Chapter 2
Attitudes and Ideology

People can be said to choose ideas, but there is also an important and reciprocal sense in which ideas choose people.

—Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009

Introduction

In engaging with attitudes and ideology, this chapter appears to tackle two distinct and clearly conceptualized topics. Attitudes, after all, have for millennia been the object of religious, philosophical as well as medical and political inquiry (Olson and Kendrick, in Crano and Prislin 2008). Yet, as much as attitudes have been theorized about for much of history, they have been the subject of contestation for just as long. How attitudes form and what to do with them once they have materialized are questions that constitute the mainstay of discourses in fields as diverse as social psychology and political ideology. Equally challenging to conceptualize concretely is the measuring of attitudes, as is its sister effort, measuring attitude change. Thus, attitudes are a deceptively congruent category of research, as we shall see below.

The term ideology, for its part, hardly enjoys consensual definition. Leaving aside the obvious room for differences in ideological stances, the word itself conjures a range of meanings, depending upon who is offering the account. Indeed, ideology has been called ‘the most elusive concept in the whole of social science’ (McLellan 1983, p. 1, in Jost 2009). Moreover, inaccurate predictions of the ‘death’ of ideology have contributed to the conceptual confusion. According to Jost (2006), in the wake of World War II, with its cataclysmic ideological clashes, political scientists, sociologists and psychologists alike roundly announced ‘the end of ideology’ (p. 651). This claim proved to be rather dramatically false, and in the following pages we shall get a sense of how acutely alive ideology is today.

In actuality, of course, attitudes and ideology are not fully distinct features on our mental landscape. Below, we shall see how these two systems work in tandem to form and inform the other. Moreover, and pertinent to our central concern, we
shall learn how it is precisely in this nexus that the Israelis and the Palestinians in the BPKP meet. As this field is crucial to our broader discussion, we shall spend some time considering its implications for encounter within the context of intractable conflict. We shall now set the stage with some definitions.

**Toward a Definition of Attitude**

Let us begin with an attempt to define the term *attitude*. Perhaps one of the broadest definitions was articulated by Zanna and Rempel (1988): [attitudes] ‘conveniently summarize how we feel about pretty much everything’ (cited by Olson and Kendrick in Crano and Prislin 2008). This global description seems to succinctly capture a lived experience of attitude. Yet such an overarching definition leaves us with a certain sense of lack of missing nuance. And so we continue the inquiry.

The following definition, still arguably neutral in tone, has been offered by Crano and Prislin (2006):

> [An attitude] represents an evaluative integration of cognitions and affects experienced in relation to an object. Attitudes are evaluative judgments that integrate and summarize these cognitive/affective reactions. These evaluative abstractions vary in strength, which in turn has implications for persistence, resistance, and attitude-behavior consistency. (in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 3)

Thus, for Crano and Prislin, attitudes are a kind of assessment that features both cognitive and affective components, different levels of strength, and a corresponding range with regard to durability, changeability, and the degree to which attitudes are consistent with behaviors. Each of these points will be taken up in the present chapter.

Adding a further aspect to our understanding of the term attitude, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggested that an attitude is ‘a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor’ (p. 1, cited by Conner and Armitage in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 261). With the terms ‘favor’ and ‘disfavor’ we are alerted to the either/or that Conner and Armitage noted reflect much current research on the topic. The emerging notion of attitudinal ambivalence, as Conner and Armitage stress, and as we shall soon see, questions this polarization and provides an alternative to such a binary.

Our final consideration with regard to the definitional frame for the term attitude was discussed by Devos (2008, in Crano and Prislin 2008). Devos introduced the important—and rather controversial—distinction that has been made for the past two decades between *explicit* attitudes and *implicit* attitudes. According to Devos, something of a paradigm shift has taken place in the study of attitudes, and the shift is related to the growing body of literature on the notion that: ‘… attitudes operate at two distinct levels. More precisely, evaluations based on controlled or deliberate processes have been distinguished from evaluations operating outside of conscious awareness or control’ (Devos 2008, in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 61).
Devos (2008) has clarified that each of these types of attitudes, namely, implicit and explicit, are further comprised of different aspects. For instance, taking the term *implicit* to denote lack of awareness, at least three distinct types of awareness may be involved: source awareness, content awareness, and impact awareness (Gawronski et al. 2006, cited in Devos, in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 62). Moreover, following Payne (2005, cited in Devos 2008, in Crano and Prislin 2008), the term *control* too has multiple meanings, including accurately describing the environment, and self-regulation.

As we conclude this brief overview of the scope of attitudinal definitions, we turn to the second topic of this chapter, namely ideology, and attempt to provide a sense of how this concept has been construed in the literature.

**Toward a Definition of Ideology**

Traced to the late 1700s, the term ideology originally referred to the science of ideas (i.e., the sociology of knowledge) (Jost 2006, p. 652). Marx and Engels, in *The German Ideology*, employed the term in two different ways: (1) neutrally, that is, ‘any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to explain (or justify) social, economic, or political realities’; and (2) negatively, such that ‘ideology denotes a web of ideas that are distorted, contrary to reality, and subject to ‘false consciousness’’ (Jost 2006, p. 652).

Moving to contemporary times, Jost (2009) has spotlighted the slippery state of the notion of ideology. Going a step further in his wide-ranging definitional analysis of the term, Gerring (1997) rather colorfully suggested that those who make use of the term engage in ‘semantic promiscuity’ (p. 957). Indeed, Gerring provided a sampling of 13 distinct definitions of ideology used in current discourse, and classifies into five approaches (‘operationalization, terminological reshuffling, intellectual history, etiology and multivocality’) the ways in which social scientists have tried to deal with the semantic challenge presented by the word *ideology* (p. 959). In his attempt to identify the true core feature of ideology, Gerring arrived at the notion of coherence, ‘Ideology, at the very least, consists of a set of belief-elements that are bound together, that belong together in a non-random fashion…’ (p. 980). As a final note, Gerring stressed the importance of the notion of context-specificity, that is, of jettisoning the goal of hitting upon a single definition of ideology that suffices across place, purpose, and time.

In seeking a basic definition of ideology, we might consider that of Erikson and Tedin (2003, cited in Jost 2009): ‘a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved’ (Jost 2009, p. 309). As our current inquiry has much to do with collectivities, we consider it important to add the related but specifically socially oriented account of ideology offered by Denzau and North (1994/2000): ‘… ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured’ (p. 24, in Jost et al. 2009,
p. 309). Jost here honed in on the word ‘shared,’ and used it to suggest that a useful way to understand ideology involves investigating the juncture between the needs of individuals and groups and specific ideologies. Thus:

If one accepts that ideology is shared, that it helps to interpret the social world, and that it normatively specifies (or requires) good and proper ways of addressing life’s problems, then it is easy to see how ideology reflects and reinforces what psychologists might refer to as relational...needs and motives. Jost et al. (2009, p. 309)

Such a psychological/social juncture of interpretive and prescriptive values heavily informed the research of BPKP, as we shall see in Chap. 8. Meanwhile, having made a preliminary foray into the rather murky area of attitude and ideology definition, we are ready to consider the provenance of these terms.

Attitudes: The Beginnings

Olson and Kendrick (in Crano and Prislin 2008) posed a question both fundamental to understanding attitudes per se, and fundamental to the inquiry at hand:

Do we naturally dislike people unlike ourselves, or are we carefully taught to hate? If our values, tastes, and opinions come from our parents, peers and society, how do we learn them? Do we consciously choose, as it just happens to be, to have similar political attitudes as our parents, or are we ‘implicitly’ socialized to be like them? (p. 111, italics added)

These questions are highly pertinent to the work of peace programs. By way of answer, the researchers referred to what has been dubbed the ‘ABCs of attitudes,’ namely affect, cognition, and behavior (p. 112). This model, also called the ‘tripartite’ approach, has long served as the main framework of attitude formation research (Zanna and Rempel 1988, p. 112). Nonetheless, we do see in the literature other classifications on attitude formation; for instance, the distinction between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ processes has been offered (Rudman 2004, cited in Olson and Kendrick 2008). Tesser (1993, cited in Olson and Kendrick, in Crano and Prislin 2008), for his part, has suggested an inherited element in attitude formation, while Buss (1989, cited in Olson and Kendrick, in Crano and Prislin 2008) has pointed to an evolutionary origin of some attitudes.

If the traditional ‘theoretical umbrella’ (Olson and Kendrick, in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 118) provided by the tripartite model is by now only one of many ways to look at attitude formation research, we might ask: Is the model wholly unrelated to the other proposed perspectives? Olson and Kendrick answered this question in the negative, pointing out that ‘explicit formation processes lend themselves to more belief-based, cognitive approaches...Implicit processes, on the other hand, tend to be more affective in nature’ (p. 118). They cautioned, however, that we are dealing with a two-way street; that is:

...people often are aware of the emotions that exert influence on their attitudes. Similarly, our beliefs sometimes exist beyond our awareness in ways that influence our attitudes
In other words, implicit and explicit processes can operate in both the ‘heart’ and the ‘head.’ (pp. 118–19)

Olson and Kendrick presented a ‘grand theme,’ which suggests that ‘we are very much the products of the situations in which we find ourselves’ (p. 112). Notwithstanding this conclusion, or, perhaps, precisely because of it, the researchers put forth a call to leave the laboratory and try to understand how attitudes are formed in real-world settings, responding to the abuse, terror, epidemics, and war that is currently sweeping the world’s population. That, of course, is precisely what efforts such as BPKP aim to accomplish.

In their move beyond the traditional structural inquiry of explicit attitudes, Albarraci, Wang, Li and Noguchi (in Crano and Prislin 2008) have reminded us that ‘attitudes have memory and judgment components’ (p. 19). Specifically, the researchers noted that the element of memory concerns ‘representations of the attitude in permanent memory’ while the element of judgment concerns evaluative thoughts produced at a given place and time about an object (p. 19). Albarraci and colleagues here presented three models of the implicit–explicit attitude relation. The first of these concerns a separation between the two types of attitude; the second involves the two types of attitude indicating distinct levels of processing yet not themselves being structurally distinct; and the third entails separate but interactive types of attitude (p. 22). Moreover, the researchers specified that an ‘online’ judgment is reached when evaluative features of an object are considered either spontaneously or explicitly. These processes are deemed ‘configural, associative or reasoned’ (p. 24).

Now that we know something about where attitudes come from, we are ready to ask: Can they be shifted, and, if so, how? In his 2008 review, Forgas (in Crano and Prislin 2008) took up the role of affect with respect to attitude and attitude change. Specifically, he drew our attention to the ‘affective revolution’ that has taken place in attitude research (p. 132), and the preceding longstanding privileging of the cognitive aspect. Reporting findings on persuasive communication with 256 Australian undergraduates (Forgas 2007), Forgas indicated ‘an intriguing possibility that mild negative affect may promote more concrete, accommodative, and ultimately, more successful attitude change strategies in real-life situations’ (p. 147). This notion has significant implications for peace programs. While it is clear from the BPKP findings described in Chap. 8 that some participants heard the program’s persuasive communication with a great deal more than ‘mild’ negative affect, some of the participants did indeed report a mild degree of negative affectivity. Following Forgas (2008), this mild negative affect may actually contribute to achieving the goals of such programs, which certainly include accommodation and real-world attitude change.

Attitude change indeed comes very hard. The related topic of persuasion—or better, resistance to it—was tackled by Tormala (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008). He signaled the swing toward resistance to persuasion research, and suggested that it was prompted by the durability—the very stickiness—of attitudes. Tormala offered a metacognitive frame for making sense of such resistance. This frame,
which he called a ‘resistance appraisals approach,’ indicates that the act of resistance to persuasion is not neutral: rather, it has consequences for one’s attitude. Thus, after individuals resist an attempt at persuasion their original attitude becomes either stronger or weaker. This ‘attitude certainty’ is contingent upon individuals’ perceptions and assessments of their resistance and can further impact on the attitude (p. 230). In the context of peace programs, where persuasive communication is rather ubiquitous, these findings ought to be considered vis-à-vis the potential for weakening, on the one hand, and strengthening, on the other, the attitudes of participants.

**Attitudinal Ambivalence**

As noted above, attitude research has long been marked by a distinct polarity: conventional wisdom has it that one either likes or dislikes, favors or disfavors. Conner and Armitage (in Crano and Prislin 2008), who traced this tendency to Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) work on attitudes, have taken a different tack. After reviewing the scholarship on attitudinal ambivalence, they reported ‘fairly consistent evidence’ of the attitude–behavior relation being moderated by ambivalence, with higher levels of ambivalence associated with weaker attitude–behavior relations (p. 276). Turning to a related topic, namely, the consequences of ambivalence, Conner and Armitage noted that ‘rather than treating ambivalence as a moderator of attitude–behavior relationships, a number of studies have treated ambivalence as a direct predictor of behavior’ (p. 278). The assumption driving this work is that psychological discomfort resulting from increased ambivalence may spur behavior change toward reducing the ambivalence. Armitage and Arden (2008) indeed showed that individuals attempting to change their behavior are more ambivalent about such change than those not performing the behavior (cited in Conner and Armitage 2008). A note of caution was sounded by the researchers, however, when they stated that there has been no evidence to date that behavior change is actually advanced by inducing ambivalence (p. 278).

Walther and Langer (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008) have advanced an evaluative conditioning account of attitude formation and change through association. Countering what they have referred to as the ‘Fishbein and Ajzen ‘1975’ tradition … that attitude formation is confined to cognitive processes’ (p. 87), Walther and colleague provided an alternative to Fishbein and Middlestadt’s (1995) assertion that: ‘… findings indicating that variables other than beliefs and their evaluative aspects contribute to attitude formation and change can best be viewed as methodological artifacts resulting from the use of inappropriate predictors and/or criteria’ (p. 88, italics added). In fact, Walther and Langer marshaled a great deal of evidence for an affect-based attitude account (e.g., Walther and Grigoriadis 2004; Walther 2002) and pointed out that attitudes have been shown to be impacted by even the proximity of a neutral stimulus with affective stimuli.
Moreover, in an attempt to reconcile what we might call the ‘cognitivists’ and the ‘affectivists,’ Walther and Langer (in Crano and Prislin 2008) have proposed that the two research traditions might be honing in on two different phases in attitude formation and change. Thus, the former take belief as a fundament of attitude change, while the latter centers on attitude formation. In any event, the researchers noted, the utility of such a distinction has been placed into question by Walther et al. (2009), who found that attitude change may also be influenced by evaluative conditioning.

Above, we have alluded to the notion that the attitude–behavior relation is a two-way street; that is, while attitudes may shape behavior, at times, behavior shapes attitudes. In their work on processes of cognitive dissonance, Stone and Fernandez (2008) explored this topic, investigating the attitude–behavior relation when ‘people have committed themselves to a position or a course of action, only to realize later that it was the wrong thing to do’ (cited in Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 313). They reference Aronson (1973), who aptly observed that most of us like to consider ourselves rather ‘rational animals;’ yet ‘when faced with undeniable discrepancies, people become rationalizing animals’ (in Crano and Prislin 2008, pp. 314–15, emphasis in original). The researchers added that, in general, the research on the use of hypocrisy to promote prosocial behavior indicates that people tend to change their behavior, rather than their attitudes, following an act of hypocrisy. Strikingly, however, they found an exception to that rule: Fried’s (1998) work on hypocrisy and recycling behavior demonstrated that when confronted publicly with past failure to act on their convictions, shame concerning that past behavior may prompt individuals to justify their errors rather than modify their current actions. As peace programs may well include activities and moments in which participants come to face prior hypocritical behaviors, program designers might take note of the difficulty of achieving behavior change when such realizations come to light under public conditions.

Coming from the attitude–behavior relation from a different angle, namely, the field of communication, Kelman (1958) wrote what became a classic study of attitude change. Kelman asked a fundamental question concerning measured attitude change brought about by a given communication: ‘... did the communication produce public conformity without private acceptance, or did it produce public conformity coupled with private acceptance?’ (p. 51, italics in the original). In Kelman’s view, it was precisely such information on the nature of the attitude change that permits the prediction of future behavior.

Kelman’s research was conducted during a watershed era in US racial legislation: the year 1954, just moments before the US Supreme Court announced its highly controversial decision on public school desegregation. In his study, black college students in a US state that was considered a ‘border’ between the northern and southern parts of the country were exposed to a communication intended to shift their attitudes concerning a topic linked to the upcoming Supreme Court decision. Participants completed post-communication questionnaires aimed at assessing the degree to which they agreed with the communicator. Kelman found that three mediating processes of influence: compliance, identification, and internalization
In other words, influence was accepted in three distinct ways. The first, compliance, has to do with ‘the social effect of accepting influence’ (p. 53, italics in original); the second, identification, concerns taking on a behavior because it is linked to the desired relationship; and the third, internalization, involves adopting behavior that is in line with one’s values. The researcher concluded that in the presence of the necessary antecedents, influence will take the form of one of these three processes.

Kelman suggested that his framework might be applied, for example, in the field of public opinion. There, it could be used to determine conditions likely to result in compliance, identification or internalization and predict future actions linked to attitudes taken under such conditions. Conceiving of programs such as BPKP as self-contained fields of public opinion, designers too might consider the implications of such a framework on their design.

**Attitude Change and Higher Order Needs**

We have touched on several aspects of persuasion and attitude change. Watt et al. (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008) have taken us a step further, addressing attitude *functions* in persuasion. In their view, ‘attitude change occurs to meet a functional need’ (p. 194). From this vantage point, we can gain access to the motivations that may underlie attitudes. Reviewing the relevant literature, the researchers found that ‘value-expressive, ego-defensive, and social-adjustive attitudes’ more likely to prompt defensive message processing than utilitarian attitudes, and that resistance might be mitigated by self-affirmation (p. 207). Stressing that these findings are far from definitive, Watt et al. have pointed toward the possible utility of a more hierarchical model to map the relation of psychological needs and persuasion.

Already in the mid-twentieth century, Adorno et al. (1950) contended, as Jost et al. (2009) has observed, that “a structural unity” exists between underlying psychological needs and ideological manifestations of those needs’ (p. 327). Borrowing the title of Goethe’s (1809/1966) novel *Elective Affinities*, Jost et al. (2009) have begun to explore ‘why certain individuals and groups choose particular constellations of ideas or, similarly, why certain ideologies find deep resonance in the minds of some political actors but not others’ (p. 327). These ‘elective affinities’ as Jost et al. (2009) dub them, stand at the core of our inquiry, as a fuller understanding of them seems to be a prerequisite for reaching our goals of attitude change toward peace.

In this vein, we draw attention to Smith and Hogg’s (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008) interest in the interaction of attitudes and social context. For Smith and Hogg, ‘… our attitudes are rarely idiosyncratic—more often than not they sever to define and proclaim who we are in terms of our relationships to others …’ (p. 337). Drawing on social identity theory, the researchers advance a ‘group-centric
orientation to attitudes’ (p. 338). In this they diverge from decades of scholarship that has taken the individual as the primary unit of analysis. Social identity analyses of attitudes hold that ‘certain attitude effects flow from the perception of knowledge that an attitude is normative of a self-inclusive group with which one identifies’ (p. 342). Yet we do not always assess accurately the status of an attitude with respect to normativity. It is precisely through engagement with others—both passive and active—that we determine such normativity. This engagement will be evident in the praxis-oriented Chap. 8. Furthermore, when considering the design of peace programs, we might do well to heed Smith and Hogg’s comment that:

...people are more likely to behave in line with their attitudes if the attitudes and behaviors are normative of a salient social group with which they strongly identify. The more definitional of the norm the attitudes and behavior are, and the more injunctive the norm itself is, the stronger the likelihood. This idea has implications for collective mobilization...how individual attitudes are transformed into collective action. (p. 351)

Collective action is one possible way to describe the dynamics of programs that aim for attitude change toward convergence. Thus, architects of such programs might take into account the influence of salient group identification on attitude change. Moreover, in their consideration of the interplay between attitudes and social context, Smith and Hogg made explicit mention of the attitude–behavior relation, bringing us to our next major theme, the complex relationship between attitude and behavior.


In his classic—and highly contested—review of attitude–behavior correspondence research, Wicker (1969) suggested an antecedent for the already widespread notion that behavior is determined by attitude:

Most of the investigators whose work we have examined make the broad psychological assumption that since attitudes are evaluative dispositions, they have consequences for the way people act toward others, for the programs they actually undertake, and for the manner in which they carry them out. (Cohen 1964, pp. 137–138, in Wicker 1969, p. 42)

Wicker went on to question the validity of this assumption, adding a wide range of findings to support his stance. He concluded with the sharp suggestion that those who adhere to the notion that evaluating attitudes is a simple way to examine social behaviors ought to substantiate their view with evidence that verbal measures reflect such behaviors.
The Inquiry Continues

In 1970, Ajzen and Fishbein carried out a groundbreaking study on the prediction of behavior from attitudinal and normative variables. The researchers used the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which participants choose between two responses assumed to be in the service of competition, on the one hand, and cooperation, on the other. Ninety-six college students participated in the experiment, one-half of whom were male and one-half female. They found that the experimental manipulations had an effect on the motivational orientation of the participants and on the Cooperation Index of the game, as shown in both game behavior and in a related questionnaire. Strikingly, however, the manipulations did not affect the participant’s attitude toward the other player. Such findings shed important light on the previous failed attempts to base prediction of behavior with respect to an object on attitude toward that object (Ajzen and Fishbein 1970, p. 483; Fishbein 1967). Thus, the authors posited that it is two points, namely (1) attitude toward a related act; and (2) beliefs about the expectations of the other player, which determine one’s actual behavioral intention.

Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1970) results have important ramifications for group deliberations such as those created by BPKP. We now know, then, that demonstrated attitude shifts on the heels of messages of persuasion do not suffice to produce behavioral change. Rather, it is only by influencing an individual’s attitude toward a related act, as well as her attitude toward the expectations of the other person, that behavioral intention may budge, thus producing behavioral change.

A decade after Wicker’s ‘pessimistic review,’ as it was referred to by Davidson and Jaccard (1979), researchers had far from given up on the idea that action is linked to attitude. For instance, with contraceptive and childbearing behaviors as their focus, Davidson and Jaccard studied the variables that moderate the attitude–behavior relation. Two hundred and seventy white, married women between the ages of 18 and 38 participated in this three-wave, 2-year longitudinal study. The Fishbein (1963) model of behavioral intentions was used as the frame for the study’s selection of belief and attitudinal measures. Consistent with their hypotheses, the following factors moderated the attitude–behavior relation: (1) behavioral sequence to be completed prior to the behavior; (2) time elapsed between attitude measurement and behavior; (3) change in attitude; (4) participant’s educational level; and (5) correspondence between behavioral and attitudinal variable (Davidson and Jaccard 1979, p. 1364). Countering Wicker, the researchers concluded that normative beliefs, attitudes, and intentions predict quite accurately married women’s fertility and contraceptive behavior.

Moving forward a further decade, Kraus (1995) registered the ‘crisis’ (p. 4) that Wicker’s (1969) research had prompted, and pointed out that the apparent poor correspondence between attitudes and behaviors was subsequently explained by a spate of studies that showed either poor methodology or moderator variables accounting for the inconsistencies. An ‘era of optimism’ (p. 4) concerning attitude–behavior correlations ensued, which nonetheless was marked by a lack of consensus.
concerning the magnitude of these relations. In an attempt to gain a more accurate picture, Kraus (1995) did a meta-analysis of 83 attitude-behavior consistency studies. Taking into account Ozer’s (1983) remark that effect size seemed to have long been inaccurately indicated due to the once standard method of interpreting by squaring them to arrive at proportion variance, the researchers found that attitudes indeed ‘substantially and significantly predict future behavior’ (p. 7).

In a still later move to attain greater precision with regard to the attitude–behavior relation, Sutton (1998) performed a meta-analysis on studies that used the theory of reasoned behavior (TRB; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB; Ajzen 1998). He found that the models account for between 40 and 50% of intention variance and between 19 and 38% of behavior variance. (p. 1333). Sutton stressed that the assessment of the predictive power of the models is highly dependent on the comparison standard. In other words, in comparison to some ideal of explaining 100% of variance, TRA and TPB perform poorly; yet if the comparison were to be made with the typical effect size in the behavioral sciences, the performance would appear much better (Sutton 1998, p. 1334).

Despite such a shift in research direction, Wicker’s disappointing assessment of the attitude-behavior correspondence continues to reverberate in the scholarship. Bassili (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008) commented on the degree to which it has disturbed the field of social psychology, and used it to set the stage for his the idea that attitude strength is at the heart of the issue.

Affirming that the concept of attitude strength has amassed multiple labels, Bassili presented as highly useful Krosnick and Petty’s (1995) conceptualization, which highlights the attributes of impact, on the one hand, and durability, on the other. He found that this notion, comprised of the effect of attitude strength on feelings, behaviors and thoughts, resistance to attack, and stability is an excellent ‘benchmark for evaluating the antecedents and consequences of various strength constructs’ (p. 255). Furthermore, Bassili suggested that positioning well-conceptualized attitude strength at the core of contemporary attitude-behavior inquiries may help to reconcile evidence and common observation, thus conclusively allaying the concerns evoked by Wicker’s unsettling review.

**Attitude–Behavior (in)Consistency in Prosocial Domains**

The attitude–behavior relationship has been shown to be inconsistent in prosocial donation domains (Anker et al. 2010). As a moderator of this relationship, these researchers proposed *vested interest* (Sivacek and Crano 1982). The term *vested interest* has been defined by Crano (1995) as ‘the extent to which an attitude object is hedonically relevant for the attitude holder’ (p. 132, in Anker et al. 2010, p. 1296). From the point of view of this theory, attitude–behavior congruence is at its peak when actors have a personal interest in outcome (Anker et al. 2010). Prediction of behavior is not at issue with the theory of vested interest; instead, the
theory holds that vested interest moderates attitude and behavior. Anker et al. (2010) Study 1 found a three-point structure for vested interest (e.g., self-efficacy, salience and stake); while their Study 2 failed to find support for vested interest as an attitude-behavior relation moderator, it did find that such relationship was mediated by self-efficacy (p. 1296). Below, we consider the attitude-behavior relation in a different domain, namely, health.

**Attitude–Behavior (in)Consistency in Health Domains**

Ajzen and Timko (1986) tackled the health attitudes and behavior correspondence. In their study, 113 undergraduates (42 males, 71 females) filled out a questionnaire that evaluated global, as well as specific, attitudes toward health and illness relating to 24 health-related behaviors. Their findings were in line with previous research that predictability of health behavior depended on measurement correspondence, and that attitudes about suggested health practices correlated with the aggregate, multiple-act measure of health behavior (p. 1). The researchers made particular note of the latter finding, in as much as it ‘was true of an affective judgment concerning enjoyment or displeasure associated with performance of health practices but not of a more cognitive evaluation of the desirability of engaging in health-related activities’ (p. 1). In other words, they found that more than evaluative measures of attitude, affective measures predicted health behavior. Pertinent to our overall inquiry, Abelson et al. (1982, in Ajzen and Timko 1986) described comparable results in the political domain.

In their study, Conner et al. (2013) considered cognitive attitudes, affective attitudes, anticipated affect and blood donation. Extending Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action/theory of planned behavior (TRA/TPB), which posits that behavior results from intentions, themselves the products of norms, perceived behavioral control, and attitudes, Conner and colleagues highlight the impact of affect on blood donation intentions and behavior. Countering the distinctly cognitive focus of TRA/TPB, they reported that anticipated negative affective reactions are the strongest of four examined attitude predictors of actions and intentions after controlling for TPB predictors. Or, as frankly put by the researchers ‘some feelings may be more important than others in determining intentions and behaviors’ (Conner et al. 2013, p. 8).

While Conner et al. (2013) were spotlighting a health-related issue, namely blood donation intentions and behaviors, their findings may have implications for programs such as the BPKP. Our data indicates an enormous amount of anticipated negative affective reactions experienced by BPKP participants, particularly Palestinian ones (Chap. 8 of this volume). In light of recent research, then, we might predict that such anticipated negative affective reactions will impact on participants moving from intention to behavior, even if such a program succeeds in its goals of cognitively promoting convergence.
State of the Science

By the end of the 2000s, Ajzen and Cote (2008) had asserted firmly that, construed as an inclination to respond favorably or unfavorably to a psychological object, attitudes are both important and useful in predicting human social behavior. This statement was not made without caveats, however. Hence, they were equally unequivocal in their view that:

…a strong relation between attitudes and behavior cannot be taken for granted. Global attitudes can help us understand general patterns of behavior, but they are usually poor predictors of specific behavior with respect to the object of the attitude. This is true whether explicit or implicit methods are used to assess global attitudes. (p. 305)

Continuing along these lines, Schultz et al. (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008) investigated how normative beliefs function as agents of influence. They zeroed in on five conventional truths about social norms, namely: (1) normative beliefs are produced by social interaction only; (2) normative beliefs affect behavior only when they are associated with a close reference group; (3) normative beliefs impact on behavior only under conditions of ambiguity; (4) normative beliefs affect only public behavior; and (5) individuals are aware of when they have been influenced by normative data (p. 388). Reviewing the literature, Schultz and colleagues concluded that while behavior can indeed be influenced by normative beliefs, the direction and strength of this effect can be moderated (Rimal et al. 2005, cited in Schultz et al. in Crano and Prislin 2008). Specifically, normative social influence effects have been moderated by how one’s behavior diverges from the norm, in-group/out-group normative data, and norm salience. Moreover, widely accepted truths concerning ambiguous situations and public/private behavior have been demonstrated to be inconsistent moderators.

Improving Attitude–Behavior Correspondence

Designers of peace programs aim for attitude change toward convergence, which includes the goal of corresponding behavior change toward convergence. Yet we have read above that attitude change, on the one hand, and behavior change, on the other, do not necessarily shift in harmony. This raises the question: How do we heighten attitude–behavior consistency? White et al. (2002) attempted to do so by providing exposure to normative support from a salient in-group. In their study, 160 college students (Experiment 1) and 180 college students (Experiment 2) with ‘a more or less certain target attitude were exposed to attitude congruent versus incongruent normative support from a relevant reference group … under conditions of low versus high group salience’ (p. 91). The researchers found improved attitude–behavior correspondence received normative support for their attitude from an ingroup. This effect was also found, although somewhat less strongly, under conditions of high- versus low salience.
White et al. (2002) remarked that their findings have significance for the design of programs in which positive attitudes translate to desirable behavioral outcomes, as well as the design of meetings wherein participants might be reminded of their group membership, thus enhancing desired attitude–behavior consistency. Such data could indeed be useful in programs that wish to use BPKP (discussed later) as a model.

In his meta-analysis discussed above, Sutton (1998) offered several suggestions for improving the intention–behavior correspondence. These include (1) measuring intentions after and not before decisions have been made; (2) employing intention and behavior measures that are compatible, based on multiple indicators for high reliability; and (3) if multi-item scales cannot be used, the effects of varying degrees of reliability on the findings ought to be examined (p. 1334).

Anker et al.’s (2010) above-mentioned work may have implications for programs such as BPKP. To recall, they found that stake ‘I would feel good about myself,’ salience ‘I frequently spend time thinking about …’ and self-efficacy ‘I am able to overcome any negative feelings I might have about …’ comprised the tripartite base for vested interest moderating the correspondence between attitude and behavior (pp. 1322–23). Taking Anker et al. (2010) prosocial donation domain as a frame, we might suggest that program coordinators encourage efficacy beliefs pertaining to peace in participants through their program design. Thus, rather than concentrating directly on attitude change, programs interested in promoting convergence for peace would target relevant self-efficacy beliefs.

The above-noted studies take measurement as a crucial piece of the attitude–behavior relation puzzle. Below, we briefly review research that further foregrounds this issue.

**Attitude Measurement**

Devos (in Crano and Prislin 2008) set out clearly the main goal of attitude measurement:

A central aim of measuring attitudes is to predict behavior’ (p. 74).

This simple-sounding endeavor, however, is far from simple to implement. In fact, Crano and Prislin (2008) have gone so far as to call the ‘search for evaluations unadulterated by mundane extraneous factors’ the ‘Holy Grail’ of social psychology (p. 5).

An intriguing slant on attitude measurement was offered by Schwarz (2008) (in Crano and Prislin 2008). After surveying a wide range of attitude measurement techniques including both implicit and explicit measures, the researcher summed up by stressing the strong context-dependency of attitude reports. He went on to propose a promising reframing of the situation:
To date, attitude research has predominantly taken the observer’s perspective, deploring the context ‘dependency’ of attitude reports, which presumably obscures the actor’s ‘true’ attitude. Once we adopt the actor’s perspective, deplorable context ‘dependency turns into laudable context ‘sensitivity.’ If so, there may be more to be learned from exploring the dynamics of context sensitive evaluation than from ever more sophisticated attempts to discover a person’s ‘true’ enduring attitude—attempts that have so far mostly resulted in a reiteration of the same basic lesson: evaluations are context sensitive. Such a shift…would require a methodological approach to attitude measurement that focuses on evaluation-in-context. (Ferguson and Bargh 2007; Schwartz 2007, cited in Schwartz, in Prislin and Crano 2008, pp. 56–57)

Furthermore, research on attitude measurement is intrinsically linked to research on attitude content. For instance, in the context of the above-mentioned ‘Holy Grail’ of research (Crano and Prislin 2008), Devos (in Crano and Prislin 2008) wrote that it was precisely the pitfalls of self-report measures that induced a research push for implicit attitude research. Yet reviewing the consequent literature, Devos concluded that this inquiry has much to recommend it, over and above the capacity of indirect measures ‘to bypass social desirability, impression management, or demand characteristics’ (p. 78). Specifically:

Attitudes, evaluations, and preferences are shaped by a myriad of psychosocial processes marked by a lack of conscious awareness, control, intention, or self-reflection… Refinements in the conceptualization of implicit attitudes have been proposed. Various factors that play a role in the development of implicit attitudes have been identified. The emphasis on disassociations between implicit and explicit attitudes has given way to a more thorough understanding of the circumstances under which implicit and explicit attitudes converge or diverge. The idea that implicit attitudes are fixed or rigid entities has been shown to be untenable and firmer theoretical accounts of contextual influences on implicit attitudes are starting to emerge. (pp. 78–79)

Thus, from the effort to improve attitude measurement we see a diverse, deep and broad enhancement of our grasp of implicit attitudes and their implications. No longer conceived of as unchangeable constructions with little or no relation to either explicit attitudes or the world at large, implicit attitudes are coming into their own as an object of scholarly scrutiny (Devos, in Crano and Prislin 2008). Research in general, and that research which emerges from the laboratory and enters the complexity of life, in particular, deals critically with such attitudes—those that lie beyond the conscious awareness.

**Putting the Pieces Together: Organization of Political Attitudes**

As we move to our third topic, the interaction of ideology and attitudes, we shall consider Federico’s (2009) study on evaluative motivation, expertise, and ideology. Diverging from prevailing theories that spotlight the reliance on political expertise for individuals organizing their political attitudes (e.g., Converse 2000, cited in
Federico (2009) contended that motivation features strongly in such attitudinal structuring, discussing what he has termed, ‘evaluative motivation.’ The novelty of Federico’s (2009) approach can be appreciated when we recall that a great deal of scholarship has taken the employment of ideology to be an informational problem (para. 6). That is, it is widely expected that in the presence of sufficient information, individuals will organize their political attitudes. Yet the researcher notes a gap in the literature on how the needs of an individual shape how this expert information is used to make such assessments. Thus: ‘… the actual application of ideology may depend not just on expertise but also on citizens being motivated to evaluate political objects as good or bad. […] Evaluative motivation should have critical effects on the process by which attitude responses occur’ (Federico 2009, para. 9). Federico here mined data from three large surveys of the 1998 American National Election Study (ANES), the 2000 ANES, and the 2004 ANES. Countering previous research that theorized ideology mostly as an informational process, he found evidence that political attitudes are organized through an interactive process entailing the motivation to use expertise.

Idea as ‘Hot Cognition’

We continue in the mode of ideology and motivation. In the context of their research on political conservatism as ‘motivated social cognition,’ Jost et al. (2003) have advanced the notion of ideology as ‘hot cognition’ (p. 341). In this respect, ‘motivated social cognition’ makes several assumptions: the first of these is that the adoption of belief systems is related to the fulfillment of emotional needs. Furthermore, as there is no motivational vacuum, commitment to principles occurs in the context of a range of essentially unavoidable social and personal motivations. This can easily yield an ideological attitude that is motivationally driven and principled at one and the same time. Against this backdrop, Jost et al. (2003) have distinguished ‘hot cognitive’ approaches, that is, those that foreground the influence of motivation and affect on reasoning, decision-making and memory, from ‘cold cognitive’ approaches, which privilege information processing over motivation as a determinant of social judgment. For Jost et al. ‘Ideology is perhaps the quintessential example of hot cognition, in that people are highly motivated to perceive the world in ways that satisfy their needs, values, and prior epistemic commitments’ (Abelson 1995, cited in Jost et al. 2003, p. 341).

Crucially important for the work of BPKP and related programs, Jost et al. (2003) view the impact of motivation, on the one hand, and informational processing, on the other, as not only potentially compatible, but intrinsically so. For them, belief formation nearly inevitably entails both factors (although each performs a distinct function). Below, we continue the inquiry concerning ideology and cognitive processes in belief/attitude formation.
Ideology and Cognitive Processes in Attitude Formation

Castelli and Carraro (2011) studied ideology and cognitive processes involved in attitude formation. Two hundred thirty-four undergraduate students (194 females) participated in a study using as a framework the *illusory correlation* modeled by Hamilton and colleagues (Hamilton and Gifford 1976). Castelli et al. (2010) examined whether the salience of rare negative behaviors performed by numerical minority groups is further heightened among perceivers with a conservative worldview. Social conservatism was found to impact on both memory for minority group negative behaviors and on the assessment of such a group. As we shall see, such perceptual issues are highly pertinent to peacework initiatives such as BPKP. We now move to a consideration of how attitude change and ideology is impacted by the communication strategy of *deliberation*.

In a study that looked at the effects of face-to-face deliberation on ideology and attitude change, Gastil et al. (2008) built on previous research that reported post-deliberation aggregate changes in participants’ political beliefs (e.g., Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Gastil and Levine 2005). Gastil et al. (2008) had 57 groups discuss three public policy issues for between thirty and sixty minutes, completing both pre- and post-discussion questionnaires. Extending the body of literature, they found that group-level characteristics impacted on individual-level shifts in attitude. Specifically, they identified that self-reported measures of conscientiousness, extroversion and deliberation were positively correlated with within-group variance in attitude shift.

Gastil et al.’s (2008) finding has significant implications for any group deliberation that aims to improve convergence. Of course, the goal is not to cherry-pick one’s participants. Rather, the idea is to identify particular tendencies found among group members, and to leverage these inclinations in the service of the program. In the words of the researchers:

Designers of deliberative forums are unlikely to select participants based on personality traits, nor should they consider doing such a thing; however, this finding suggests that an effective event organizer might seek to draw out the more extraverted and conscientious tendencies in participants. After all, traits such as these exist in people to varying degrees—not in a binary present/absent manner. Moreover, the findings reported herein occurred at the group level, and these traits can be conceptualized as a group resource (e.g., the conscientious member who keeps the whole group on track). (Gastil et al. 2008, p. 39)

The BPKP program was exemplary in this respect, as demonstrated in Chap. 8. In multiple meetings, across Knowledge Exchange Forums (KEFs) and Learning Events (LEs), participants engaged in activities that tapped directly into such a vein of group extroversion, toward the goal of convergence.
Conclusion

Where can we go from here? To a certain extent, Jost et al. (2009) pulled it all together when they concluded that ‘ideology can play an important role as a system-serving bundle of attitudes, values and beliefs’ (p. 327). Yet does that leave us stranded high and dry, impervious to change in social relations? Perhaps not. For these researchers, while system-serving beliefs, attitudes and values are pervasive, they are infrequently totalizing. Thus, at least some shift can be hoped for—and sought—in such relations.

In this vein, Albarracin et al. (2008) asserted that attitudes are often ‘at the heart’ (Crano and Prislin 2008, p. 19) of violent acts—as well as at the core of actions geared toward the well-being of others. This is a significant assessment, and one that has direct bearing on our broader inquiry. If attitudes—bundled as they may be in ideologies—assume such a pivotal position in the structure of human relations, the voluminous scholarship on their definition, formation, measurement, intersection with behaviors, and change potential, a sample of which we have reviewed above, is highly justified. Looking ahead to the rest of the current volume, we might say, borrowing from Jost et al. (2009) that understanding the ‘elective affinities’ of the BPKP participants in particular and of Palestinians and Israelis in general is crucial to the effort of reaching some sort of peace in this region of resolute violence. Toward this end, we proceed to an examination of the nature of conflict itself.

References


Building Peace Through Knowledge
The Israeli-Palestinian Case
Al-Krenawi, A.
2017, XIII, 144 p. 1 illus. in color., Hardcover
ISBN: 978-3-319-56278-0