A Theory of Social Action

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Philosophy and the Theory of Social Action

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 1-16

3. Individualism and Concept Formation in the Social Sciences

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 17-54

4. Theories of Action

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 55-78

5. The Purposive-Causal Theory of Human Action

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 79-110

6. The Structure of Social Action

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 111-158

7. Action Generation

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 159-196

8. Practical Inference and Social Action

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 197-235

9. Norms, Roles, and Social Structures

   • Raimo Tuomela

   Pages 236-268

10. Social Interaction and Control

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 269-311

11. A Pragmatic Theory of Explanation

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 312-344

12. Proximate Explanation of Social Action

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 345-387

13. Dynamic Explanation of Social Action

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 388-429

14. Functional and Invisible Hand Explanation of Social Action

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 430-454

15. Explanatory Individualism and Explanation of Social Laws

    • Raimo Tuomela

    Pages 455-475

16. Back Matter

    Pages 500-534

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It is somewhat surprising to find out how little serious theorizing there is in philosophy (and in social psychology as well as sociology) on the nature of social actions or joint act. hons in the sense of actions performed together by several agents. Actions performed by single agents have been extensively discussed both in philosophy and in psycho~ogy. There is, ac­ cordingly, a booming field called action theory in philosophy but it has so far strongly concentrated on actions performed by single agents only. We of course should not forget game theory, a discipline that systematically studies the strategic interac­ tion between several rational agents. Yet this important theory, besides being restricted to strongly rational acting, fails to study properly several central problems related to the concep­ tual nature of social action. Thus, it does not adequately clarify and classify the various types of joint action (except perhaps from the point of view of the agents' utilities). This book presents a systematic theory of social action. Because of its reliance on so-called purposive causation and generation it is called the purposive-causal theory. This work also discusses several problems related to the topic of social action, for instance that of how to create from this perspective the most central concepts needed by social psychology and soci­ ology. While quite a lot of ground is covered in the book, many important questions have been left unanswered and many others unasked as well.

• action theory
• concept
• game theory
• grammar
• individual
• intention
• interaction
• nature
• philosophy
• psychology
• realism
• reason
• sociology
• structure
• style

`This is a good book - rich, subtle, sophisticated, penetrating, original, and wide-ranging.'
The Philosophical Review (July 1986)

• Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland

  Raimo Tuomela

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