Abstract  Here, I defend the plausibility of the view that abortion constitutes a seriously harmful action. I will do so by defending two arguments in favour of ascribing the foetus a right to life: the deprivation argument and the substance view. These views cannot, however, establish the moral risk of abortion by themselves, since abortion rights can be defended by the so-called Good Samaritan argument according which abortion is permissible, even though it is granted that the foetus has a right to life. The question is consequently whether this argument can make the substance view and the deprivation argument irrelevant. I argue that this is not the case by trying to demonstrate that the Good Samaritan argument cannot justify abortion rights generally but only, at best, abortion under certain circumstances.

Keywords  The deprivation argument • The substance view • The good samaritan argument • Uncertainty argument

In this chapter, I defend the plausibility that abortion constitutes a serious harmful action. For this, I begin by defending two arguments in favour of ascribing the foetus a right to life, namely the Deprivation
Argument and the Substance View. However, it is important to note that a defence of the plausibility of ascribing a foetus a right to life is not a sufficient argument for defending the plausibility that abortion constitutes a serious harmful action. This is the case because a defence of abortion can be based on the so-called Good Samaritan argument, according to which abortion is permissible, even though it is granted that the foetus has a right to life. I will deal with this argument subsequently in this chapter, since its relevance depends on whether I can make a case for the plausibility of ascribing foetuses a right to life. This chapter therefore unfolds in the following way: I, first, introduce the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View and defend the plausibility of these views. I then turn to the Good Samaritan argument and critically review whether it can justify abortion and thereby make the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View irrelevant. I end this chapter with some general remarks on how the moral risk of abortion on the basis of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View can be managed by the state, paving the way for the next chapter in which these questions will be analysed in depth.

2.1 Defending the Right to Life of the Unborn: The Deprivation Argument and the Substance View

I take my point of departure from two reconstructions of each argument. Here is one version of the argument against abortion according to the substance view:

1. The unborn entity, from the moment of conception, is a person.
2. It is prima facie morally wrong to kill a person.
3. An unborn entity is killed in an abortion.

Therefore, abortion is prima facie morally wrong.

And here is one version of the deprivation argument:

1. Foetuses have a future of value.
2. Having a future of value is the basis of the right not to be killed.
3. Foetuses are killed in abortion.

Therefore, abortion is impermissible.

A common premise in the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View for ascribing the foetus a right to life is that the individual who is being killed is the same organism as the one whose future is being deprived. This identity claim is implied by Substance View as the foetus is considered as a person and is defended by proponents of the Deprivation Argument as they argue that the individual who is being killed in an abortion is the same organism as the one whose future is being deprived. Both views rest, consequently, on the assumption that we as humans are essentially organisms. I will therefore start by arguing for the plausibility of the organism view.

I then turn to the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View specifically, starting by explicating the more modest identity claim of the former position. I then add the stronger claim of the latter position that the foetus is not only the same organism as the future person, but is in fact already a person. Defending the position that the foetus is a person is the most controversial part of the Substance View objection to abortion. Once this position is accepted, most philosophers would be inclined to ascribe such an entity a right to life, which means that I will not here defend the move from the claim that the foetus is a person to the claim that the foetus therefore has a right to life.

2.1.1 The Organism View

The organism view states that we are essentially organisms, which are “beings that have the capacity to carry on certain life processes” (Liao 2006a, 336). Such processes may include metabolism, growth, responsiveness, movement, and reproduction (Liao 2006a, 336). Here, I take the position that the organism view implies that we: (a) begin to exist when the individual organism begins to exist, which is “when the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic processes is there”; that we (b) persist as long as there is “continuing ability to regulate and
coordinate metabolic processes”; and that we (c) cease to exist “when the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life processes is permanently gone” (Liao 2006a, 337).

Strong arguments can be made in defence of the organism view, as it seems to capture our understanding of the biological world. As Matthew Liao concludes, “it is fairly uncontroversial to hold that bacteria, plants and lower non-conscious animals are numerically identical to their organisms” (2006a, 338). As we share the above-mentioned life processes with these organisms as humans, why would we be any different? Not least in the light of evolutionary theory does it seem implausible to reject the organism view. If neither we nor our earlier generations were animals, does that then mean that our more distant ancestors were not organisms? If so, then the rejection of the organism view implies the rejection of evolutionary theory, which seems costly (Blatti 2016).

Another argument in favour of the organism view was made by its most prominent defender, Eric T. Olson, as early as 1997. According to him, the organism view can explain foetal development better than can its alternatives. If we were not foetuses some time ago, but rather came to existence some months before or after birth—which is proposed by many opponents to the organism view—then what happened to the organism? According to Eric Olson, two options are available: either the foetus ceased to exist or the foetus survived separately from me but came to share its matter with me (1997, 100). The first option obviously addresses the question “why a foetus should perish simply because … it (or rather its successor) came to be able to think” (Olson 1997, 101). The second solution—that a foetus survived separately from me but came to share its matter with me—leads to the so-called “too-many-thinkers problem” for views that reject the organism view. The argument underlying the too-many-thinkers problem can be formalized as follows (Blatti 2016, 163):

(P1) There is a human animal currently located where you are.
(P2) The human animal currently located where you are is thinking.
(P3) You are the thinking being currently located where you are.
(C) Therefore, the human animal currently located where you are is you.
If you and the one who is located where you are is not the same—that is, if you and the organism are not the same—then there would seem to be two entities located where you are thinking. Such a conclusion can be deemed implausible in itself, but it moreover leads to other and well-known implausible implications. If I say that I am sitting in the chair thinking, who is the one who utters “I”—the person or the organism? As Steinvör Árnadóttir explains,

… the referent of “I” is usually taken to be the thinker or speaker of the thought or the utterance, but if the animal and the person are distinct, and both have the capacity for thought, then we get a competition for the reference of “I”. (2011, 576)

This competition for the reference of “I” leads in turn to problems to do with meaning, truth, and the individuation of thoughts (Árnadóttir 2013, 576). There are other implausible implications as well, but for the purpose of this book, it is sufficient to conclude that this argument threatens the plausibility of alternatives to the organism view (Árnadóttir 2013; Blatti 2016).5

There are consequently strong reasons to believe in the correctness of the organism view. However, there are likewise reasons to believe that this view is wrong, and that the main alternative view—the neo-Lockean account—is correct. Perhaps the strongest, but certainly not the only, argument against the organism view is said to be revealed by thought experiments that include the transplantation of the cerebrum of one’s brain.7 Here is one recent version of it (Toner 2011, 75):

I go into the hospital, where my cerebrum is carefully removed, leaving a living (but cerebrum-less) animal on the table where I laid down. That cerebrum is then transplanted into a living but previously cerebrum-less human animal on another table. That latter living human animal wakes up a little while later, and finds itself with all my attitudes and memories and inclinations and loves. Where am I?

How have defenders of the animalist position responded to the fact that most people seem to be inclined to follow the intuition that they went
with their psychology? Eric Olson’s answer is to maintain that the cerebrum-less organism still is you, but to defend the view that this fact—granting that the organism view is true—should not matter too much (Olson 1995). Even if we, based on his response, do not follow the psychology, it is the transplanted person we should care about. We should care about “the being in which the physical realization of our psychological capacities is found—no matter whether the being in question is me” (Hershenov 2011, 467). Consequently, according to this defence of animalism against the force of the transplantation intuition, identity is not what matters to us, which means that we can maintain that the cerebrum-less organism still is you, but also that this state of affairs should not matter to you since your psychological capacities are found elsewhere.

Downplaying the significance of identity is an important response to the transplantation intuition. As such, however, it cannot be employed by proponents of either the Deprivation Argument or the Substance View because in both these accounts, the identity between the foetus and “the being in which the physical realization of our psychological capacities is found” is important. However, Alexander Pruss proposes another way for the animalist to respond to the transplantation intuition. Pruss claims that the animalist position is compatible with the intuition that I am the second animal, i.e. I consequently went with the cerebrum, and that the body that was previously cerebrum-less but now is connected to my cerebrum should be considered a mere prosthesis (Pruss 2011, 23). It can certainly be questioned whether this answer is compatible with animalism, as it is at least disputable whether the cerebrum can be considered an organism. Eric Olson concludes that “an organism controls the rate of its metabolism and the growth of its various parts” (1995, 174), which seems to exclude a cerebrum as an organism. Pruss argues, however, that “actual” control of the rate of its metabolism and the growth of its various parts is not necessary for an entity to constitute an organism, but that “attempted” control is sufficient (Pruss 2011, 23), a position that moreover seems compatible with the above definition of the organism view according to which organisms are “beings that have the capacity to carry on certain life processes” (Liao 2006a, 336). The cerebrum certainly has the capacity to carry on certain life processes, but this
capacity is not realized as long as it is separated from the body (Liao 2006a; see also Kaczor 2011, 111 and Napier 2015). I am not claiming to have demonstrated conclusively that these efforts to reconcile the transplantation intuition and the organism view are, in the end, successful. Rather, more modestly, my aim has been to demonstrate that the organism view is not obviously in conflict with the transplantation intuition, and that this view therefore can be considered at least plausible when all arguments for and against it are considered.8

Both the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View are based on the organism view. The plausibility of the organism view is therefore necessary for the plausibility of these positions, but of course is not sufficient since the organism view does not imply a position against abortion. That position must be argued for from the premises of both these arguments respectively.

2.1.2 The Plausibility of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View

While proponents of both the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View adhere to the organism view, they differ, as I concluded above, in how they justify their opposition to abortion. While it is certainly theoretically possible to reject the Deprivation Argument and adhere to the Substance View,9 I believe it is more common for the opponents of abortion either to accept both these arguments or to reject the Substance view and accept the Deprivation Argument. That is because the latter position is usually considered the less demanding position of the two to accept. Why then even consider the Substance view? I suggest that one reason is that the proponents of this view not only take a more demanding position when they claim that foetuses are persons rather than mere individuals, but also avoid some problems that vitiate the Deprivation Argument as the claim that foetuses are persons rather than mere individuals also makes it easier to differentiate embryos and abortion from sperm, eggs, and contraception. That gives the Substance View a comparative advantage in responding to arguments that claim that the conclusion that abortion is wrong implies that one also should conclude
that contraception is equally wrong. Moreover, it can be argued that the Substance View can accommodate some intuitions about the wrongness of killing persons with no valuable future better than the Deprivation Argument can. While that by itself is not necessarily very important, since proponents of the Deprivation Argument do not claim to defend sufficient criteria for why killing is wrong, some of these cases can be seen as analogous to abortion. By being able to accommodate such intuitions, the Substance View therefore adds plausibility to the claim that abortion poses a moral risk.

Nevertheless, as the Deprivation Argument is the less controversial view, often also accepted by proponents of the Substance View, I will start by arguing for its plausibility and then, after having discussed the above-mentioned differentiation problem, will turn to the Substance View.

As concluded above, the Deprivation Argument does not rest on a premise about the embryo being a person; it depends only on the position that we all once were foetuses. This position is certainly not uncontroversial, but since this position follows from the organism view, it is supported by strong arguments and can—as I hope I have demonstrated above—be considered plausible while not necessarily true. I will therefore not argue for this position here, but rather focus on the second premise in the above argument:

Having a future of value is the basis of the right not to be killed.

Granting that the organism view is accepted, the controversial position to argue for here is why the mere fact that I once was a foetus leads to the conclusion that the foetus has a right to life. How can a mindless organism be said to have a right to life or have any interests at all? First, I believe that the reluctance to ascribe interests to mindless organisms—having such interests often being considered a condition for the right to life—can be explained by the failure to “distinguish something being in an individual’s interest from that individual taking an interest in something.” (Hershenov and Hershenov 2015, 268). As the philosophers David B. Hershenov and Rose J. Hershenov (2015) argue, it is plausible to consider that even plants have an interest in healthy development, even though they certainly do not take an interest in healthy
development. However, their future is not as valuable as is the future of a human organism, which justifies differentiating between different kinds of mindless organisms.

Second, the Deprivation Argument gains even more plausibility when it is compared with alternative accounts, which seem to struggle hard to avoid implausible implications. Many proponents of abortion want their defence not to imply an acceptance of infanticide, but it is doubtful whether they succeed in that. The alternatives to the Deprivation Argument that are probably the most prominent, namely Boonin’s account of dispositional and ideal desire (2002) and McMahan’s time-relative interests account (2002), are, for example, claimed to imply the acceptance of infanticide (Galvao 2007; Nichols 2012), while McMahan’s account is also claimed to imply the acceptance of killing individuals in advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease (Nichols 2012). While such implications, if they can be demonstrated to follow from Boonin’s and McMahan’s accounts, may not be considered clear-cut reductio arguments, I still believe that they at least should make us hesitant to accept such views.

Other counterintuitive implications are also claimed to follow from Boonin’s and McMahan’s views. As Francis Beckwith (2006) argues in his review of David Boonin’s _A Defense of Abortion_ (2002), it seems counterintuitive to claim that desire—albeit dispositional and ideal—is necessary for having rights. According to Boonin, “organized cortical brain activity” is a necessary physical condition for having desires, but Beckwith asks us to imagine a scientist who is able to prevent the foetus from developing this capacity (Boonin 2002, 126–127). According to Boonin, such an action would not violate the rights of the foetus, but I believe that we are inclined, as Beckwith claims, to hold that the foetus has already been wronged by the action of the scientist (Beckwith 2006, 188).

Likewise, Nils Holtug claims that McMahan’s time-relative interest account has implausible implications. To have time-relative interests is “to be able to stand in some psychological relation to one’s future and past selves”, and the strength of one’s time interests “depends on how strongly one is psychologically connected to … those future and past selves” (Liao 2007, 242f). Now consider a case in which an infant has an “unusually rich and rewarding future waiting ahead” but, as an infant,
she/he is very weakly psychologically connected to future and past selves (Holtug 2011, 177). Therefore, according to McMahan’s account, it would not be seriously wrong to give the infant a pill that would prevent him/her from developing psychologically beyond his/her present stage (Holtug 2011, 177). Or, in the absence of such a pill, it would not be seriously wrong to isolate an infant in a room without any light in order to prevent sensory input, and thereby to keep her/his time-relative interest at a very weak level. Such implications are indeed counterintuitive, however.

The claim that the alternative views imply positions that we morally believe are wrong is also especially relevant to my uncertainty argument against abortion. If we believe that these alternative positions imply not only implausible, but also morally wrong positions, then it seems particularly plausible to reject them out of precautionary concerns. In addition, even opponents of the Deprivation Argument admit that “it is uncertain whether there ever has been a successful reply to this argument” (Degrazia 2007, 68), which is also a clear indication of its plausibility.

The fact that the Deprivation Argument is not dependent on a premise about the embryo being a person is generally viewed as a great advantage over the Substance View. This also has a cost, since it makes the Deprivation Argument more vulnerable to the objection that it implies that contraception is as wrong as abortion. Certainly contraception does not deprive an individual of a future like ours, since the egg and the sperm are not together an entity as the embryo is, but one can ask why that should matter. To differentiate morally between abortion and contraception in this regard, we need to assume that identity is what matters, but, as David Shoemaker (2010) notes, what makes abortion wrong according to the Deprivation Argument is the deprivation of the value of a future and that does not, he claims, entail numerical identity. Peter Nichols (2012) seems to agree with Shoemaker by arguing that it is at least questionable “whether a necessary condition of an action’s wrongness is that the action harms a determinate individual” (p. 505). For example, he argues that it might be “morally wrong to knowingly bring into existence a child for whom one cannot provide adequate care” (Nichols 2012, 505). Applied to the abortion issue, the claim is
consequently that, according to the Deprivation Argument, one acts wrongly by using contraception because that leads to the deprivation of a valuable future, even though a specific individual is not wronged. According to critics of the Deprivation Argument, this conclusion is implausible and is consequently a reductio against this argument if it can be demonstrated that it follows from this argument.

I believe that this reductio argument against the Deprivation Argument can be questioned. Because even if we, for the sake of argument, grant that one can act morally wrong without harming a determinate individual, it still does not follow that contraception is as wrong as abortion is. There is, after all, one obvious state of affairs that differentiates abortion and contraception: abortion involves the deprivation of a specific individual’s future, while contraception only prevents the realization of someone’s future (Marquis 2005; Heathwood 2011). Even if we grant for the sake of argument that it is possible to be involved in wrongdoing without harming a determinate individual, it can be argued that it is still worse to wrong a determinate individual. Therefore, proponents of the Deprivation Argument are still justified in differentiating between abortion and contraception, even if they accept that one can be involved in wrongdoing without harming a determinate individual. I believe that this conclusion weakens the force of this reductio argument against the Deprivation Argument.

Still, one might argue that once it is accepted that one can act morally wrongly without harming a determinate individual, then it follows from the Deprivation Argument that contraception is at least wrong to some degree because it prevents a valuable future, even though there is no individual who is deprived of it. I do not, however, see that this conclusion necessarily follows from the Deprivation Argument. After all, the proponents of this argument could try to argue that it is the deprivation of someone’s future that matters morally rather than preventing “generic” valuable futures. On the other hand, if one finds it very plausible that it is “morally wrong to knowingly bring into existence a child for whom one cannot provide adequate care”, then one might question why, according to the Deprivation Argument, it would not be wrong at least to some degree to prevent the existence of a child with a valuable future. That might be seen as quite an implausible conclusion, even though I believe
that the force of the reductio argument loses much of its strength if it is reduced to this claim. Nevertheless, even in this weakened version, one might worry about the objection from contraception to the claim that the foetus has a right to life. To seek a more robust defence of this claim, one might therefore turn to the Substance View, which is not as vulnerable to this objection. That is because proponents of the Substance View regard the embryo not only merely as an individual, but also as a “substance of rational nature”, which is the definition of a person according to this view (Lee 2013, 236). This thick notion of the status of the embryo provides resources to differentiate it from sperm and eggs, and thereby avoid the contraception objection, which might be considered an advantage in relation to the Deprivation Argument, even though it also makes the Substance View more demanding to accept.

Consequently, even though the Substance View might be considered more controversial than the Deprivation Argument, there are reasons for the opponents of abortion to ground their opinion on the former view. As mentioned above, I will focus on the first premise:

The unborn entity, from the moment of conception, is a person.

I will not, however, defend this premise as it stands, because to do that I would need to consider the very extensive discussion of whether or not an individual can exist before twinning, a phase that ends approximately 2 weeks after fertilization. This question is less relevant to the moral status of abortion, since most abortions are performed after this phase.¹⁰ I will therefore assume that the premise is about an unborn entity 2 weeks after fertilization. However, even after this revision, premise one is still highly controversial since it is in conflict with the so-called personhood intuition. According to this intuition, certain mental powers are required in order to be a person. There are certainly disputes about exactly which mental powers, but the general underlying logic of this intuition is clear: “anything that has those powers [whatever they may be] is a person at time t, and anything that lacks those powers at time t is not a person at time t” (Toner 2014, 2). The embryo 2 weeks after fertilization has obviously not actualized those powers—whatever they might be. However, such an
embryo is still regarded as a person according to the substance view. How can this position plausibly be defended? The defence for this position can be summarized as follows:

Human beings are animals of a special kind. They differ in kind from other animals because they have a rational nature, a nature characterized by having the basic natural capacities for conceptual thought and deliberation and free choice. In virtue of having such a nature, all human beings are persons. (Lee and George 2008, 191)

Granting that we accept that it is prima facie wrong to kill persons, while it at least might not be morally wrong to kill other beings, then proponents of the Substance View argue that this differentiation must be based on radical difference to avoid being arbitrary and, by implication, unfair. The proponents of this view therefore argue that differentiations of persons from non-persons should not be based on criteria that vary in degrees, because that would inevitably result in arbitrariness when the necessary level is determined. If a person is defined according to the mental powers discussed above, that would be arbitrary in this sense—no matter whether it is self-consciousness, capacity for rationality, ability for self-motivated activity, and/or another power (Goodman 1988). According to the Substance View, in contrast, a person is an “individual substance of rational nature”, and as a substance cannot lose its nature, the human person exists as long as the organism exists. Since this difference is based on what a human being is rather than what she or he exercises, a human person comes into existence when the human animal starts to exist, which means that even embryos are considered persons (Lee 2011, 26–27).

Now, this conclusion might strike many people as obviously implausible, but I believe that some thought experiments might serve to illustrate why the Substance View is not easily rejected. First, consider one thought experiment presented by the philosophers David Hershenov and Rose Hershenov (2015). They ask us to imagine “a scarce life-saving drug that we either can give to a 5-month-old foetus that just became minimally conscious a day earlier, or to a foetus that will become minimally conscious in a day” (Hershenov and Hershenov 2015, 270). Do
we really consider the question of consciousness to be of moral importance in such a case? I believe not, and I think we would come to the same judgement if we replaced “consciousness” with another mental power, such as self-consciousness, the ability for self-motivated activity, or the capacity for rationality. If so, then it can plausibly be argued that the difference in terms of the length of pregnancy is not morally significant enough to determine whether or not a particular kind of being should be ascribed a right to life.

Here is a second thought experiment presented by the philosopher Patrick Lee (2013), which serves as an argument for why we need the Substance View in order to account for killings that at least some of us consider to be impermissible:

Let us suppose I have something seriously wrong with my brain, and unless I have brain surgery I will die very soon. So, let us suppose that next week I will be admitted to a hospital, where I will undergo major brain surgery. But it is also virtually certain that one of the side effects of this surgery is that I will suffer complete amnesia—even to the point of losing all my linguistic abilities, abilities to walk, to eat with a fork, and so on … After the surgery I will not remember my wife, my children, any of my friends, or my deeply held beliefs. In a way, I will be starting all over. (Lee 2013, 237)

He adds that after the surgery I will be unconscious for several months before regaining consciousness, but with a completely different content than before the surgery. As Lee concludes, the circumstances he asks us to imagine seem to be, in the relevant aspects, analogous to the position of a human foetus. Therefore, if we believe it would be wrong to kill me, the patient under these circumstances—i.e. when I am unconscious—then it is arguably impermissible to kill a foetus. 11 This conclusion can certainly also be justified by the Deprivation Argument, as I am predicted to regain consciousness and therefore have a valuable future, but that does not undermine its force against rival views that are unable to explain why it would be impermissible to kill me under these circumstances and that are invoked to defend abortion. Moreover, we can actually add an assumption to the thought experiment that makes it seemingly hard for
proponents of the Deprivation Argument to explain the wrongness of the killing: just before the surgery, I was sentenced to death, but the execution was delayed until after the surgery and after I regained consciousness. So in fact, I had no valuable future. Still, it can be argued that it would be wrong to kill me when he was unconscious, and it is hard to see how other accounts than the Substance View can explain that conclusion. Granting that this is the case—namely that only the Substance View can accommodate this intuition about the wrongness of killing in such a case—that adds plausibility to this view, and thereby also to its position about the wrongness of killing unborn entities.

These thought experiments certainly do not explicitly address the question of whether the foetus is a person; nevertheless, they are claimed to demonstrate that it might be hard to differentiate between a mindless foetus and entities with the mental powers that, according to the personhood intuition, constitute a person. That speaks indirectly, I claim, in favour of the plausibility of the second premise of the Substance View, which states that the foetus is a human person.

2.1.3 Objections to the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View

Of course, several objections have been raised against the plausibility of both the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View. It is neither feasible nor necessary, for the purpose of this book, to deal with all of these; rather, I will focus on objections considered to pose the most serious challenges to these arguments. My aim in this section is to demonstrate that these objections have been subject to responses that make it reasonable to conclude that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View have not been conclusively refuted due to these objections.

One important argument against the Deprivation Argument as well as the Substance View is called the “absurd-extension argument” in a recent paper (Stier and Schoene-Seifert 2013, 20). This reductio argument challenges both the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View as
they conclude—albeit from different premises—that the “embryonic developmental potential [is] sufficient for bestowing a full moral status on the embryo” (Stier and Schoene-Seifert 2013, 20). According to the absurd-extension argument, the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View imply that, in the face of recent biotechnological advances, it can at least be imagined that any cell can be converted into an entity that is sufficiently similar to an embryo. That would then imply that any cell should be bestowed the same moral status as the embryo is bestowed according to the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View, which would obviously be absurd.

However, the argument that recent biotechnological advances imply that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View must embrace the position that any cell should be bestowed the same moral status as the embryo, has been criticized by both the proponents and critics of these views (Cunningham 2013; Hyun 2013; Muders and Ruether 2013; Condic et al. 2009; Lee 2011; Gómez-Lobo 2004). For example, Thomas V. Cunningham, although himself a proponent of abortion rights, argues that once it is realized that the process of converting cells implies the destruction of embryos in order to create new potentialities, it does indeed raise reasonable doubts about whether this imagined scenario represents a reductio argument against the status that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View ascribe to embryos (2013, 41–42).

Furthermore, Patrick Lee defends a criterion for determining when a human organism comes to exist that he believes can differentiate between human embryos and converted cells. Lee argues that a human organism exists “when there is a new living entity with a genetic–epigenetic state that provides the cascaded information for the development of this entity to the mature stage of a human organism” (2011, 79). This criterion can, argues Lee, differentiate between an entity with the “active disposition to develop itself to the mature stage of a human organism” and one without this disposition (2011, 79). It certainly remains to be proven that these efforts to differentiate embryos from converted cells with regard to their kind of potentiality are successful, but the literature suggests that it is so far unjustifiable to conclude that these reductio arguments have been successful (see also Condic et al., 2009; Hershenov and Hershenov 2015).
There are other reductio arguments that also claim that absurd implications follow from the position that human embryos should be ascribed a right to life, as proponents of both the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View claim. According to one famous argument, based on the “rescue case” thought experiment, such a position implies that we should be indifferent to the choice of either saving an embryo or a child if we were forced to choose, which seems implausible (see, e.g., Lovering 2013). There are also reductio arguments aimed at the Deprivation Argument more specifically, arguments claiming that a proponent of this view is obliged to hold that there is no moral difference between late- and early-term abortion since abortions whenever they are performed deprive foetuses of a similar amount of future value, which seems to be an implausible conclusion. However, the objections based on both the rescue case and the moral equivalence of late- and early-term abortion suffer from one and the same flaw, namely that the position that the embryo and the early foetus both have a right to life, which makes it desirable to save the embryo and not abort the early foetus, is the only aspect of the harm of death. As a proponent of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View, one is not obliged to hold that. There might be other aspects that contribute to additional harm that makes it justifiable to choose the child in the rescue case and to consider late-term abortions morally worse than early-term ones (Liao 2006b, 2007; Nichols 2012; Friberg-Fernros 2015).

2.2 Undercutting the Relevance of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View: The (Im)Plausibility of the Good Samaritan Argument

As stated above, proponents of the Good Samaritan argument claim that abortion is permissible even if it is assumed that the foetus is a human person. Therefore, this argument aims to make the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View irrelevant by justifying the conclusion
that abortion is permissible even if the unborn entity has a right to life. My aim here is to reject the claim that the Good Samaritan argument makes the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View irrelevant. What does this aim require? It certainly does not require that I can demonstrate that the Good Samaritan argument can conclusively be rejected. Rather, what I need to demonstrate, minimally, is that the Good Samaritan argument is unable to justify all kinds of abortion, since that would mean that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View are still relevant in at least these cases. I will do that in two ways. First, I will argue that the Good Samaritan argument can be rejected in relation to some kinds of abortion, which means that the uncertainty that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View bring to the moral status of abortion is unaffected by the Good Samaritan argument in these cases. Second, I will argue that it is uncertain in all other cases—with possibly one rare exception—that the Good Samaritan argument can justify abortion, which means that the Good Samaritan argument in all these cases at best reduces the moral risk of abortion to some extent.

The Good Samaritan argument takes its point of departure from the famous analogy of a violinist who is plugged into you to survive, which the philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson applied when the Good Samaritan argument was introduced in 1971. Here is how it goes:

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you”. (Thomson 1971, 48–49)
Thomson argues that it would be permissible to unplug oneself from the violinist, even though this act would lead to the death of the violinist. Analogously, Thompson thinks that a woman has the right to abort the foetus even if one assumes, for the sake of the argument that it would lead to the death of a human person.

As many commentators have noted over the years, however, the situation of the plugged-in violinist is disanalogous to that of abortion in many respects, which in turn undermines the relevance of the violinist example. Perhaps the most obvious difference between the violinist example and abortion is the nature of the acts of abortion and unplugging, respectively. While disconnecting the violinist may reasonably be described as an act of letting die, most abortions involve the act of killing. However, one abortion method, hysterotomy, is often described as an act of letting die rather than of killing (Tupa 2009). In this method, the foetus dies as it is extracted from the womb. If this is done before the foetus is viable, it will die during this procedure since the pre-viable foetus cannot survive outside the womb.

Even if this adjustment is made, there are still differences between the violinist situation and hysterotomy. In contrast to the violinist situation, the parents cause the pregnancy by the sexual act. Before the sexual act they are, in the normal case, able to foresee that a pregnancy could be the consequence of their actions, which means that they can decrease the risk of pregnancy by contraception or completely avoid the risk by not having sex at all. Furthermore, the sexual act as such is usually considered something valuable—in contrast to the kidnapping preceding the decision to connect the subject with the violinist. Finally, in an abortion situation, the threat to the life of the foetus is initiated by the decision to abort it, while in Thompson’s violinist situation, the violinist already has a pre-existing condition that would be the primary cause of the violinist’s death should he or she be unplugged.

To properly evaluate the strength of the violinist case as an argument for abortion rights, we have to adjust the violinist situation to make it more analogous to the abortion situation. We would have to imagine that the cause of the situation, in which one is plugged into the violinist for 9 months, is the same as in the case of pregnancy, namely sexual intercourse and subsequent fertilization rather than the acts of the Society
of Music Lovers. In contrast to the original version of the story, the new version would imply that it is the unplugging of the violinist, rather than a pre-existing disease, that initiates the mortal need. The new version also implies that one can avoid being plugged into the violinist by simply not having sex. Like pregnancies, it is also possible to reduce the risk of being plugged in by contraception, but not to completely eliminate the risk. It might be possible to construct a new analogy that incorporates these aspects, but I believe that the analogy then would be too far-fetched to serve as a guide for determining our intuitions.

Moreover, as most of the disanalogies between the violinist and abortion situations are usually considered to make the case for abortion too generous rather than the opposite, meaning that more people would agree with the conclusion that one should be permitted to unplug oneself from the violinist than would agree that abortion should generally be permitted under these conditions, there is no need to launch a new analogy. If I can demonstrate that there are circumstances in which it would not even be permissible to unplug oneself from the violinist, then abortion would arguably not be permissible either. Therefore, I return to the original scenario, despite its disanalogies with the pregnancy situation, and argue that it is counterintuitive to hold that one has an unrestricted right to unplug oneself.

First, I believe that one must have proportionate reasons to unplug oneself. One certainly does not have a right to unplug oneself for no or trivial reasons. Minimally, it seems obvious that one at least has a duty to provide a reason for why one had decided to unplug oneself. Putting ourselves in the position of the violinist, I think that we all would demand at least some justification as to why we are being unplugged and left to die. Moreover, some reasons would be inherently too trivial to justify the decision to unplug oneself. Paraphrasing the originator of the argument, Judith Jarvis Thomson, to unplug oneself only to “avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad” (1971, 66) would certainly be impermissible. Consider also a situation in which mainly financial reasons motivate one’s request to unplug oneself, but in which the violinist offers almost full financial compensation to induce one to stay plugged in. Of course, it would then be impermissible to unplug oneself because the reasons for causing the death of another human being would not be proportionate.
The justifiability of disconnecting oneself from the violinist can also be undermined if other measures are taken that, while not addressing the concerns motivating the request for disconnection as effectively as economic compensation does, still reduce the cost of being plugged in. For example, assume that one’s request for disconnection is motivated by concerns about a certain educational course that will take place during the months one is connected; let us further assume that the violinist succeeds in arranging an education for you after the 9 months. In that case, I do not believe that the difference in time constitutes a proportionate reason for one to disconnect oneself, and thereby cause the death of the violinist. Contrast such a scenario to a situation in which one once and for all will lose the opportunity to get a specific education because one will be connected to the violinist for 9 months: in that situation, the question of the permissibility of disconnection is far less clear-cut. This illustrates the importance of considering the cost of staying connected when determining the justifiability of disconnection from the violinist. It must be sufficiently costly for one to stay connected to justify disconnection. The requirement that the reasons motivating the request for disconnection must be proportionate suggests that there is a threshold that must be passed for the Good Samaritan argument to be relevant at all. Unless the reasons are proportionate, which means that they pass this threshold, my claim is that this argument does not add any significant plausibility to the claims of abortion rights. In short, far from supporting the general permissibility of abortion, the Good Samaritan argument at best justifies abortion in some cases in which the reasons for letting an entity with a right to life to die are proportionate to the resulting harm.

This is also in fact how the originator of the Good Samaritan argument viewed its applicability:

... [W]hile I do argue that abortion is not impermissible, I do not argue that it is always permissible. There may well be cases in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaratanism of the mother, and this is a standard we must not fall below. (Thomson 1971, 65)

The question of the proportionality of the reasons for unplugging oneself must consequently be considered, minimally, when seeking to justify
abortion rights by this argument. However, there are other constraints as well. Thomson herself as well as other proponents of her argument usually emphasize that the mother’s right to terminate life-sustaining treatment is not a right to “kill the foetus per se”, but rather the right “to decide she does not want to use her body to sustain the foetus’ life” (Manninen 2013, 334; Thomson 1971, 66). But this distinction between the right “to decide she does not want to use her body to sustain the foetus’ life” and the right to “kill the foetus” certainly restricts the applicability of this argument. Consider, for example, the abortion of foetuses once they have been diagnosed with a defect such as Down’s syndrome. Like most other foetal defects, Down’s syndrome is first detectable at the end of the first trimester (Skotko 2009). This implies that the information that the foetus has Down’s syndrome is always preceded by the information about the pregnancy, so one can assume that it is not the information about the pregnancy that led to the decision to abort, but rather the later information about Down’s syndrome or other foetal defects. Moreover, the fact that a foetus has Down’s syndrome does not in itself generate an extra burdensome pregnancy; rather, the extra burden is expected to occur after birth.  

To test whether an abortion under these circumstances would be permissible, we must adjust Thomson’s thought experiment about the violinist. As the information that the foetus has Down’s syndrome, or another foetal defect, is preceded by the information about the pregnancy, it is assumed that one decides to maintain one’s life-supporting assistance when one realizes that one is connected to the violinist, but that one changes one’s mind after receiving information about the status of the violinist. To be as analogous as possible to the abortion of foetuses diagnosed with foetal defects such as Down’s syndrome, we can assume that the reason why one decided to stay connected to the violinist in the first place was that one expected that the future existence of the violinist would be more beneficial than burdensome. However, once the violinist is examined 3 months after one was first connected, it is suggested that the future existence of the violinist would be more burdensome than beneficial, one’s mind is changed and disconnection is effected.
Now, the decisive question is whether it would be permissible to disconnect oneself from the violinist once one realizes that his future existence would be burdensome. The objective of the decision would be to eliminate the existence of the violinist rather than to avoid being connected to him for 9 months. That is the implication of the fact that one initially seems to have accepted, at least temporarily, the arrangement, since one did not disconnect oneself from the violinist until he was examined some months later. I claim that such a motive would make your decision morally impermissible. Consider another example that is claimed to be analogous to the pregnancy and that has been invoked to support the Good Samaritan argument.

You are dying from a blood disorder and need a bone marrow transplant to survive. I am not required to donate bone marrow to you, even if my failure to do so results in your death. (Manninen 2013, 334)

However, to be analogous to the abortion of foetuses with Down’s syndrome or other defects, we must assume that I first agreed to donate bone marrow, but then changed my mind once I realized that your future existence would be more burdensome than beneficial for me. Therefore, I chose not to donate my bone marrow, in order to secure your death. Such an action would be incompatible with the defence of abortion according to the Good Samaritan argument. Why? Because the motive I have in refusing to give you my bone marrow—to secure your death—is morally wrong. Rather than being an unfortunate side effect, your death would be a way of intentionally eliminating you as a future burden. Moreover, to avoid future burden by securing your death would be a necessary element of my motivation for refusing to give you my bone marrow as I would have given you the bone marrow if you weren’t burdensome. That illustrates how essential the aim of securing your death is for my decision to not donate bone marrow.

My claim is that these cases demonstrate that the Good Samaritan argument is unable to justify abortion that is motivated by concerns about future parenthood, such as the expected burden of raising a disabled child, since such concerns imply that the aim of abortion is to secure the death of the foetus. Now, acting to secure the death of the
foetus might be permissible if the status of the foetus is something lower than that of a human person, but it is important to recall that the Good Samaritan argument presupposes that the foetus is a human person with a right to life. If that is taken for granted, I argue that the examples above demonstrate that the Good Samaritan argument cannot morally justify such abortions independently of considerations about the status of the foetus, because to act with the intention to secure the death of another human person is to violate that person’s right to life. As I argued in the previous chapter, if it could be conclusively established that abortion violates the right to life of an innocent right-holder, then not allowing abortion would be justified in almost all circumstances. Consequently, that also constrains the relevance of this argument, which in turn means that the strengths of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View must be considered in at least these kinds of abortions.

However, I will argue that the scope of relevance of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View is greater than in relation to abortion without proportionate reasons or when the intention is to eliminate the foetus rather than escape the burden of being pregnant. That is so because I believe it is uncertain whether the Good Samaritan argument can justify any abortion at all—with one possible exception. To illustrate this, consider Brian D. Parks’ analogy based on conjoined twins that, according to him, supports the conclusion that we are, in fact, not inclined to support the Good Samaritan argument, not even in situations in which the pregnancy is “forced upon us”, as in cases of rape. According to Park, conjoined twins are the only natural phenomenon except pregnancy that entails “a natural bodily union between two human beings” (Parks 2006, 675). This fact is important, because he explains the divergence between our intuitions concerning his analogy versus the violinist analogy by referring to the natural–artificial distinction. Since Park’s analogy has so far gone almost unnoticed in the literature, I cite him at length:

Consider … the hypothetical example of Amy and Janey, two teenage twins who are conjoined at the chest and abdomen. Except for the impaired lifestyle brought about by their unusual physical condition, Amy and Janey are both normal human beings, fully capable of rational
thought. They each possess a functioning brain and a full complement of organs and appendages. As conjoined twins, Amy and Janey share a number of important blood vessels in the conjoined regions of their bodies. Their circulatory systems are interconnected through these blood vessels. Unfortunately, this feature of their condition has made the problem of safely separating them from each other unusually difficult to solve. The twins have remained conjoined until this point because their parents have not had access to the innovative technology that would be necessary to separate them. Fortunately, a charitable group of highly skilled surgeons who have successfully separated similar cases of conjoined twins have become aware of their condition and have extended an offer to help. The problem, however, is that Janey cannot currently survive on her own. She recently acquired an illness that has caused serious damage to her renal system. Her kidneys have deteriorated so severely as a result of this illness that they no longer have any ability to remove impurities from her bloodstream. She has managed to survive the illness only because of the interconnection that exists between her circulatory system and Amy’s circulatory system. Through this interconnection, Amy’s kidneys have assumed the purification load of Janey’s body, indirectly filtering her bloodstream of the impurities that her own kidneys can no longer filter. Thanks to the medical treatment that Janey has been receiving of late, her kidneys seem to be gradually healing and getting stronger. The doctors who are evaluating her condition unanimously agree that she will eventually become capable of independent survival. According to their best estimates, she will need nine months. After nine months of treatment, her kidneys will have healed and strengthened to a point where they will once again be able to maintain her body free of impurities. When that point is reached, it will be possible to separate her without causing her to die. Understandably, Amy is extremely unhappy with her life as a conjoined twin. She recognizes that she can survive on her own and she wants to be separated immediately—or at least as soon as possible. But if the twins are separated immediately Janey will die. (2006, 675–676)

According to Parks, it would obviously be impermissible to separate the twins under these circumstances. By implication, he argues that it would likewise be impermissible to abort a foetus—even if the pregnancy is the result of rape. If that is the case, then the relevance of this argument is arguably very limited indeed. My case against the Good Samaritan
argument does not rest on Parks’ conclusion, according to which he claims to have conclusively refuted the Good Samaritan argument and explained our intuitions by referring to the natural–artificial distinction. In fact, I believe that this analogy supports the permissibility of abortion under one extreme circumstance: when the pregnancy is the result of rape and threatens the life of the mother. That is so because I believe that we would think it permissible for Amy to demand separation if that was the only way to save her life. Analogously, that implies that abortion would be permissible if the pregnancy were the result of rape (like Amy, the mother is not then at all responsible for the pregnancy) and threatens the life of the mother. Apart from that, I think it is hard to imagine circumstances in which it is conclusively permissible for Amy to demand her separation from Janey. We are, I claim, at least uncertain about whether that would be permissible. I would therefore argue that the Good Samaritan argument, except in the situation described above, at best contributes doubt as to whether the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View provide a case against abortion, but certainly does not make them irrelevant.

2.3 Taking the Moral Risk of Abortion Seriously

The strengths of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View and the weaknesses of the Good Samaritan argument suggest that it is at least plausible, albeit not conclusively proven, that abortion constitutes a severely harmful action. More specifically, I find it plausible to conclude from the above discussion that there are reasons to believe that abortion violates an individual’s right to life. As it seems uncontroversial to claim that the state should at least try to prevent violations of individual rights—in particular the right to life, which is often considered the precondition for and the most sacred of all other rights—it follows that abortion is morally risky for the state to permit.17 The conclusion that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View, either together or independently, make it plausible that abortion violates an individual’s right to life can certainly be challenged.
For example, one can invoke the fact that this conclusion can be undercut in at least two ways. One can argue that the neo-Lockean view is more plausible than the organism view. For example, one can invoke the thought experiments discussed above that involve the transplantation of the brain cerebrum, and claim that we intuitively favour conclusions that are incompatible with the organism view. Or one can argue that, even if we are essentially organisms, it is too counterintuitive to believe that, for example, a 2-week-old embryo has a right to life, and claim that other views that are compatible with the organism view, such as Boonin’s position, are more plausible than either the Deprivation Argument or the Substance View. By taking either of these routes, one can try to refute the conclusions of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View and consequently establish abortion rights in either way. While I believe that I have provided reasons for doubting that the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View can be easily refuted using either of these strategies, I certainly acknowledge that there is latitude to arrive at different conclusions about the plausibility of the claim that abortion violates an individual’s right to life. Let us therefore assume, at least for the sake of argument, that we do not find either the Deprivation Argument or the Substance View especially compelling, although neither has been conclusively refuted. To what extent does that undermine the relevance of the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View as a basis for more restrictive abortion laws? While that would certainly make it less reasonable to argue for radically restrictive abortion laws based on the Deprivation Argument and/or the Substance View, that would still not justify indifference to the risk of abortion based on these arguments. If these arguments are considered less plausible, although not entirely implausible, what only follows is that less restrictive abortion laws should be considered.

One might then think that since the risk of abortion is of such great magnitude according to the Deprivation Argument and the Substance View—violating the right to life—nothing less than radical restrictions can be justified based on these views. I would claim that this is a mistake, however, even though this is often assumed to follow (see Friberg-Fernros 2014). The reason is that the realism, and not only the seriousness, of the risk must matter when restrictions on reproductive
freedom are determined. To illustrate this, consider the following example:

A deadly epidemic for which there is no cure is rife in an isolated town in a country abroad. The virus is deadly and contagious and could cost many lives, although the risk of such a scenario is judged to be low. The incubation period is no fewer than nine months and the only way to determine whether or not one is infected is to wait out the incubation period. A man is now coming from the town in question, which means that we need to address the risk that the man might be infected by the virus.18

Contrast a situation in which we know that the man is infected to one in which the risk that he is infected is very low. It would obviously be plausible to act differently in the face of this difference. Likewise—although the situations are not analogous—I believe that considerations of the realism of the risk that abortion may be wrong should matter for how restrictive abortion laws should be made. If we consider the risk to be less realistic, then, ceteris paribus, less restrictive abortion laws are justified. Moreover, it would be easier to justify forcing the person in the thought experiment into quarantine for 9 months in order to determine whether or not he is infected if the period in quarantine did not generate much suffering or if the person would be greatly compensated. The upshot of this is that my argument is theoretically compatible with a wide range of restrictions, from very minimal to more radical ones. Considerations of the realism and seriousness of the risk of abortion and of how the effects of more restricted abortion laws can be addressed should matter for the question of whether restrictive abortion laws can be justified. The latter is the topic of the next chapter.

Notes

1. This is a slightly revised version of Beckwith (2007, xii).
2. This is a slightly revised version of Marquis (2001, 363).
3. The term “organism view” will be used interchangeably with the term “animalism”.

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4. Once it has been established that the foetus is a person, one can then, for example, less controversially defend the impermissibility of killing such an entity by invoking the wrongness of depriving such an entity of a valuable future (see, e.g., Eberl and Brown 2011: 110–111). Another line of argument for the impermissibility of killing persons available for proponents of the Substance View is the obligation never to treat persons as mere means but, at least also, as ends (see, e.g., Lee 2013, 243).

5. One other option for those who oppose the organism view is to deny that the human organism can think, i.e., questioning premise 2. However, if human organisms are unable to think then, presumably, neither can other non-human organisms, which would be, to put it mildly, empirically questionable to accept. (Blatti 2016, 163).

6. This view is often also called the “psychological account of human identity”.

7. A related but distinct objection to the organism view is based on the phenomenon of conjoined twinning (McMahan 2002; Campell and McMahan 2010). There are two cases that are claimed to pose problems for the organism view; following Olson (2014), they can be called “double-brain twinning” cases (i.e., dicephalus) and “shared-brain twinning” cases (i.e., cephalopagus). In the former there are two brains but one body, while there is one brain but two bodies in the latter. These cases are claimed to have implications that are hard to reconcile with the position of the organism view that we are organisms. For responses to this objection, see, for example, Liao (2006a), Olson (2014), and Hershenov and Taylor (2014). Moreover, Mark Johnston (2007) claims to have developed an objection, “the remnant-person problem”, to the organism view that is distinct from the “transplantation objection”. However, as this objection poses problems for most rival views of animalism as well, it does not seem to provide arguments against animalism specifically (Olson 2016). Nevertheless, one version of animalism, hylemorphism, which is closely associated with the substance view actually seems able to escape this problem, according to Olson (2016, 151 note 7; for a response to the remnant-person problem based on hylemorphism, see Toner 2014). In sum, I believe it is fair to say that both the neo-Lockean account and the organism view have their strengths and weaknesses and that it is hard to single out the more plausible one based on the literature. Fortunately, such a judgment is not necessary for my argument, because it presupposes only that the
organism view is not obviously inferior to its alternatives. That assumption, I believe, is justified.

8. In addition, the fact that Oxford University Press recently published a volume of contributions solely intending to explore this view is at least an (weak) argument from authority in support of this conclusion (Blatti and Snowden 2016).

9. See, for example, Napier (2011, 1011).

10. It is of course not entirely irrelevant since this question arises when it is discussed whether (some) contraception has abortifacient effects. It is, moreover, of course interesting to explore whether the Substance View implies—if that would be the case—that some contraception then would be considered as impermissible, and, possibly, also subject of legal restrictions. These consideration is, however, outside the scope of this analysis.

11. It is interesting to note that it probably would be permissible to kill me according to the Neo-Lockean account of human identity. I believe that such an conclusion, if valid, can be considered as another reductio against this view.

12. Most commentators agree with Thomson; the critics of the argument consequently object to the relevance of the example to the abortion situation rather than to the conclusion that it is permissible to unplug the violinist. However, for an exception, see Hershenov (2001).

13. David Boonin’s (2002) rigorous treatment of the objections to the Good Samaritan argument refers to many of these commentators, for example, Feinberg (1978), Tooley (1972), Finnis (1973), and Hurka (1994); some more recent examples are Francis Beckwith (2007), Lee (2010) Kaczor (2011), and Prusak (2011).

14. Certainly, worries about the future of the child might afflict the future parents during the pregnancy more than during pregnancies without this diagnosis. However, such worries are still about the consequences of the diagnosis and possible physiological sequelae for the parents (and the rest of the family) after birth.

15. I believe that this situation is obviously disanalogous to most pregnancies, since they are the result of situations differing radically from the case of someone diagnosed with a blood disorder. The pregnancy is usually the result of a voluntary action, which is obviously not the case with the blood disorder, though this objection is not central to my argument.
16. In that regard this case differs from the case Boonin invokes in order to defend the Good Samaritan Argument from this objection, see Boonin (2003, 217).

17. Stephen Napier also arrives at this conclusion after evaluating the plausibility of the “neo-Lockean account” of human identity (2015). However, in contrast to me, he draws this conclusion without considering either the plausibility of the Good Samaritan argument or the cost of restricting the accessibility of abortion.

18. A version of this thought experiment figures in Friberg-Fernros (2014).

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