From Reasons to Norms

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiv

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 1-9

3. The Humean Notion of Practical Reasons

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 11-25

4. The Moral Notion of Practical Reason

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 27-40

5. In Defence of Moral Realism

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 41-58

6. Some Consequences of Moral Realism

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 59-74

7. Reasons from Prudence and Rationality

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 75-94

8. Reasons from Justice and Aesthetics

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 95-103

9. Reasons to Believe

   • Torbjörn Tännsjö

   Pages 105-123

10. Reasons to Desire

    • Torbjörn Tännsjö

    Pages 125-149

11. Conclusion

    • Torbjörn Tännsjö

    Pages 151-158

12. Back Matter

    Pages 159-165

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Metaethics is the inquiry into the nature of morality (or ethics, I use the words ‘morality’, ‘morals’, and ‘ethics’ as synonyms). When we pass moral judgements, what kind of claims are we then making? I speak of this as the semantic metaethical question. a re there moral facts, to be discovered by us and existing independently of our thoughts and conceptualisation? I speak of this as the ontological or me- physical metaethical question. a nd, if there are, can we know about them; and, if we can, how do we get this kind of knowledge? I speak of this as the epistemic metaethical question. a ll these metaethical questions, the semantic, the ontological, and the epistemic ones, are raised and discussed in this book, but they are not the core questions raised. I have been more concerned with another kind of questions, which deserve to be called metaethical as well: what are the problems of morality? a re there many different moral questions, or, do they all, in the final analysis, reduce to only a few, or perhaps just one? t his question is of special importance to a non-naturalist objectivist and realist like the present author, who believes that we do make truth-claims when we pass moral judgements and who believes that there is a truth in these matters so that we must face the possibility that even our most cherished moral judgements may be false.

• Metaethics
• Norms
• Reasons
• ethics
• moral judgements
• morality
• normativity

• Dept. Philosophy, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

  Torbjörn Tännsjö

Policies and ethics