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- Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 635)
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About this book
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.
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Table of contents (4 chapters)
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Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Decision-Making in Committees
Book Subtitle: Game-Theoretic Analysis
Authors: Nicola Friederike Maaser
Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2
Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
eBook Packages: Business and Economics, Economics and Finance (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-642-04152-5Published: 04 February 2010
eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-04153-2Published: 22 January 2010
Series ISSN: 0075-8442
Series E-ISSN: 2196-9957
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XXII, 126
Number of Illustrations: 26 b/w illustrations
Topics: Game Theory, Political Science, European Integration