Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

  • Book
  • © 2011

Overview

Editors:
  1. Norman Schofield

    1. Center in Political Economy, Washington University in St.-Louis, Saint Louis, USA

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Gonzalo Caballero

    1. , Faculty of Economics, University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Presents latest research in the field of Political Economy

  • Focuses on topics such as war and the formation of states, analysis of corruption

  • Provides new techniques for analysing elections, including the connection between game-theoretic and empirical methods

  • Offers a comparison of developed and new democracies, and of elections under plurality and proportional rule

  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (17 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-ix
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    • Norman Schofield, Gonzalo Caballero
    Pages 1-10

  3. Institutions

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 11-11
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?

      • Avner Greif, Christopher Kingston
      Pages 13-43

    3. War, Wealth and the Formation of States

      • Carles Boix, Bruno Codenotti, Giovanni Resta
      Pages 45-74

    4. Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation?

      • Desiree A. Desierto, John V. C. Nye
      Pages 75-94

    5. Self-Enforcing, Public-Order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050–1350

      • Yadira González de Lara
      Pages 95-117

    6. Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937–1960

      • Alfred W. Darnell, Sunita Parikh
      Pages 119-135

    7. Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics

      • Fernando Toboso
      Pages 137-156

    8. Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)

      • Gonzalo Caballero
      Pages 157-184

    9. Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable?

      • Ignacio Urquizu-Sancho
      Pages 185-213

  4. Democracy and Voting

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 215-215
      Download chapter PDF

    2. Empirical and Formal Models of the United States Presidential Elections in 2000 and 2004

      • Norman Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Maria Gallego, Ugur Ozdemir
      Pages 217-258

    3. Modelling Elections in Post-Communist Regimes: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists

      • Norman Schofield, JeeSeon Jeon, Marina Muskhelishvili, Ugur Ozdemir, Margit Tavits
      Pages 259-301

    4. Electoral Systems and Party Responsiveness

      • Lawrence Ezrow
      Pages 303-325

    5. Electoral Institutions and Political Corruption: Ballot Structure, Electoral Formula, and Graft

      • Daniel Max Kselman
      Pages 327-371

    6. A Model of Party Entry in Parliamentary Systems with Proportional Representation

      • Daniel M. Kselman, Joshua A. Tucker
      Pages 373-388

    7. Moving in Time: Legislative Party Switching as Time-Contingent Choice

      • Carol Mershon, Olga Shvetsova
      Pages 389-402

    8. On the Distribution of Particularistic Goods

      • Jon X. Eguia, Antonio Nicolò
      Pages 403-410

    9. Vote Revelation: Empirical Content of Scoring Rules

      • Andrei Gomberg
      Pages 411-417
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

This book presents the latest research  in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory.

The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies.

 

Editors and Affiliations

  • Center in Political Economy, Washington University in St.-Louis, Saint Louis, USA

    Norman Schofield

  • , Faculty of Economics, University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain

    Gonzalo Caballero

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation