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Business & Management - Operations Research & Decision Theory | Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Çetiner, Demet

2013, XV, 168 p. 27 illus.

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  • ​Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances
  • Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods
  • Includes comprehensive surveys on the related subjects  
​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Content Level » Research

Keywords » Airline Alliance - Fairness - Game Theory - Revenue Management - Revenue Sharing

Related subjects » Applications - Game Theory / Mathematical Methods - Operations Research & Decision Theory - Production & Logistics

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