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Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory

  • Book
  • © 1992

Overview

Authors:
  1. Hans J. M. Peters

    1. Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, The Netherlands

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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C (TDLC, volume 9)

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Table of contents (11 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x
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  2. Preliminaries

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 1-11

  3. Nash bargaining solutions

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 13-45

  4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 47-61

  5. Monotonicity properties

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 63-92

  6. Additivity properties

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 93-105

  7. Risk properties

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 107-123

  8. Bargaining with a variable number of players

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 125-134

  9. Alternative models and solution concepts

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 135-168

  10. Noncooperative models for bargaining solutions

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 169-192

  11. Solutions for coalitional bargaining games

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 193-206

  12. Elements from utility theory

    • Hans J. M. Peters
    Pages 207-219

  13. Back Matter

    Pages 221-241
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Keywords

About this book

Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure.
Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach.
The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, The Netherlands

    Hans J. M. Peters

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