prior to the publication of Kant’s
essay on the same topic, Mendelssohn’s article, “On the Question: What
does ‘To Enlighten’ Mean?” [“Über die Frage: was heißt aufklären?”],
appeared in the Berlinische Monatschrift. Albeit in the tradition of the
Haskala, or Jewish Aufklärung (GSO, 9), he begins with a clarification of
three key concepts: “civilisation [Bildung], culture [Kultur] and enlight-
enment [Aufklärung] transform social life and are the product of man’s
diligent endeavour to improve his social condition” (Mendelssohn 1981,
115). In particular, Mendelssohn suggests that culture is radically altered
by modern society. To moderate man’s efforts and ensure he does not
get lost within it, he proposes the yardstick of the “vocation of man.”14
What it amounts to is enlightenment itself, which is related to culture,
as theory is to practice. And, just as language is the best indicator of a
people’s civilisation, their level of culture is indicative of their enlight-
enment. Nevertheless, while man might be able to do without culture,
which is Mendelssohn’s (1981, 115–16) riposte to the Pietists and the
Storm and Stress, he cannot live without enlightenment.

On Mendelssohn’s reckoning, enlightenment is the intermediary of
culture, which in turn is subject to the vicissitudes of modern society.
These include a disturbance of its ranks and the status of men within
it, and only deference to the progress of enlightenment by men who
know and honour their social position can alleviate it. Should they seek to deny their common vocation and challenge the mediation of culture by enlightenment, they risk having egoism, atheism and anarchy replace it. Likewise, lavishness, effeminence, superstition and slavery would engulf culture (Mendelssohn 1981, 117–118). At the same time, it would be necessary for the enlightenment philosopher, who constantly surveys the evolution of man’s vocation, to fail to authorise the legislation necessary to prevent this in the first place. For Mendelssohn, the role of enlightenment is the safe delivery of modern culture, and together they give birth to and enable one to gauge a people’s level of civilisation. Men who know their station [Bürgeraufklärung] and perform their duty [Menschenaufklärung] are the core ingredients of an enlightened, civilised culture, and only an excess of pride in its newfound spiritual and material prosperity can negate the inevitable process of enlightenment (Mendelssohn 1981, 118–119).

KANT AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

The University of Königsberg (or, as of 2011, the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University [Kaliningrad, Russia]), where Kant was an affiliated faculty in logic, ethics, jurisprudence, geography and anthropology from 1755 up to his appointment as a professor of logic and metaphysics in 1770, is no exception to the 500-year rule of Christian ontology in German universities. Nonetheless, Kant’s frequent visits to Berlin ensured that he was committed to enlightenment, and upon the deaths of Lessing (1780) and Mendelssohn (1786) he assumed responsibility for it. There was an added urgency to Kant’s task, too. Between 1781 and 1790, the cause of the Pietists and the Storm and Stress was bolstered by the support of Friedrich Wilhelm III, the conservative son of Friedrich II, who had died in 1786 (Beck 1969, 78–179; Zammitto 1992, 7–11). The Pietists’ hold on knowledge and the Storm and Stress’ desire to rescue civilisation from an overly abstract enlightenment, which they said caused rather than mitigated a decadent culture, came to define Kant’s philosophical task: shift the ground of an objective experience of things from Christian ontology’s dogmatism to man; and, where Locke’s and Hume’s scepticism is concerned, locate the seat of knowledge in man’s reason rather than his perception. Once this is done, Kant’s epistemological critique can guarantee enlightenment and realise
man’s autonomy through Morality. But what are Kantian enlightenment and the critique it establishes?

Kant is not a philosopher to beat about the bush. Enlightenment, he proclaims:

*is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding (Kant 1970, 554; italics in the original)!*

For Kant, the scarce use of understanding results from cowardice to seize the moral moment. It leaves the door open for guardians—the Pietists, for example—who, with their dogmas that maintain us in immaturity, step in and supervise life. Self-incurred immaturity [*Unmündigkeit*] denotes how, in the face of what to think and how to act, man is unreasonable [*Unvernünftig*], unreckoning [*Unzurechnungsfähig*], helpless [*Hilflosigkeit*] and mentally dependent [*geistige Unselbständigkeit*].

Yet Kant (1970, 54–55) also argues man is unlikely to find the exit to maturity on his own; instead, he has access to a harmless form of freedom that is open to all, or the freedom to deploy reason in public discourse. In this respect, Kant (1912, 36–38) speaks of the citizen’s right and responsibility to make unconstrained use of his reason in learned circles or public debates, whereas in his private use of reason the same citizen might suffer restrictions attendant upon the duties and obligations of his civilian office. As for Mendelssohn, Kant’s citizen’s private [*Bürgeraufklärung*] and public [*Menschenaufklärung*] uses of reason have their specific place. Also, like Rousseau, who speaks of man’s political liberty in the context of a General Will, the priority lies with the latter rather than the former, the public use of reason rather than the private.

In addition, man’s *humanitas*—to recall Heidegger—of a capacity for reason, which helps Rousseau’s (1988c, 186) subject transform his self-love into autonomy through recognition, is re-iterated by Kant (1970,
58), who says to renounce enlightenment for oneself or future generations is to violate the sacred rights of mankind. A balance must be struck between a people’s intellectual freedom that carries enlightenment forward, and civil freedom, which often sets up barriers to it. With Kant, as for Mendelssohn, enlightenment is the go-between of culture. It is delivered through a head of state that, re-assured by the philosophers of enlightenment, is confident in his authority and the ability of reason to inculcate maturity without the threat of revolution (Kant 1970, 55). An enlightened king, Kant says, can tell his subjects what no republic would dare countenance: argue, debate and discuss to your hearts’ content in public, but obey when it comes to your private affairs. This is why a monarch like Friedrich Wilhelm II can rest assured that, in restricting civil freedom in order to foster autonomy through the practice of reason in public discourse, “man’s inclination and duty to think freely” eventually translates into his ability to “act freely” (Kant 1970, 59; italics in the original).

To a large extent, Kantian enlightenment is a carefully orchestrated process of the birth of reason by the midwife of critique and its early childhood nurture by the monarch’s right-hand man, the philosopher. On the basis of man’s intellectual capacities, critique mediates between the autonomy that enlightenment demands, and the public order that sustains intellectual freedom and inculcates civil freedom. Enlightenment requires a metaphysics of experience to teach man how to think freely, and subsequently a metaphysics of morals to secure the conditions for man to act freely. Indeed, these ideal answers to what can I know? and what ought I to do? define the twin axes of Kantian critique.

With regard to the first question, Beck (1949, 1–2) argues that Kant is haunted by the paradox of the logical incompatibility between the objective and subjective conditions of disciplinary knowledge. How, that is, can man produce disciplinary knowledge of both things and himself and at the same time be the origin and agent of this objective experience? In many ways, the slow but progressive development of Kant’s œuvre reflects this dilemma, especially Kant’s eventful relationship to what he calls his “mistress,” metaphysics (Beck 1969, 445), in respect of which he shifts from an infatuation with rationalism (1746–1759) to a scepticism about it as a viable epistemology (1760–1766); hereafter, Kant embraces a modest ontology for metaphysics (1766–1772) before, after a temporary separation from his mistress (1772–1780), he is reconciled with her on his terms of the synthetic a priori and a critical philosophy focused on grounding rather than broadening.16
As we noted in the previous section, Kant’s metaphysics is concerned with the threat the Pietists’ Christian ontology poses to enlightenment. They treat time and space as independent variables and apprehend a thing-in-itself that conforms to God’s order of the world, such that man’s objective experience is defined by transcendental realism that upholds a dogmatic relation between words and things (Allison 1983, 15–16; Ameriks 1992, 254). What then is wrong with Kant’s other antagonist, the sceptics, in which man’s knowledge of things is based on empirical realism?

If Descartes sets the wheels in motion, Locke extricates metaphysics from the grips of Christian ontology. His philosophical thinking is no longer concerned with scholastic ontology’s fundamental objects, the soul, the cosmos and God, but with an objective experience of a thing-in-itself, which is known to the extent that, subsequent to his perception of it, man makes sense of a thing through the light of reason. From Kant’s perspective, empirical metaphysics is dogged by the antinomies. Every time reason goes beyond experience and, because of perception that is subjective, claims to have knowledge of a thing-in-itself, it falls into unavoidable contradiction. Whilst Christian ontology’s grounding in faith suffers an inevitable decline in the age of reason, the attempt by empirical metaphysics to put the queen of the sciences, philosophy, onto a truly scientific path of broadening flounders. Philosophically, it is haunted by the fact that objective experience is dependent on perception, while politically classical liberal man acts out of interest rather than duty. What is needed to carry enlightenment forward, Kant (1991, 36) suggests, is an epistemological critique of the capacity for reason itself and all that it tries to know. Further, only a critical philosophy focused on grounding can discern if the job of finding out the nature of things is “within the limits of our knowledge, and in stating its relations to conceptions derived from experience; for these must always be the foundation of all our judgements” (Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, quoted in Beck 1969, 445).

An epistemological critique of the boundaries of reason is the Kantian key to autonomous man’s objective experience of things. Kant says that it must be possible to derive more predicates about the thing than can be obtained from an analysis of the concept of it. Knowledge of a thing has to be non-empirical and extra-conceptual, or determined by an a priori and synthetic relation. With Kant, the paradox between knower and known becomes how is it possible to extend our knowledge beyond
a given concept, independently of any experience of the thing thought through that concept (Allison 1983, 78)? For his answer, he turns neither to faith nor perception, but reason, which enjoys the “prerogative of being the ultimate touchstone of truth” (Kant 1949c, 305). Kant’s task is to vindicate reason, which in its negative moment disciplines metaphysics into a science that provides principles that guide man in the already to hand ways of thought and action (O’Neill 1992, 291). We might say he proffers an epistemological vindication of enlightenment, though it does require Kant’s synthetic a priori objective experience of things, or nothing short of a transformation of metaphysics itself (Allison 1983, 28).

Kant’s anthropocentric epistemological critique presupposes that the generically different faculties of intuition, understanding and reason satisfy the epistemic conditions necessary for objective experience. According to Kant, man’s intuition and understanding constitute form, the unifying structure of experience. Intuition and understanding also entertain a thing, which appears in the form of each faculty, whilst reason’s form is the structure of thought that is devoid of a thing. Initially, man knows a thing through his perception and sensory experience of it. The faculty of intuition’s outer and inner pure—that is, a priori—forms of space and time, which are the twin pillars of Kant’s epistemological critique, allow man to perceive things. Secondly, the thing becomes an object of the pure but general concepts of thought in the faculty of understanding. Here, the logical use of reason, the science of mathematics, manipulates the concepts of pure intuition via thinking (Parsons 1992; Beck 1969, 458–460). Thirdly, in the pure forms of the structures of thought, which are situated in the faculty of reason, the (science of the) logical use of reason orders and subordinates pure concepts (Kant 1889, 1–2).

The translation of man’s intuition of a thing into knowledge about it is completed by the transcendental unity of apperception. As a pure concept that acts as Kant’s condition for the structure of thought, the transcendental unity of apperception is the spontaneous activity of thinking that is generated by reason. It is self-consciousness as pure, unmediated thought in the faculty of reason. However, to ensure that man also experiences himself in his daily existence, Kant introduces empirical self-consciousness into the faculty of understanding. Man intuits himself, so to speak, and apperception unifies his outer intuitions in thought, which makes them into subjective things of the phenomenal world, or humanly
conditioned empirical knowledge. The transcendental “I” in Kantian man has the power of apperception that synthesises his intuitions. As a result, a thing appears to him as a phenomenon only, a thing-for-itself, to which man’s knowledge must confine itself. The cost, which Hegel will later find too extravagant, is that a thing does not appear in terms of its noumenal or in-itself quality; man can reason upon this reality, but he cannot actually know it.

In effect, Kant’s critique of reason’s limits extends a mathematical method into the empirical sciences of nature and philosophy. His metaphysics of objective experience, commonly known as transcendental idealism, drives a wedge between the conditions that effect man’s knowledge of a thing-for-itself and the extra-scientific conditions required for knowledge of a thing-in-itself. Armed with the synthetic a priori, Kant successfully challenges the Pietists’ Christian ontology of transcendental realism, in which objectivity is dogmatically adhered to. The sceptic’s antinomies are resolved, too. Man’s empirical, phenomenal knowledge leaves a thing as it is in-itself within a realm of unknown causal determinism to which everything is subject. Kant’s Copernican revolution not only re-defines objective experience through a specification of the conditions necessary for man’s knowledge of things, but a metaphysics of experience is the saviour of epistemological critique that is grounded in man’s autonomy and central to enlightenment.

**Autonomy and Morality**

Because he thinks freely through objective experience that is rendered by the faculty of understanding, a transcendental idealist with resolution and courage is able to partake in enlightenment. Kant’s epistemological critique, which is grounded in the transcendental subject’s capacity for apperception, secures man his right to intellectual freedom. But what of the civil freedom that is crucial to enlightenment? What ought I to do to be mature, such that the head of state need have no fear of the actions that flow from (my) autonomy? Kant proposes that man’s reason, which teaches him how to think freely via a metaphysics of experience, can also show man how to act freely within the confines of the laws he makes himself. He says that a practical philosophy of moral wisdom can elucidate the compatibility of autonomy with Morality (Kant 1991, 43–45). Moreover, although it grounds justice in man’s will rather than God’s,
Kant’s metaphysics of morals establishes a universal Morality in a similar vein to Christian ontology, whilst it carries forward Rousseau’s dream of liberty as obedience to a law we prescribe ourselves.

Kant believes that reason is bestowed on man as a practical faculty to help him act freely via his fundamentally good will. When man’s volition is motivated by the maxims of the will, which is a formal synthetic a priori proposition, duty as necessity is performed and the ideal legality of Morality is realised (Kant 1871, 4–13). Kant argues that man’s actions should be susceptible to universal laws because all other men possess the capacity of will, too. This potential synonymy of action gives rise to the categorical imperative, where man’s duty when he acts freely is to bear others in mind as an end and never to use them as a means. Each man is an end in himself in virtue of his will, which is the basis of human dignity (Kant 1871, 25–50). It gives every man the capacity of autos nomos—“that quality of will by which a will (independently of any object willed) is a law to itself” (Kant 1871, 55)—whence the self-legislation of universal laws that constitute Morality.

But a difficulty for Kant is the relationship between ought and is, duty and desire. Is it possible for man to be a subject of Morality and to act freely in the empirical world? In other words, Kant must show how man’s autonomy constitutes the Königsberg version of the General Will. Simultaneously, he must demonstrate how man is free within the strictures of Morality, which requires the introduction of the idea of freedom that describes the non-experiential aspect of Morality (Schneewind 1992, 314–317). Kant considers the will as a kind of causality that can be attributed to people with the capacity of reason. The idea of freedom is the property of this causality, and it enables the will to originate events independently of the empirical world (Kant 1871, 57–60). Kant’s idea of freedom thus entails will [Wille] and choice [Willkür]. Apart from its constitution of Morality, will is also the basis of man’s liberty in the shape of choice, or man’s ability to act freely. Somewhat akin to the “I” of thought and the “I” of apperception as the conditions behind Kant’s metaphysics of objective experience, Kantian moral man has the capacity of reason, will, which is present in all men as the legislative will and makes them the source of Morality, as well as the capacity for choice, or the executive will that in its ideal execution allows man to choose and act freely in accordance with the idea of freedom. Will is the negative concept of freedom and choice the positive; or, as Henry Allison (1983,
129) describes them, the capacity of autonomy or moral agency, and spontaneous subjectivity or rational agency. Together, they constitute Morality, in which duty and desire are compatible.

Through the mediations of choice, which relates man back to his will every time he acts, spontaneous subjectivity is a reflexive task of self-discipline (O’Neill 1992, 292–295), an arbitrium liberum, where any hint of desire is immediately sent up to the brain for cleansing (Beck 1993, 41–42). Nonetheless, Kant worries that while it is possible to demonstrate in theory how duty and desire coincide, it may not be so easy in practice. To prove Morality’s reality and objective necessity to man in his spontaneous subjectivity requires an escape from the whirlpool of the idea of unmediated freedom, and Kant (1871, 62) wonders if we do not “occupy an entirely different station, when we regard ourselves, as by means of freedom, spontaneous a priori causes, from that station which we hold when we represent to ourselves our actions as events in the system we see presented to our senses[?]”

It is in the Critique of Practical Reason that Kant elaborates man’s dual stations and talks of the idea of freedom as the keystone of the whole architecture of human reason. Freedom is the ratio essendi of Morality, and Morality is the ratio cognoscendi of autonomy (Kant 1949a, 118–120). Whereas he proclaims in the Critique of Pure Reason that man experiences things as phenomena, Kant (1949a, 124–144) now argues that practical reason gives man access to the idea of freedom, namely, man as a thing-in-itself. The essential point is that from his phenomenal station man cannot establish any universal maxims that can be willed into Morality. Indeed, in the empirical world man is exposed to pathological phenomena that result in heteronomy, which is an arbitrary, contingent ground for Morality and the antithesis of the universal inclinations of the will. Only the noumenal station, where there is the autonomy of the will, satisfies the key Kantian issues of obligation, duty and universal Morality (Kant 1871, 99–100). And, because normative justice demands that man be represented through his capacity for the idea of freedom, Kant (1991, 65) implies that man has a sense of himself as both a transcendental [homo noumenon] and empirical [homo phenomenon] subject. In the language of enlightenment, intellectual freedom has the right of way over civil freedom, yet it requires Kant (1871, 138–139; italics in the original) to bifurcate man between the transcendental and the empirical worlds:
that necessity of nature, which may not consort with the freedom of the subject, attaches singly to the modifications of a thing standing under conditions of time, *i.e.*, to the modifications of the acting subject as phenomenon; ... yet, *e contra*, the self-same subject ... considers its existence as somewhat, detached from conditions of time, and itself, so far forth, as only determinable by laws given it by its own reason [as the acting subject as] ... noumenon.

**ENLIGHTENMENT INTO SPIRIT**

To realise the free thought and action pivotal to maturity, Kant advocates a metaphysics of experience that gives man an objective knowledge of things, together with a metaphysics of morals in which man’s autonomy enables freedom and the constitution of Morality. However, his epistemological critique that depends on the faculty of understanding to limit reason also requires a transcendental subject to bear Morality in mind every time he acts as an empirical subject in the world. Essentially, enlightenment works as a thought experiment, yet it can only work on the ground if the subject is ethically cleansed of any content, and whilst Hegel applauds Kant’s distinction between reason and understanding, he rejects the discipline of the former by the latter. Reason, Hegel claims, proffers an objective experience of things as they are rather than as they appear, and the task of epistemological critique is to ensure that thinking freely is synonymous with being. Also, because the formality and abstractness of Morality bifurcate man’s will from his choice, Hegel seeks to reconcile this fundamental dualism through a higher systematic unity (Pippin 1989, 44). In an effort to ensure the duties of the transcendental subject coincide with the desires of the empirical, he gives content and substance to Morality through Ethical Life, which enables the self-actualisation of the autonomous subject. With absolute idealism and the prioritisation of recognition as the means to autonomy, Hegel introduces the post-enlightenment world of Spirit [*Geist*], and in this section we elaborate Hegel’s critique of Kant’s metaphysics of objective experience and morals before, in the last two sections, we consider Hegel’s epistemological critique of man’s phenomenology of objective experience and his science of socially mediated recognition.

Hegel’s theory of rational knowledge personifies Kant’s conception of metaphysics, or the endeavour to know the unconditioned through reason alone (Beiser 1993, 4–7). However, Hegel’s epistemological
critique portrays man’s objective experience through absolute idealism. He grounds it in a relation between words and things that is neither dogmatic, nor sceptical, nor critical, but ideal. It represents the apotheosis of three criticisms levelled at Kant: that of the Pietists, who criticised Kant on grounds of causality; the post-Kantian idealists, most notably Johann Fichte, who spearheaded the search for knowledge of a thing-in-itself; and Friedrich Schelling, who completed the return of German philosophy to neo-Platonic idealism. Still, for Fichte and Schelling, Kant’s metaphysics is absurd in its method of the prioritisation of understanding, but correct in the problem of grounding it is derived from (Pippin 1989, 45–65; Nelson 1971, 26–59). Hegel, who takes on board Fichte’s concern with the reality of things, endeavours to complete this reconciliation. He says Kant errs in his prioritisation of the understanding and the straight jacket he designs for reason. To examine knowledge in an attempt to establish its conditions is akin to the resolution not to venture into the water until one has learnt to swim. Kant rightly takes man beyond the traditional love of knowledge, but he denies the Platonic concept of reason its right to know a thing-in-itself, which would give man access to the true structure of the world (Hartnack 1987, 77–81). Hegel (1977, 3–9) thus distances himself from Kant’s metaphysics that grounds objective experience in a monochromatic formalism. To do so, he reconceives Schelling’s Absolute as Spirit, which depends on a relation of philosophical identity between thought and reality. Indeed, the latter is idealised up into the former to establish a unity. Scientific philosophy grasps a thing in- and for-itself as an ontologically primary substance and a subject, which is not unlike “a Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunken” (Hegel 1977, 10–14, 27). Hegel thus says reason is constitutive of truth and not just regulative of its apparent possibility (Lukács 1978, 75–78; Priest 1987, 4–12). Man’s knowledge of things must go the full distance and over into things; Hegel’s absolute idealism, where Spirit is substituted for the unity of apperception, endeavours to do just this (Walsh 1987, 211).

Without the philosophical reign of reason over the understanding, the transformation of the post-Reformation vision into the world of Spirit, where thought can govern reality and autonomy is real, remains a dream. And so Hegel’s scientific philosophy entails a shift from transcendental idealism’s ground of the unmediated experience of man, to absolute idealism’s unmediated experience of Spirit. Hegel substitutes Kant’s notion
of the a priori and the analytic-synthetic propositions of reason with
the concept of Spirit and dialectical reason, respectively. With his meta-
physics of absolute idealism, Hegel deems himself to have overcome the
four core problems of Kant’s metaphysics of objective experience: it is
finite, or limited to understanding; it is subjective, which implies things
are dependent on man; it is abstract, or, insofar as things are conceived
atomistically and not relationally, undialectical; and it is personal, for
reality is constructed psychologically, not socially. When it comes to the
question of freedom, Hegel says Morality is positive because it establishes
the autonomous subject as the hinge on which epistemological critique
swings. But he also claims that with Kant philosophy reaches the summit
and the limit of the concept of the autonomous, self-conscious will.25 As
Robert Pippin (1989, 35–36) argues, Hegel wants to reformulate the
very concept of subjectivity by attacking the post-Cartesian assumptions
that deny consciousness can be a spectator of itself and the world, and
asserting that at the same time subjectivity is socially mediated.

Of Hegel’s four main criticisms of Kantian Morality, it is his classical
objection to Kant’s abstract universalism and moral formalism—with the
latent terrorism of its pure conviction and the impotency of its “ought”
in relation to practice (Habermas 1993, 327–331 and 333, f. 5)—which
are most relevant to a post-enlightenment reconciliation of autonomy
with recognition (Allison 1990, 180–191). Firstly, Hegel argues that
the transcendental subject, who has the lord of duty in himself, legis-
lates himself into rather than out of immaturity. The difference between
the soul of medieval Christianity, Hegel (The Spirit of Christianity and
Its Fate, quoted in Allison 1990, 185) writes, and Kant’s transcendental
subject, whose formal idea of freedom obliges him toward the universal
duties of Morality,

is not that the former make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but
that the former have their lord outside themselves, while the latter car-
rries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own slave. For the par-
ticular—impulses, inclinations, pathological love, sensuous experience, or
whatever else it is called—the universal is necessarily and always something
alien and objective.

The reigns to how to think and act freely, which Kant wrestled from
Christian ontology and commandeered with critical philosophy’s twin
moments of objectivity and Morality, are effectively ceded by the abstract
universalism of the latter, and it falls to Hegel to remind the philosopher of enlightenment that man belongs to this world \([\text{Diesseits}]\) rather than an abstract beyond \([\text{Jenseits}]\).

Secondly, the empirical subject is separated from the key aspect of the particular, or what Hegel’s student, Ludwig Feuerbach, coined as man’s “species-being.” Insofar as he performs pure duty from the abstract beyond that is unfathomable to man, the formality of Kantian Morality merely exacerbates the transcendental subject’s tyranny over the empirical subject. Each time the latter is tempted by the particular, his transcendental capacity for autonomy carries him back to the purgatory in which enlightenment is suspended, Morality. Kant’s intellectual and civil freedom, which are based on the capacities of will and choice, fail to reconcile man to himself. The diremption that Hegel and his generation believe Plato first grapples with persists in enlightenment, and Rousseau’s (1988b, 116) analysis of social man, who lives constantly outside himself and through opinion, “so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others,” remains unsolved, if not exacerbated by Kant’s bifurcation of man into a transcendental and an empirical subject.\(^{26}\)

**Hegel and Absolute Idealism**

Hegel’s critique of Kant expresses the insecurity of a generation traumatised by The Terror in France and the bloody adventures of Napoleon, and thus apprehensive about the consequences of enlightenment.\(^{27}\) Because a metaphysics of objective experience does not actually grasp the truth of the world, Kant’s epistemological critique leaves man at the centre of it without really being there. Relatedly, the metaphysics of morals outlines the conceptual armoury of freedom, but it does no more than provide man with abstract and formal strategies about how to exercise it. Man’s ability to think and act freely needs re-assurance, and in the prefatory and introductory remarks to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel charges scientific philosophy with knowledge of a thing-in-itself, which reconciles the essence of man-in-himself with the empirical world. Further, in opposition to Romanticism’s flight into the abstract Absolute and its treatment of the state as a servant of man’s emotions and feelings, Hegel (1991, 18) makes philosophy exoteric and intelligible to the man on the Jena horse-cart. For the most part, however, Hegel’s
phenomenology is an epistemological critique of philosophy’s historical modes of knowledge, which includes Kantian critical philosophy, and he seeks to channel it into a scientific mode that reconciles man to himself in Spirit and Ethical Life.²⁸

Although it is not a dialectical method, phenomenology describes the historical modes of individual knowing and the socially knowable (K. R. Westphal 1998, 84–85). The phenomenology of social experience depicts the dialectic of man’s desire, which involves his consciousness of the socio-cultural limits of each historical mode of knowledge. Phenomenology portrays how man raises himself up [aufheben] through modes of social experience.²⁹ These culminate in Spirit’s frustration by the limits of enlightenment. Man’s social experience is examined in the next section in terms of the recognition that is fulfilled in Ethical Life (Hegel 1977, 55–56), but for the moment we focus on man’s individual experience of the dialectic of knowing and its modes of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. In his individual experience, that is, man becomes aware of himself through his recognition of his otherness from things in terms of sense-certainty, perception and Kantian understanding (Hegel 1977, 58–102). Hegel especially criticises the last of these, the transcendental subject’s “wanderlust” born of the will to know (M. Westphal 1998, 129), because it allows understanding to mediate between man’s reason and things. What man finds is that his truth is something other than himself, which only his post-enlightenment individual experience of Spirit’s moment as reason and man’s social experience of Ethical Life can resolve (Hegel 1977, 35). In other words, we must get behind the truth of appearance and discover “what consciousness knows in knowing itself” (Hegel 1977, 103; italics in the original).

In terms of man’s experience of objectivity, in Kant’s tautology, “I am I,” man is unmediated being-for-himself. Hegel’s goal is to demonstrate that man’s attainment of transcendental subjectivity commences in the dialectic of the embodied subject’s animal desire for self-preservation (M. Westphal 1990, 122–126). Originally located in the world, man’s animal desire moves him to satisfy his material needs by reproduction, which entails an expression of individuality that places him at the centre of the world, yet dirempts him from the universality it manifests. Importantly, individuality is the pre-condition for man’s human desire for recognition (Hegel 1977, 108–109).³⁰ It designates man’s notion of himself and the aims he strives for, which can only be fulfilled by the
recognition of another self-consciousness (Taylor 1975, 137–138). Human desire thus implores man to leave behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now, as well as the Kantian “nightlike void of the supersensible beyond;” only then, Hegel (1977, 110–111) claims, can the subject step out into the spiritual illuminations of the present where recognition takes place.

But before man can step into post-enlightenment daylight, in which scientific philosophy reigns in Spirit’s world of the infinite living unity of all things, Hegel must first chart the phenomenological journey that transforms animal desire into human desire (Lamb 1980, 156–159). The satisfaction of human desire through recognition—the reciprocal esteem, value and acknowledgement of worth between two people—is precipitated by the acknowledgement between men of the existence of others in their individuality, as well as by the universal endeavour of all men toward Spirit. In reference to Kant, Hegel (1977, 112) says that man recognises that others are not utilisable for his own purposes. Also, to show the other that he is independent of the world necessitates that each man abolish the things upon which his animal desire depends. Yet neither man can labour on things while the other watches. It demands that he risk his life to impress the other. Similarly, it implies that the other already possesses pure self-consciousness, which would make him the sole arbiter of man’s independence. As a result, they engage in a life-and-death struggle to demonstrate their independence from animal desire and receive the recognition that each man’s being-for-itself is his essence.

Although the death of either would obviously be self-defeating, Hegel suggests that through this experience the subject learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness (Hegel 1977, 112–115). The human desire for permanent recognition awakens man to the fact of his material dependence on the world. At the same time, he becomes aware that human desire incorporates a spiritual need for freedom, which only recognition can afford. Indeed, such is his desire for freedom that man risks death to procure it, for to follow the impulse of appetite is inhuman, whilst the unloved life is not worth living. Thus, the life-and-death struggle ends in a truce, where one man is independent and a being-for-himself, whilst his opponent remains embroiled in nature as a being-for-another. Instead of the mutual reciprocity that is desired, their mutual fear of death enforces the first social relation of inequality in the shape of the dependence between the lord and bondsman.
Nonetheless, Hegel is quick to dispel the intuition that the lord prospers from socio-economic inequality. His recognition is dependent on the servile, unessential consciousness of the bondsman, whilst in his relation to the world, which is mediated by the bondsman, the lord’s recognition is contingent and impermanent. To the extent that he does not labour, he is alienated from his species-being, or animal desire. What is absent is the absolute certainty of the truth of himself, which only another autonomous subject can provide (Hegel 1977, 117). Like a jilted lover, the lord is left to equivocate whether his being-for-himself is indeed who he essentially is.

By contrast, through work the bondsman fulfils his desire and avoids a fleeting relation to the world, as work forms and shapes things (Hegel 1977, 118). It is through the bondsman’s formative activity, when labour as the reproduction of needs becomes work as the production of socio-cultural goods, that he gives an element of permanence to the world and establishes his independence from it (Bernstein 1984, 34–35). Work socialises man’s animal desire into reflexive, human desire. It gives the bondsman freedom within the permanent order of things, and through his capacity to be autonomous the bondsman posits himself as a being-for-himself whose recognition is derived from the things he produces. In opposition to Kant’s identity of identity without difference, or the unmediated subject who intuits things in picture-thoughts without reflection, there is Hegel’s (1977, 119–120) bondsman’s identity of identity and difference, or an actual rather than a virtual subject that know things in concepts. The bondsman knows himself and the world because he transforms the things that constitute it (Westphal 1990, 122–126).

It is in virtue of the bondsman’s absolute mediation of the world through concepts, Hegel (1977, 21) argues, that man raises himself up from the world and becomes a transcendental subject. Where Kant posits the transcendental subject as his condition of possibility for epistemological critique, Hegel examines the conditions of possibility for the transcendental subject (Wood 1990, 91). From Socrates to Descartes and Kant, transcendental philosophy uses a constructive metaphysics with its logical circle of knowing before you know. In contrast, Hegel’s descriptive epistemological critique departs from man’s individual embodied consciousness as one phenomenon in the world of phenomena and climaxes in the social experience of Spirit (Lamb 1980, 3–41). Through the bondsman Hegel shows how man’s self-understanding and (an
unequal) society are born together. The lord-bondsman relation is the superstructure of the human desire for recognition. Albeit subsequent to the satisfaction of animal desire’s material needs, it is only fulfilled where there is equality (Westphal 1990, 136–138). Phenomenological critique is a dialogue between man’s individual and social experience, between the historicity of man’s modes of consciousness, which culminate in the human desire for recognition, and the history of man’s practico-social conditions, which make this experience possible (Hegel 1977, 55–56). For its part, Hegel’s scientific philosophy apprehends the post-enlightenment world of the rational state, where the journey of the transcendental subject of reason collides with the progress of the historical career of Spirit that is manifest as Ethical Life.

**Recognition and Ethical Life**

Hegel’s epistemological critique identifies the social modes of experience of mind, religion and absolute knowledge, which mirror man’s individual experience of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. Yet, because the individual is dirempted from the social, Spirit is imperfectly manifest in the first two modes of social experience. It is only in the post-enlightenment dispensation, when Hegel observes how social experience is mediated by Ethical Life, that subjectivity is resolved as self-certain Spirit. In this way, individual experience as reciprocal recognition leads to the union of the subjective in the objective (Westphal 1992, 116–129).

Spirit, however, has a long history and first appears as Ethical Life in Greek antiquity. Here, it is bifurcated between the *polis*, where duty and customs determine the citizen’s immediate social experience, and the *oikos*, in which the citizen’s autonomy only allows him unmediated individual experience. Subsequently, in Greco-Roman antiquity, Spirit as empire overcomes communal Ethical Life. The primacy of law supersedes custom, and apart from his socio-political roles the citizen’s non-legal experience is irrelevant to the rights-based empire. After the extreme of immediate social experience in Athens, the opposite of unrecognised individual experience in Rome causes antiquity to founder. Similarly, diremption persists in medieval Christianity through to 1789. Self-estranged Spirit is manifest as man’s attempt to know nature and to place himself at the centre of a garden of Eden (Westphal 1990, 154–172). It results in a split between the material world, where a struggle ensues between absolutist state power and capitalist wealth, and a schism in the transcendental world between faith and enlightenment, which results
in the dominance of the latter’s rational will (Taylor 1975, 396–416). Finally, after 1789 Spirit migrates to Berlin, where it emerges in Kant’s Morality as self-certain Spirit, or man who has being-for-himself and dignity irrespective of who one is (Ritter 1982, 151–158).

Hegel’s history of man’s socio-moral experience and his historicity of man’s epistemologico-individual experience is a descriptive critique of the historical estrangement of the individual from the social. Although enlightenment prepares the ground for their reconciliation, it ultimately fails to re-assure the autonomous subject of the self-actualisation necessary for recognition. Thus, in addition to the epistemological critique of man’s individual experience of objectivity, Hegel’s (1991, 21–23) scientific philosophy of right allows him both to explore the rationality of man’s social experience and to apprehend in thought the presence of Ethical Life, where the particular is reconciled to the universal. As with Rousseau, Hegel conceives of freedom as an intersubjective question insofar as man is born socially and his subjectivity is a posteriori to politically mediated recognition. The transcendental subject’s human desire is tantamount to a will or mode of thought that translates itself into existence due to its need to know itself as united in its innermost being, which can only be comprehended through others within the norms of community (Hegel 1991, 11). If Rousseau implies autonomy and recognition, and Kant perfects the former to the abstract and formal detriment of the latter, Hegel (1991, 196–197) concretises autonomy via recognition, for the right of individuals to their subjective determination of freedom is only possible insofar as they belong to an ethical actuality where the certainty of freedom finds its affirmation.

As Taylor (1975, 23–49) suggests, Hegel’s philosophy of right attempts to re-unify the radical freedom of the capacity of autonomy with man’s desire for recognition. Man willingly fulfils—indeed, finds his liberation in—his duties to the social institutions and practices of Ethical Life. As they determine his character, they make duty synonymous with virtue. And, if a virtue that is essential to man’s character can be called a custom, then duty appears as habit to him (Hegel 1991, 189–196). The gap between duty and desire, which is expressed by Kant through homo noumenon and homo phenomenon, is reconciled through the individual and social journeys of “homo dialecticus” (DEI, 414), who depends on Ethical Life for his self-actualisation. Man’s purpose is to will his free will through each dialectical stage of abstract right and Morality until, in Ethical Life via the mediation of the family and civil society, the concept of freedom determines the content of the rational state (Hegel
Homo dialecticus proceeds from a being-in-himself with abstract right to a being-for-himself with subjective freedom and, finally with Hegel (1991, 74–78, 136–138, 185–189), to a being-for-himself for and with another, or autonomy in the context of recognition. That is, man’s desire for recognition is realised in Ethical Life. In its highest actuality, his freedom is self-actualised in the context of the rational state, or “freedom in its most concrete shape, which is subordinate only to the supreme absolute truth of the world spirit” (Hegel 1991, 64).

In Ethical Life, the “I” knows himself in the “we” in virtue of Spirit, which incorporates aspects of the divine insofar as it is causa sui and the ground of man’s actions and his goal and purpose (Westphal 1990, 138–146). Ethical Life is a concept that remains true to Kant’s idea of freedom, which links the transcendental subject to Morality, whilst Hegel’s Aristotelianism enables him to introduce the human desire for recognition as a fundamental human need (Wood 1990, 216–217; O’Hagan 1987, 137–138). Through his return to Aristotle, Hegel’s state is able to realise the ethical idea (Avineri 1972, 176–179). Kant’s bifurcated man that is pulled in the direction of the abstract formalism of Morality is reconciled by homo dialecticus, who has personality safeguarded by abstract right, autonomy in the realm of morality, and recognition in Ethical Life.31

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**Notes**

1. Hobbes (1985, Chaps. I–III) calls man’s mental reaction to a sensation an idea, an idea committed to memory an image, the consciousness of an image imagination, all images remembered sensory experience and, insofar as he uses his memory to foresee and react to new sensations, man’s orientation by this experience is prudence.

2. As Etienne Balibar (1996, 233–234) argues, Locke also introduces philosophy to the concepts of the self (hence, das Selbst and le soi [in place of le moi]), consciousness (thus, das Bewusstsein instead of conscience, das Gewissen), self-consciousness (das Selbst-Bewusstsein and le conscience de soi), and personal identity.


4. Rousseau (1988b, 65) speaks of the need to avoid the blunders of those “who, in reasoning on the state of nature, always import into it ideas gathered in a state of society,” an example of which is the confusion between “an explanation of how languages already formed are taught, … [which] by no means explains how languages were originally formed.” The answer to the problem of the origin of language, Rousseau (1988b,
89) continues, can be discerned from men collected and compelled to live together, where “a common idiom must have arisen much more easily than among those who still wandered through the forests.”

5. Rousseau (1988b, 67) alludes to language as the condition of possibility for knowledge, as “general ideas cannot be introduced into the mind without the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them except by means of propositions…. [I]mages … [and p]urely abstract beings … are only conceivable by the help of language.”

6. To the extent that Kant saw anthropology as knowledge of the world (as opposed to knowledge of nature, which he addressed in his university lectures on physical geography), “we could reckon all of … [these questions] as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last” (Kant 1885, 9: 25). Although this is the reading that Foucault gives in The Order of Things (see Chap. 4 below), for present purposes we treat each question independently of the other.

7. Kant (1949a, 214−249) argues that God cannot be the ratio determinans antecedenter of things, although a ratio cognoscendi of God’s existence is possible as a derivative concept and crucial, along with the idea of immortality, to a moral teleology.

8. In our analysis of what ought I to do? we focus on the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. The former classifies and the latter justifies the supreme principle of Morality, autonomy, whereas the Metaphysics of Morals applies it. Henry Allison (1990, 66−67) calls this Kant’s mature doctrine, rather than his semi-critical doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason. Further, although Mary Gregor (1991) argues it is unfortunate that the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and not the Metaphysics of Morals, is taken as Kant’s definitive position on Morality, the Metaphysics of Morals is arguably the least significant of Kant’s works on Morality (Beck 1949, 16−17).

9. The Sturm und Drang can also be translated as Storm and Urge or Storm and Drive. We follow Bruce Kieffer (1986) and Alan Leidner (1992) and adopt Storm and Stress.

10. Friedrich II’s Codex Fridericianus (1747) established a Prussian judiciary, which upheld religious diversity and abolished the use of torture, whilst his Allgemeines preussisches Landrecht (1796) combined natural law with German and Roman law.

11. Though, as Peter Gay (1973b, 47−72) and John Randall (1965) argue, a more commercially driven enlightenment occurs beyond Prussia, too, in Frankfurt-am-Main, Halle, Hanover, Hamburg, Leipzig and Dresden.

12. For the background context discussed in this paragraph and the two that follow, see Pascal (1953, 40−67), Engell (1981, 91−101), Wolff (1949, 65−255), Randall (1965, 50−58), Hegel (1956, 427−439), Zammito (1992, 11−22), and Brunschwig (1974, 1−95).
13. This is not to suggest that Kant is influenced by Mendelssohn’s essay. Indeed, on the day he finishes his own essay on enlightenment, Kant (1970, 60, note) says “I read today … [of] Mendelssohn’s answer to the same question…. I have not yet seen this journal, otherwise I should have held back the above reflections. I let them stand only as a means of finding out by comparison how far the thoughts of two individuals may coincide by chance.”

14. On the prevalence and meaning of the “vocation of man” [die Bestimmung des Menschen] in seventeenth and eighteenth century German philosophy, see Grimm and Grimm (1854, 1678–1679).

15. On the semantics of Unmündigkeit from Luther to Kant, see Grimm and Grimm (1936, 1192–1195).


18. An intuition can only be lent meaning if man is aware of the intuition as his own. It must of necessity be possible (though not necessarily actual) for man to reflectively attach “I think” to his intuition. This is the “I” of apperception. But man’s intuition of a thing, which is initially as a single complex thought, must be grasped as a unity, which requires a single thinking subject. This is the task of the Kantian “I,” the unity of consciousness, which is evident in every act of thought. As the “I” of apperception and the “I” of thought are indissolubly one, they signify a logically simple subject, man. They are contained together in the concept of thought, and the transcendent unity of apperception is hence an analytic proposition about man qua transcendental subject. The gymnastics of Kant’s transcendent unity of apperception are also detailed in Allison (1983, 258–278, 137–139), Hatfield (1992), Wartenberg (1992), Nelson (1970, 204–205), Brook (1994, 11–91), and Guyer (1992, 12–15).

19. For Allison (1983, 25–26; italics in the original), “Kant’s idealism is ‘formal’ in the sense that it is a theory about the nature and scope of the conditions under which objects can be experienced or known by the human mind. This is to be contrasted with idealisms of the Cartesian or Berkeleyan [sic] sort, which are first and foremost theories about the contents of consciousness…. Again, this idealism is ‘critical’ because it is rounded in a reflection on the conditions and limits of human knowledge, and not on the contents of consciousness or the nature of an sich reality.”

20. When man’s maxims relate to external actions and conform to law, they are juridical and the action has legality, and when in relation to external
actions man’s maxims conform to Morality, they are ethical and the action is moral (Kant 1991, 42).

21. The Latin origins of *Wille*, *Voluntas*, and *Willkür*, *Arbitrium*, draw out their difference well (Hegel 1991, 399, f. 2).

22. Kant (1949a, 195–201) is reluctant to attribute freedom to man under the concept of causality, as it abandons him as *homo phenomenon* to blind chance in the empirical world. So the concept of causality of freedom is attributed to the same man as *homo noumenon*. In fact, both of Kant’s revolutions, the Copernican and Rousseauian, stand or fall on this separation, for they contain mutually incompatible concepts that would, as Kant acknowledges, contradict each other were there not the distinction between *homo noumenon* and *homo phenomenon*.

23. Until Hegel demarcates them, Ethical Life and Morality are synonymous in the work of Mendelssohn, Kant and Germanophone philosophy generally (Inwood 1992, 12–13).

24. In 1799 Fichte was accused of atheism for his belief that God is a moral force rather than a person. He was forced to leave the University of Jena—he moved to the University of Berlin—and Schelling, who later secured Hegel the post of *Privatdozent*, replaced Fichte. Later, in 1816 and after a short tenure at the University of Heidelberg, Hegel succeeded Fichte at Berlin (Inwood 1992, 20–22).


27. Although, as Roger Chartier (1994, 177) argues, it is important to avoid an “oversimplification of any analysis of the French Revolution that plays the game of retrospective dovetailing to inscribe 1793 in 1789 … [or] terrorist violence in the theory of the general will.”


29. *Aufhebung* in its verbal form, *aufheben*, denotes that which is contained in a new mode of experience. To proceed to his new individual-social unity, man has to sublate present contradictions, even modify them out of their original, particular sense, in order to move on to his real and universal experience in Spirit. See Forster (1993), Sallis (1998, 49, f. 7), Taylor (1975, 117–119), and Jagentowicz Mills (1998, 243).

30. Individuality should not be confused with identity, which is the outcome of the intersubjective relation of recognition that is fulfilled in Ethical
Life. Individuality is unmediated and man’s being-for-himself is temporary and dependent on the world.

31. Hegel (quoted in Westphal 1990, 131–135) uses the conceptual metaphor of love to aid the comprehension of recognition in Ethical Life; that is, “only in love are we one with the object, neither dominating nor dominated, a reciprocal giving and taking, a Juliet: the more I give to thee, the more I have”. We see “only ourselves in the beloved, and in turn, we see the beloved as not ourselves.”

References


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