Global Problems and Common Security

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XI

   PDF

2. Strategic Nuclear Disarmament

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

      PDF

   2. Deep Cuts in Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Possible? Desirable?

      • Richard Garwin

      Pages 2-13

   3. A Comprehensive Test-Ban Verification Regime: Implications of Cooperative Measures in INF and START

      • Jeremy Leggett

      Pages 14-21

   4. Soviet-American Collaboration on Seismic Monitoring

      • Mikhail Gokhberg

      Pages 22-24

   5. Threshold Limits on Anti-Missile Systems

      • John Pike

      Pages 25-33

3. Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 35-35

      PDF

   2. Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hopes and Realities

      • Esmat Ezz

      Pages 36-45

   3. Prevention of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

      • Valerii Davydov

      Pages 46-51

   4. Revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

      • Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam

      Pages 52-60

   5. A Strategy to Stop the Spread of Fissile Material

      • Harold Feiveson

      Pages 61-69

4. Nuclear and Conventional Forces

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 71-71

      PDF

   2. The Links Between Nuclear and Conventional Forces

      • Jean Klein

      Pages 72-78

   3. Nuclear Forces and Their Relation to Conventional Armaments

      • Mikhail Milstein

      Pages 79-85

   4. Restructuring Conventional Forces in Defensive Modes

      • Peter Deak

      Pages 86-92

   5. Interaction Between Nuclear and Conventional Arms-Control Measures (Report on a Pugwash Workshop, June 1988)

      • John Holdren

      Pages 93-96

5. Prevention of Chemical Warfare

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 97-97

      PDF

   2. International Machinery for Monitoring a Chemical Weapons Convention

      • Ronald G. Sutherland

      Pages 98-104

   3. Adequacy Versus Feasibility in the Scope of the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention

      • Julian Perry Robinson

      Pages 105-111

   4. Chemical Disarmament: Reliable and Efficient Control

      • Kirill Babievsky, Nikolai Enikolopov

      Pages 112-116

After many years of sterile arms control negotiations between the super powers, which did not produce a single genuine disarmament measure - and sometimes had the opposite effect of stimulating the development of new weapons to serve as bargaining chips - an agreement to abolish completely two categories of nu­ clear weapons, the INF Treaty, was signed and is now being implemented. This historical event, the first actual destruction of deployed nuclear missiles (although not of their warheads) became possible largely because of the radical changes in the policies of the Soviet Union, the "new way of thinking", ad­ vanced by its leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The relaxation of tension that resulted from this policy was one of the factors contributing to the successful conclu­ sion of the INF Treaty. Another, no less important factor, was the acceptance by the Soviet Union of on-site inspections as a basic element of a verification system essential to ensure compliance with the Treaty. This breakthrough led to the mutual acceptance of an elaborate and precise verification regime, and thus made possible the signing of the INF Treaty, which in tum contributed to the further lessening of tension between East and West. But perhaps the most important factor, one which carries much promise for the future, was the changed approach to security problems.

• Dritte Welt
• Kernwaffen
• Rüstungskontrolle
• Umweltprobleme
• degradation
• environment
• iron
• konventionelle und chemische Waffen
• stability

• Pugwash, Flat A, Museum Mansions, London, UK

  Josef Rotblat

• Institute of Chemical Physics, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, USSR

  Vitalii I. Goldanskii

Policies and ethics